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Beyond the Poverty Line: Measuring South's Poor

OWEN COVINGTON, Master's student, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, UNC-Chapel Hill

Census figures show the South once again has the highest average poverty of the nation's four major regions. In the South, 12.5 percent of the population last year lived in poverty, compared to 11.9 percent in the West, 10.3 percent in the Northeast and 9.5 percent in the Midwest.

And yet, the South's 12.5 percent poverty rate was a drop of 0.6 of a percentage point from the previous year and a drop of 4.6 percentage points from 1993. The 2000 poverty rate represented an historic low.

These figures are based on the Census poverty thresholds of \$8,959 in income for an individual under the age of 65 and an income of \$17,463 for a family of four with two adult members.

Nationally, the poverty level dropped 0.5 of a percentage point from the previous year to 11.3 percent, which the Census Bureau reported was statistically equal to the record low of 11.1 percent set in 1973.

While the downward trend in the South and across

the nation is encouraging, there is a significant population of working individuals and families in the region employed in low-wage jobs that produce incomes below or just above the poverty line. These individuals and families, called the working poor or working near-poor depending upon on which side of the poverty line they fall, constitute an economic subset often difficult to quantify.

A means for estimating how many people fall into the categories of working poor and working near-poor is to look at how many people in the South receive the earned income tax credit (EITC). The federal government established the EITC to help reduce the tax burden of qualifying individuals and families, with the credit often resulting in a refund. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted earned income tax credits, but no Southern state has followed their lead.

The national EITC effectively brings many recipients

SEE **POVERTY** ON PAGE 3 →

In This Issue

- 1 Beyond the Poverty Line: Measuring South's Poor
- 2 A Political Pattern or Happenstance?
- 3 Battle for Control of U.S. Senate Has Southern Focus in 2002
- 4 Job-Approval Ratings Provide One Sign of Vulnerability
- 5 National Survey Shows Half-Century Trend Away From Democrats
- 6 With Divided Senate, the Cost of Close Southern Races Will Continue to Rise
- 8 The 2001 Elections in Virginia
- 9 While Redistricting Gives South More Clout, Some States Are Still Losing
- 9 Southern States Continue to Work Through Redistricting
- 10 The Camelot Index in Southern States
- 12 Publisher's Note

Working Near-Poor in the South

STATE	EITC RECIPIENTS	PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION RECEIVING EITC	REPORTED POVERTY LEVELS (Census 1998-2000 average)	WORKING NEAR-POOR
				(% population that are EITC recipients and are living above poverty level)
ALABAMA	1,150,382	25.9%	14.6%	11.3%
ARKANSAS	635,647	23.8%	15.8%	8.0%
FLORIDA	3,215,879	20.1%	12.1%	8.0%
GEORGIA	1,889,372	23.1%	12.6%	10.5%
KENTUCKY	764,720	18.9%	12.5%	6.4%
LOUISIANA	1,309,997	29.3%	18.6%	10.7%
MISSISSIPPI	937,940	33.0%	15.5%	17.5%
NORTH CAROLINA	1,623,297	20.2%	13.2%	7.0%
OKLAHOMA	704,172	20.4%	14.1%	6.3%
SOUTH CAROLINA	966,365	24.1%	11.9%	12.2%
TENNESSEE	1,224,328	21.5%	13.3%	8.2%
TEXAS	5,268,818	25.3%	14.9%	10.4%
VIRGINIA	1,109,676	15.7%	8.1%	7.6%
WEST VIRGINIA	338,401	18.7%	15.8%	2.9%
SOUTHERN AVERAGE		22.9%	13.8%	9.1%
U.S. AVERAGE		17.3%	11.3%	6.0%

SOURCES: *Poverty in the United States: 2000*, United States Census Bureau; Center On Budget and Policy Priorities

A Political Pattern or Happenstance?

THAD BEYLE, Pearsall Professor of Political Science, UNC-Chapel Hill

Over the past 13 years an interesting political pattern has been developing across the Southern states. It is a three-step pattern that we have seen following the 1988 through 1996 presidential elections, and we are two-thirds of the way into seeing it occur once again following the 2000 presidential election.

There are the three steps to the pattern. First is the presidential election that sets the stage for the following steps. Next are the two off-year gubernatorial elections in New Jersey and Virginia held in the year immediately following the presidential election. Finally are the many off-year elections for governor and U.S. senator held two years following the presidential election.

The pattern has worked in this manner. In the New Jersey and Virginia governors' races in the year following the presidential election, the winning candidates are members of the opposite party than the president's party. After Republican George H.W. Bush won the presidency in 1988, New Jersey and Virginia elected Democratic governors. In the two presidential elections won by Democrat Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1996, New Jersey and Virginia elected Republican governors. Now in 2001, we saw two Democrats win the New Jersey and Virginia governors' races after Republican George W. Bush won the presidency in 2000.

Then in the gubernatorial elections held two years after the presidential election, the winning governors in the Southern states also tend to be members of the opposite party than the president. In 1990, two years after the GHW Bush 1988 presidential victory, seven Democrats won the governorship in Southern states,

compared to only two Republicans. In the 1994 and 1998 elections, two years after the 1992 and 1996 Clinton wins, Republicans won five governorships to the Democrats' three wins each year. If the pattern holds, Democrats can expect to win a majority of the eight gubernatorial seats up in 2002.

The U.S. senatorial races don't quite follow the pattern as clearly as the gubernatorial races did. In the 1990 U.S. Senate races, Democrats did win more races, seven of the thirteen races. And in the 1994 U.S. Senate races, Republicans also won more of these races, five of the seven races held. But in the 1998 U.S. Senate races, the pattern did not hold as the Democrats won five of the nine races held. So, for the 2002 U.S. senatorial races, the question is whether the pattern returns or if the results of the 1998 elections signaled a break away from a very temporary situation — a happenstance in Southern politics.

As a concluding note, the third step in this pattern does not hold for states outside the South for either gubernatorial or U.S. senatorial races. Republicans won more of the gubernatorial races no matter who was in the White House in 1990, 1994 and 1998. And they only followed the pattern in the 1994 U.S. Senate races after having split the wins in 1990 and saw the Democrats win one more seat than they did in 1998.

The 2002 elections will help us know whether the political pattern described here continues or whether it is merely a happenstance. That happenstance most likely is tied to the growing strength of the Republican party in the South

— and maybe the unique politics involved in the unsuccessful attempt to impeach incumbent President Bill Clinton just prior to the 1998 elections. ■

EDITOR'S NOTE: A version of this article appeared in *The Chapel Hill News* on November 28, 2001.

Harbinger Elections

ELECTIONS/YEARS	1988-'89-'90	1992-'93-'94	1996-'97-'98	2000-'01-'02
'88-'92-'96-'00 PRESIDENT	GHW Bush, R	Clinton, D	Clinton, D	GW Bush, R
'89-'93-'97-'01 NJ GOVERNOR	Florio, D	Whitman, R	Whitman, R	McGreevey, D
VA GOVERNOR	Wilder, D	Allen, R	Gilmore, R	Warner, D
'90-'94-'98-'02 SOUTH GOVERNORS	7D 2R	3D 5R	3D 5R	8 seats up
OTHER GOVERNORS	12D 15R	8D 20R	8D 20R	28 seats up
'90-'94-'98-'02 SOUTH SENATORS	7D 6R	2D 5R	5D 4R	13 seats up
OTHER SENATORS	11D 11R	12D 16R	13D 12R	21 seats up

Battle for Control of U.S. Senate Has Southern Focus in 2002

THAD BEYLE, Pearsall Professor of Political Science, UNC-Chapel Hill

In 2002 there will be 13 U.S. Senate races across the 14 Southern states — only Florida will escape having such a race. Over the last four decades, Democrats have been successful in winning two-thirds of these off-year races. But in the decade of the 1990s, the tide shifted and Republicans won 16 of the 30 U.S. Senate races. Will the Republican tide continue in 2002?

There are three patterns in these off-year races:

The first pattern consists of those three years in which there are the fewest U.S. Senate races in the South — 1970 and 1982 — 6 races, and 1994 — 7 races. Here the high rate of Democratic wins in the first two years (89 percent) fell to the lowest win-rate of all in the Republican Revolution year of 1994 (29 percent).

The second pattern consists of those four years in which there were nine U.S. Senate races in the South. In the earlier years of 1962, 1974 and 1986 the Democrats consistently won 89 percent of the races. Then in 1998, the Democrats barely won a majority of the races.

The third pattern consists of those three years in which there are the most U.S. Senate races in the South. In 1966, 1978 and 1990 there were between 13 and 14 races — and 2002 joins this pattern with 13 races. The Democratic victory rates in these years have always been lower than in the other two patterns, ranging from 71% win rate in 1966 to 54% win rate in 1990.

When looking at how these races play out on a state-by-state basis in these off years, we see that there are seven states where Democratic candidates won more than two-thirds of the races — Arkansas, Louisiana, West Virginia, Alabama, Florida, Georgia and North Carolina. There were two states in which the Republicans won more than two-thirds of the races — Tennessee and Texas. There was a more competitive situation in Mississippi, Oklahoma and

Virginia, where Republicans won 50 percent of the races. In Kentucky, Republicans won one more race than the Democrats. In South Carolina, Democrats won two more races than the Republicans.

What does all of this portend for the 2002 races? If the Republican surge of the 1990s continues, the edge obviously will go in their direction. But three Republican stalwarts — North Carolina's Jesse Helms, South Carolina's Strom Thurmond and Texas's Phil Gramm — are retiring from office. So rather than having a long-time incumbent seeking reelection, the Republicans will be forced to fight for open seats that could just as easily be won by Democrats.

Of the 10 incumbent Senators seeking reelection in the South, seven are Republicans and only three are Democrats. Republicans have more to lose than the Democrats in these incumbent races. Each party also has two incumbents seeking their first reelection — Democrats Max Cleland (Ga.) and Mary Landrieu (La.), and Republicans Jeff Sessions (Ala.) and Tim Hutchinson (Ark.).

With control of the Senate virtually up for grabs, each of these races will be watched closely by party leaders, the media and those interested in politics. There is a great deal at stake in 2002 in these 13 races. ■

Southern Off-Year Senate Races, 1962-98

Year	PARTISAN SUCCESS, BY YEAR				PARTISAN SUCCESS, BY STATE			
	# Races	Winner		Dem %	States	Dem.	Rep.	%Dem.
1962 ⁱ	9	8	1	89	AR	7	0	100
1966 ⁱⁱ	14	10	4	71	LA	7	0	100
1970 ⁱⁱⁱ	6	5	1	83	WV	6	0	100
1974 ^{iv}	9	8	1	89	AL	6	1	86
1978 ^v	13	7	6	54	FL	6	1	86
1982 ^{vi}	6	5	1	83	GA	6	1	86
1986 ^{vii}	9	8	1	89	NC	5	2	71
1990 ^{viii}	13	7	6	54	SC	5	3	63
1994 ^{ix}	7	2	5	29	MS	3	3	50
1998 ^x	9	5	4	56	OK	4	4	50
TOTALS	95	65	30	68	VA	3	3	50
					KY	3	4	43
					TX	2	4	33
					TN	2	4	33

ⁱ Dem. wins: AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, NC, OK, SC; Rep. win: KY
ⁱⁱ Dem. wins: AL, AR, GA, LA, MS, NC, OK, SC, VA, WV; Rep. wins: KY, SC, TN, TX
ⁱⁱⁱ Dem. wins: FL, MS, TX, VA, WV; Rep. wins: TN
^{iv} Dem. wins: AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, NC, SC; Rep. wins: OK
^v Dem. wins: AL, AR, GA, KY, LA, OK, WV; Rep. wins: MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA
^{vi} Dem. wins: FL, MS, TN, TX, WV; Rep. wins: VA
^{vii} Dem. wins: AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, NC, SC; Rep. wins: OK
^{viii} Dem. wins: AL, AR, GA, LA, OK, TN, WV; Rep. wins: KY, MS, NC, SC, TX, VA
^{ix} Dem. wins: VA, WV; Rep. wins: FL, MS, OK, TN, TX
^x Dem. wins: AR, FL, LA, NC, SC; Rep. wins: AL, GA, KY, OK

→ POVERTY FROM PAGE 1

above the poverty line — and helps others from falling below it. To obtain the EITC, an individual with no qualifying children must have earned less than \$10,380. That figure jumps to \$27,413 if an individual has one qualifying child and is raised to \$31,152 if the individual has more than one qualifying child.

The average credit to qualifying recipients nationwide in 1999 was about \$1,647. In the South, reflecting its population of poorer people, the average credit was higher — about \$1,720.

Recipients in Mississippi led the region with an average credit of \$1,900.

By looking at the difference between the Census poverty levels and the calculated number of EITC recipients, a clearer picture of the working poor and working near-poor can be drawn. In the South, the percent of the population that receives the EITC ranges from 15.7 percent in Virginia to 33 percent in Mississippi, with 22.9 percent as the average. In four Southern states, at least one out of every four people receives the tax credit.

In contrast, 17.3 percent of the population

nationally receives the credit. Only one Southern state — Virginia — falls below that average. When ranked by share of the population receiving the credit, Southern states make up 13 of the top 15.

On average in the South, 9.1 percent of the population is living above the poverty line while earning an income that allows them to receive EITC. This group of working near-poor ranges from 2.9 percent in West Virginia to 17.5 percent in Mississippi. More than 21 million people in the South fall into the near-poor category, with a fourth of that number living in Texas. ■

Job-Approval Ratings Provide One Sign of Vulnerability

THAD BEYLE, Pearsall Professor of Political Science, UNC-Chapel Hill

With the proliferation of state-level polling in the recent decades, we are able to find out just how well the respondents to these polls feel their elected officials are performing. Candidates, donors and journalists use these approval ratings as one way of determining where they should focus their energy and efforts.

The table presents the most recent job approval ratings (JARs) for each of the 10 incumbent Southern U.S. senators seeking reelection in 2002. Two caveats should be noted to these JARs. First, while there are five that come from 2001 polls, there are four that come from 1999 polls, and one comes from a 1996 poll. Second, the two polls of Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and Sen. Tim Hutchinson (R-Ark.) conducted after the September 11 attacks saw their ratings each jump 12 points over their previous readings that were taken earlier in 2001. This represents the same “rally around the flag or the leaders” phenomenon that we see in the president’s

JARs jumping from the mid-50s to the high 80s and low 90s following the attacks. But as the president’s father found out following the Gulf War, what goes up so fast also can come back down rapidly, especially when the economy is in trouble.

Here are several things to consider about these senators’ JARs. There tends to be a consensus that when the positive rating gets below 60 percent, the incumbent may be in trouble — or eminently challengeable in a reelection bid. This would suggest that Hutchinson, Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.) and Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) might have some political problems in their reelection bids. Another point that many consider is that when the disapproval rate gets above 30 percent, the incumbent may be in trouble. But there is another factor that needs to be remembered here — long-time incumbency. Two of the incumbents with a 35 percent disapproval rating — Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) and Sen. John Warner (R-Va.) — are multi-term senators. The power of their long-term incumbency may both lead to these higher negative percents and overcome them at the same time as they have a history of winning their elections. ■

Job Approval Ratings for Incumbents Seeking Reelection

SENATOR/PARTY/STATE	ELECTIONS ⁱ		JAR RANGE High-Low	YEARS	LAST JAR ⁱⁱ		DATE
	1st	Last			%Pos	%neg	
MITCH MCCONNELL, R-KY	84	96	77-48	87-01	77	17	10/01
THAD COCHRAN, R-MS	78	96	75-52	81-99	72	25	6/99
FRED THOMPSON, R-TN	94	96	66-56	95-99	66	27	4/99
MARY LANDRIEU, D-LA	96	96	66-52	97-01	63	26	4/01
JAY ROCKEFELLER, D-WV	84	96	63-57	89-96	63	35	5/96
MAX CLELAND, D-GA	96	96	62-46	97-01	61	36	7/01
JOHN WARNER, R-VA	78	96	80-47	86-99	61	35	6/99
TIM HUTCHINSON, R-AR	96	96	58-46	00-01	58	14	10/08
JAMES INHOFE, R-OK	94	96	51-48	95-01	51	N/A	4/01
JEFF SESSIONS, R-AL	96	96	60-38	97-99	48	35	8/99

POLLSTERS

AL	Southern Opinion Research Poll
AR	Tarrance Group-Rep
GA	Mason-Dixon Poll
KY	Voter Consumer Research-Rep
LA	Southern Media & Opinion Poll
MS	Mason-Dixon Poll
OK	Mason-Dixon Poll
TN	Mason-Dixon Poll
VA	Mason-Dixon Poll
WV	Mason-Dixon Poll

ⁱ 1st election = when the senator as first elected to the Senate; last = the most recent election for the senator.

ⁱⁱ % pos = the percent of the respondents indicating a positive feeling toward the senator’s job performance (excellent, good, approve etc.); % neg = the percent of the respondents indicating a negative feeling toward the senator’s job performance (fair, poor, very poor, disapprove, etc.)

2002 U.S. Senate Ratings in the Southern Statesⁱ

REPUBLICANS (10)	DEMOCRATS (3)
<i>Toss-Up</i>	
Hutchinson, AR	
<i>Narrow Advantage Incumbent Party</i>	
NC Open (Helms)	Cleland, GA
<i>Clear Advantage Incumbent Party</i>	
McConnell, KY	Landrieu, LA
SC Open (Thurmond)	
TX Open (Gramm)	
<i>Currently Safe</i>	
Cochran, MS	Rockefeller, WV
Inhofe, OK	
Sessions, AL	
Thompson, TN	
Warner, VA	

ⁱ The Rothernberg Political Report, 24:22 (November 2, 2001).

National Survey Shows Half-Century Trend Away From Democrats

GREGORY A. PETTIS, Ph.D. candidate, political science, UNC-Chapel Hill

The partisan realignment in the South is a well-known fact. The 20th century began with the South solidly in the hands of the Democratic Party. This was true because the Southern Democratic Party took positions congruent with the Southern electorate's public policy preferences; namely, a states-centered view of government and an opposition to more egalitarian racial policy.

This began to change in 1932 with the Great Depression and the election of Franklin Roosevelt. While Roosevelt maintained the Democratic Party's position on race, he was the chief architect for an expanded federal government that intervened in the economy and society (thus infringing on the sovereignty of U.S. states) in a way never before imagined. This led to a general realignment in the U.S. where the Democratic Party became the clear majority party.

The main action to upset the applecart of partisan attachments was the Democratic Party's embrace of more egalitarian racial positions. This was foreshadowed at the 1948 Democratic National Convention when Truman's platform included a progressive racial agenda, causing some Dixiecrats to split from the party and support Strom Thurmond's presidential candi-

dacy. The Democrats' new racial issue position became more concrete with President Kennedy and his decision in the final months of his administration that the federal government needed to work for greater racial equality. This was carried through by President Johnson and Congressional Democrats with the passage of various civil rights and social welfare bills.

Changing the course of racial politics in the U.S. also changed the course of partisan identification in the South as many, not supportive of greater racial equality, gradually switched to the less racially progressive Republican Party. While the electoral consequences for presidential elections were immediate (Southern states began voting solidly Republican for President), the consequences for more slow-moving partisan identification took longer to appear.

The consequences of this policy change are apparent. Before the Democratic Party embraced the more egalitarian racial positions, Democratic identification was high. The American National Election Study records that it reached its second-highest point in the presidential election of 1964, probably driven by an election in which the Republican Party fielded a presidential candidate out of the American ideological mainstream to an extraordinary degree. However, the decline in Democratic identification begins immediately following the 1964 election as Southerners, opposed to more racially egalitarian policies, began to evacuate the political party that was pushing for such reforms.

An inspection of the time series finds there are three occasions during which Democratic identification trends downward. The first is from 1964 to 1972. This was caused by the dramatic positions the Democratic Party took on racial issues. The second downward trend occurred from 1976 until 1992. During this time conservative Democrats were leaving the party, finding that it was genuinely solidifying behind racially progressive programs. This decrease in identification may also have also been caused by cultural considerations, with the Republican Party under Ronald Reagan more attractive to Southerners. The final decline began after 1996 and may still be continuing.

While Southerners increasingly got off the Democratic boat, they did not join the increasingly large flotilla known as the Republican Party. Instead, Southerners have increasingly not identified with either party. As one would expect, the incidence of increasing Independent party identification mirrors the

incidence of decreasing identification with the Democratic Party. It is important to note that while this seemingly portends the further decline in the strength of political parties in the electorate, many respondents who tell the ANES they identify as Independents actually "lean" toward one of the two political parties. These individuals vote and have the policy preferences of those who identify more strongly with the parties.

A possible cause of the increasing incidence of Independent identification may reflect a realignment. As Black and Black argue in their book *Politics and Society in the South*, Southerners may identify as Independents in the midst of their realignment toward the Republican Party. This brings us to a consideration of Republican identification.

What we see is a steady rise in members of the electorate identifying with the Republican Party. While Republican identification is not high, its slow and steady increase has mirrored the increased Republican electoral success. Mirroring the realignment that has taken place, the South has been transformed from a one-party system to a competitive two-party system, and the realignment tells part of the story. In the last election about 35% of the electorate identified as Democrats, 25% as Republicans, with the remainder identifying as Independents. ■

Southern Party Identification in Presidential Years, 1952–2000¹

YEAR	DEM. %	IND. %	REP. %
1952	68.6	13.1	11.2
1956	62.2	14.9	17.2
1960	62.5	15.4	18.7
1964	67.1	18.5	12.5
1968	57.2	30.9	11.1
1972	49.9	32.6	16.7
1976	50.4	31.0	18.1
1980	47.5	31.6	19.8
1984	43.2	36.1	19.8
1988	41.1	36.6	21.5
1992	39.5	38.0	21.7
1996	42.3	32.9	24.4
2000	35.0	39.0	26.0
CHANGE	-49%	+198%	+132%

¹ These results are from the National Election Service Poll conducted on Election Day each of these years. These percentages reflect how the respondents answered the first NES party identification question: "Do you typically think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, or what?" Thus, strong and weak partisans are in the Democratic and Republican categories. All Independents, including those leaning to either the Democratic or Republican parties, are in the Independent category.

Southern Party Identification in Off-Year Elections, 1958–98¹

YEAR	DEM.%	IND.%	REP.%
1958	62.7	14.9	16.7
1962	53.7	19.7	20.9
1966	52.9	29.3	16.1
1970	50.5	33.0	16.9
1974	51.0	31.9	14.9
1978	44.3	36.3	18.0
1982	52.8	27.3	18.8
1986	46.8	31.7	20.7
1990	42.8	38.8	17.0
1994	37.0	32.9	29.4
1998	37.8	32.0	29.4
CHANGE	-40%	+115%	+76%

¹ These results are from the National Election Service Poll conducted on Election Day each of these years. These proportions reflect how the respondents answered the first NES party identification question: "Do you typically think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, Incumbent, or what?" Thus, strong and weak partisans are in the Republican and Democratic categories. All Independents, including those leaning to the Democratic and Republican parties, are in the Independent category.

With Divided Senate, The Cost of Close Southern Races Will Continue to Rise

THAD BEYLE, Pearsall Professor of Political Science, UNC-Chapel Hill

In 2002, there will be 13 U.S. Senate races across the 14 Southern states — only Florida will escape having such a race. Three of these races will be for open seats as Republicans Strom Thurmond (S.C.), Jesse Helms (N.C.) and Phil Gramm (Texas) are retiring. With the partisan split in the Senate so close, every race will be watched closely.

Looking back at the electoral history of these

13 seats, we can see some changes over the past three decades.

In the five election years in which all 13 seats were contested, the 1972, 1978, 1984 and 1990 elections saw the two parties split the Senate wins almost equally. But in the 1996 elections, Republican candidates posted a 10 to 3 winning record.

The average victory percentage in 1996 (57 percent) was back where it had been in 1972 (58 percent), after reaching as high as nearly 72 percent in 1990 when three of the senators were unopposed in the general election. The four Southern senators who were first elected in 1996 — Republicans Jeff Sessions (Ala.) and Tim Hutchinson (Ark.), and Democrats Max Cleland (Ga.) and Mary Landrieu (La.) — averaged 51 percent. So some of these senators will be facing strong challenges.

The average cost, in inflation-adjusted 2001 dollars, of the 67 Senate elections held in the South since 1972 for these seats was just under \$8 million. But averages can hide a lot of variation. Generally these elections have become more expensive each time around with but one exception — 1984. This was the year that there were three very expensive Senate races in North Carolina (\$45 million), Texas (\$26 million) and West Virginia (\$22.6 million). In the 1972 elections the average cost was \$4.6 million, which increased to

The 1972–96 History of the 2002 U.S. Senate Races in the South ⁱ

STATE	STATUS ⁱⁱ	GENERAL ELECTION VOTE		CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES ⁱⁱⁱ			COST PER VOTE ^{iv}
		Total Votes	%	Actual\$	2001\$	%	
AL	IR						
1996	Jeff Sessions, R	1,499,393	52.5	6,147,160	7,081,982	62.8	4.72
1990	Howell Heflin, D	1,185,004	60.6	5,290,942	7,188,780	65.0	6.07
1984	Howell Heflin, D	1,359,043	63.3	2,575,768	4,250,442	77.7	3.13
1978	Howell Heflin, D	582,005	94.0	1,059,113	2,885,866	100.0	4.96
1972	John Sparkman, D	1,002,014	65.3	1,467,070	6,242,851	47.9	6.23
AR	IR						
1996	Tim Hutchinson, R	846,183	52.7	3,161,852	3,642,687	50.7	4.30
1990	David Pryor, D	unopposed	100.0	622,479	845,760	100.0	N/A
1984	David Pryor, D	875,956	57.3	2,911,231	4,976,463	63.1	5.68
1978	David Pryor, D	517,025	76.5	823,895	2,244,946	94.0	4.34
1972	John McClellan, D	634,636	60.9	516,573	2,198,183	100.0	3.46
GA	IR						
1996	Max Cleland, D	2,259,232	48.9	12,785,346	14,729,661	22.9	6.52
1990	Sam Nunn, D	unopposed	100.0	1,214,695	1,650,401	100.0	N/A
1984	Sam Nunn, D	1,681,300	79.9	843,891	1,442,549	100.0	.86
1978	Sam Nunn, D	645,128	83.1	548,814	1,495,406	100.0	2.32
1972	Sam Nunn, D	1,178,301	54.0	1,012,603	4,308,949	56.1	3.66
KY	IR						
1996	M. McConnell, R	1,307,046	55.5	7,105,087	8,185,584	70.8	6.26
1990	M. McConnell, R	916,010	52.2	8,158,937	11,085,512	64.1	12.10
1984	M. McConnell, R	1,284,711	50.2	4,211,205	7,198,641	42.0	5.60
1978	WD. Huddleston, R	466,496	62.3	538,253	1,466,629	85.8	3.14
1972	WD. Huddleston, R	1,022,887	51.7	1,262,239	5,371,230	52.2	5.25
LA	IR						
1996	Mary Landrieu, D	1,700,102	50.2	4,383,057	5,049,605	57.1	2.97
1990	J. Ben. Johnston, D	1,396,113	53.9	8,004,891	10,876,211	67.3	7.79
1984	J. Ben. Johnston, D	977,473	85.7	1,046,293	1,788,535	100.0	1.82
1978	J. Ben. Johnston, D	839,669	59.4	1,185,200	3,229,428	72.4	3.85
1972	J. Ben. Johnston, D	1,055,994	56.7	1,022,473	4,350,949	50.0	4.12

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PAGE 7 →

an average of \$7.2 million in 1978. Then came the 1984 elections, which averaged \$10.7 million. In 1990 the elections averaged \$7.9 million, and the 1996 elections averaged \$9.5 million. This suggests that the upcoming 2002 Senate elections will average more than \$10 million, especially with the three open seats involved.

There have been eight races that topped the \$20 million level. The most expensive race was the 1984 Helms race — in fact, four of the five most expensive races in the South have been in North Carolina when Helms sought reelection. Helms' five elections cost more than \$133 million for an average of \$26.7 million. Two other races in which the candidates spent more than \$20 million were in Texas, and there was one each in Virginia and West Virginia. At the other end of this campaign-spending continuum were the three races that cost less than \$1 million — the 1972 West Virginia race and the 1990 races in Arkansas and Mississippi, in which incumbents won reelection. Two of them were unopposed — David Prior in Arkansas and Thad Cochran in Mississippi.

Several states experienced a single “big bump” race in terms of how much was spent in their Senate races. West Virginia's “big bump” year was in 1984 when Jay Rockefeller won the seat for the first time. Georgia's “big bump” year was in 1996 when Max Cleland won that seat for the first time, and Louisiana's “big bump” year was in 1990 when Bennett Johnson won his last race.

Finally, another way to measure the differences between these races is to see just how much money was spent per vote in the general election. At the top of the list was the 1984 Rockefeller, West Virginia race where \$31.39 was spent per vote. This is followed by the North Carolina races of 1978, 1984 and 1990, which ranged between \$20.25 to 16.79 per vote. At the other end of this cost-per-vote spectrum was the 1984 Sam Nunn reelection race in Georgia in which only \$0.86 was spent per vote. Nunn easily won reelection with 80 percent of the vote. ■

STATE	STATUS ⁱ	GENERAL ELECTION VOTE		CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES ⁱⁱⁱ			COST PER
		Total Votes	%	Actual\$	2001\$	%	VOTE ^{iv}
MS	IR						
1996	Thad Cochran, R	864,801	72.2	1,305,680	1,504,240	100.0	1.74
1990	Thad Cochran, R	unopposed	100.0	691,865	940,034	100.0	N/A
1984	Thad Cochran, R	952,240	60.9	3,610,633	6,172,022	79.5	6.48
1978	Thad Cochran, R	582,189	45.2	2,069,940	5,615,640	50.8	9.65
1972	J. O. Eastland, D	624,881	60.0	565,134	2,404,826	72.6	3.85
NC	OS						
1996	Jesse Helms, R	2,519,708	53.4	22,582,246	26,016,412	64.6	10.33
1990	Jesse Helms, R	2,069,904	52.6	25,573,099	34,746,058	69.5	16.79
1984	Jesse Helms, R	2,227,256	51.9	26,379,483	45,093,133	64.1	20.25
1978	Jesse Helms, R	1,135,814	54.5	8,387,293	22,853,659	96.9	20.12
1972	Jesse Helms, R	1,472,541	54.0	1,124,339	4,784,421	58.2	3.25
OK	IR						
1996	James Inhofe, R	1,183,150	56.7	2,812,567	3,240,285	89.3	2.74
1994	James Inhofe, R	982,430	55.2	3,792,387	4,541,781	50.6	4.62
1990	David Boren, D	884,498	83.2	1,732,005	2,353,268	91.9	2.66
1984	David Boren, D	1,186,769	76.4	1,198,951	2,049,489	99.4	1.73
1978	David Boren, D	741,810	66.6	1,194,998	3,256,125	62.9	4.39
1972	Dewey Bartlett, R	995,146	51.9	1,137,153	4,838,949	55.0	4.86
SC	OS						
1996	Strom Thurmond, R	1,160,968	53.4	4,546,256	5,237,622	57.9	4.51
1990	Strom Thurmond, R	726,144	66.4	2,339,921	3,179,240	99.7	4.38
1984	Strom Thurmond, R	951,797	67.7	1,691,985	2,892,282	99.5	3.04
1978	Strom Thurmond, R	632,852	55.6	3,147,599	8,576,564	64.0	13.55
1972	Strom Thurmond, R	656,862	63.3	834,122	3,549,455	79.9	5.40
TN	IR						
1996	Fred Thompson, R	1,778,664	61.4	4,265,338	4,913,984	81.3	2.76
1994	Fred Thompson, R	1,451,928	61.0	7,773,238	9,309,267	48.8	6.41
1990	Al Gore, D	783,922	67.7	1,912,375	2,598,336	99.7	3.31
1984	Al Gore, D	1,644,857	60.8	4,813,079	8,227,485	63.1	5.00
1978	Howard Baker, R	1,108,872	58.0	3,826,477	10,426,368	50.2	9.40
1972	Howard Baker, R	1,157,138	61.9	1,055,422	4,491,157	78.7	3.88
TX	OS						
1996	Phil Gramm, R	5,456,456	55.5	15,056,993	17,346,766	93.5	3.18
1990	Phil Gramm, R	3,822,157	60.2	16,026,484	21,775,114	77.1	5.70
1984	Phil Gramm, R	5,313,905	58.6	15,340,218	26,222,595	61.6	4.93
1978	John Tower, R	2,290,525	50.3	6,788,031	18,495,997	64.2	8.06
1972	John Tower, R	3,334,862	54.7	2,930,878	12,471,821	78.5	3.74
VA	IR						
1996	John Warner, R	2,351,726	52.5	17,419,581	20,068,642	33.4	8.53
1990	John Warner, R	1,083,690	80.9	1,219,726	1,657,236	100.0	1.53
1984	John Warner, R	2,007,336	70.1	3,466,699	5,925,981	85.8	2.95
1978	John Warner, R	1,221,743	50.2	3,730,010	10,163,515	77.7	8.32
1972	William Scott, R	1,362,300	52.7	1,000,829	4,258,847	61.9	3.13
WV	IR						
1996	Jay Rockefeller, D	595,614	76.6	5,819,157	6,704,098	100.0	11.26
1990	Jay Rockefeller, D	404,305	68.3	2,732,569	3,712,730	99.2	9.18
1984	Jay Rockefeller, D	718,913	52.1	13,202,166	22,567,805	91.3	31.39
1978	Jennings Randolph, D	493,351	50.5	1,143,428	3,115,608	59.9	6.32
1972	Jennings Randolph, D	731,841	66.5	179,183	762,481	74.6	1.04

ⁱ SOURCES: Michael Barone et. al., *The Almanac of American Politics* (Washington, DC: The National Journal), various issues, 1984 through 2002.

ⁱⁱ Status for 2002 election: IR = incumbent running for reelection; OS = open seat

ⁱⁱⁱ Campaign Expenditure: Actual\$ – amount spent in that year's dollars; 2001\$ – amount spent in 2001 dollar value.

^{iv} Cost Per Vote: the 2001\$ amount divided by the total General Election Vote.

The 2001 Elections in Virginia

ROBERT HOLSWORTH, Professor, Political Science, Virginia Commonwealth University

The 2001 elections in Virginia resulted in a split decision. Mark Warner, a businessman turned politician, retook the statehouse for the Democrats after an eight-year absence with a 52 percent to 47 percent victory over the GOP candidate, former Attorney General Mark Earley. At the same time, the Republicans scored a landslide victory in the House of Delegates races, picking up 12 seats and extending what had been a razor thin majority to a dominant one in which they now hold a 64–34 (with 2 Independents) advantage.

Warner is only the second Democrat since 1990 to win more than 50 percent of the vote in any statewide Virginia election. He ran a deft campaign that capitalized on the state's budget mess, appealed to voters who had been voting Republican for a decade and used his financial advantage skillfully.

In the spring of 2001, Governor Jim Gilmore and the Republicans in the General Assembly could not reach an agreement on a modified budget for the second year of the biennium and did not provide any money for teacher salary increases and a host of other high priority needs. The debacle angered Virginians of all political stripes and provided a rationale for Warner's candidacy.

Using a Perot-like theme that it was time to clean up the mess in Richmond, Warner told voters that his bottom-line — results-oriented business experience — was just what the Commonwealth needed. And many business leaders in the Commonwealth seemed to agree with him, abandoning the GOP and supporting Warner as the candidate best suited to lead Virginia forward.

Warner also utilized his business experience to woo voters in rural Virginia. From the outset, the Warner campaign recognized a major reason that Republicans did so well in the 1990s was that their candidates were running huge margins in rural areas. To counter the Republican message on cultural issues, Warner spent a good portion of time in rural communities, preaching a message of economic development and vowing to enhance the state's commitment to vocational education. His efforts paid off handsomely as Warner carried some rural congressional districts and reduced the traditional Republican margin where he did not.

In all of this, of course, Warner was assisted considerably by his financial advantage. He raised more money than Earley inside Virginia and, in the last month of the campaign,

opened his own checkbook to ensure that all campaign needs were adequately funded. Even with millions of dollars funneled to the Earley campaign through Jim Gilmore's position as head of the RNC, Warner maintained a sizeable advantage in resources.

For his part, Mark Earley never seemed to find a theme or an issue that could capitalize on the GOP's natural advantage in Virginia. Earley tried to draw a sharp distinction on taxes by pointing to Warner's support for a regional referendum in Northern Virginia that would raise the sales tax to fund transportation projects. Saying that he would "veto the referendum in a heartbeat," Earley strived to portray Warner as a tax and spend liberal. The effort ultimately backfired because Warner was able to reframe the issue as an attack by Earley on the state's most populous region. Warner said that he had no plans to raise taxes, but if the people of Northern Virginia wanted to deal with their transportation crisis by taxing themselves, he would allow them the right of self-determination.

Earley was also unable to utilize the events of September 11th to convince voters that continuity might be preferable to change. After the terrorist attack, many political observers felt that Earley's experience as Attorney General might be favorably contrasted with Warner's lack of experience in elected office. But the public never seemed to think that there was a direct connection between the attacks and the decision they were getting ready to make in the governor's race. The fact that President George W. Bush did not campaign for Earley, either in person or on television, certainly made the case more difficult for the GOP candidate.

Fortunately for the GOP, Earley's problems were not contagious and did not spread to GOP candidates for the House of Delegates. A GOP drawn redistricting plan in the spring had precipitated an unprecedented number of Democratic retirements and resulted in 12 open seat races. The Republicans took full advantage of the opportunity and won all 12 contests, boosting their majority in the 100 seat chamber from 52 to 64.

The 2001 split decision has recast Virginia politics in an entirely new light. A Democratic governor has never had to work with a Republican-controlled General Assembly. As he takes office, Warner's first order of business will be to respond to the recession that he inherits through a GOP-controlled General Assembly. Virginians will quickly see if Mark Warner can govern as skillfully as he campaigned. ■

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While Redistricting Gives South More Clout, Some States Are Still Losing

RYAN THORNBURG, Assistant Director

Following the 2000 Census, the South continued its 40-year trend of increasing its representation in the U.S. House of Representatives. Over that time, the South's population has grown faster than that of the country as a whole. Migration into the South from other parts of the nation has brought the region increasing political clout in Washington. However, each of the states in the region has not equally enjoyed this increase in political representation. Migratory moves within the South — out of the Mississippi Delta and into suburban areas around Atlanta, Houston and Raleigh — have meant that while some Southern states have boosted the region's voting strength in Congress others have been a drag.

Beginning with the 108th Congress in 2003, 145 of the 465 House members will be from the 14 Southern states, assuming that Utah's challenge to North Carolina's new district continues to be unsuccessful. That is a net gain of five representatives since the 1990 apportionment and a net gain of 21 representatives since the growth trend began in 1960. Florida, Georgia and Texas each gained two seats in the 2000 apportionment, while North Carolina gained one.

Mississippi and Oklahoma each lost a seat. Over the last 40 years the largest growth occurred in Florida, which increased its representation from 12 to 25. The biggest loss over that time was in West Virginia, which has lost two of the five representatives it had in 1962.

During the last 40 years that the South's congressional representation has grown, so have Americans' ideas on how to equitably distribute that congressional representation. The march toward today's generally accepted concept of "one person, one vote" began in 1962 with *Baker v. Carr* and 24 other court cases calling for the reapportionment of legislative districts based on the most recent Census. By 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Wesberry v. Sanders* recognized that congressional districts must contain roughly the same number of people. Since then, legislatures and the courts have been busy crafting laws to prevent the dilution of voting power by packing too many people into any single district.

With 281.4 million Americans divided between 465 congressional districts, each district's population must be as close as possible to 605,208.

However, because each state must have at least one House district, and because state boundaries are set in concrete and cannot be redrawn every 10 years to manipulate apportionment, the ideal district population is different in every state. In the South, for example, North Carolina's ideal district population is 620,590 while Mississippi's is 713,232.

Although several Southern states have completed their legislative voting on congressional districts, lawsuits will continue to shape boundaries for the next decade. One way of considering where the tough congressional redistricting battles of this decade will be located is to find the current districts that are the most over or the most under their ideal populations. Of the 10 Southern districts that most need to reduce their size, all are in Florida, Georgia and Texas. Each one of those states will be adding two new congressional districts into the mix. Of the 10 districts that most need to add people, all but one are in Mississippi and Oklahoma, the two states that are losing a representative. The other is Tennessee's 9th District in Memphis. ■

Southern States Continue to Work Through Redistricting

DOUGLAS JACOBSON, Research Associate, Southern Legislative Conference

In the Southern states and across the country, few legislative matters take on the long-term importance of redistricting. In the South, redistricting of statehouse and congressional districts is almost always undertaken by the state legislature. However, many state legislatures' plans can be vetoed by the governor. Some states, such as Arkansas, in which a Board of Apportionment performs redistricting duties, have entirely different systems in which redistricting is taken out of the legislature's hands. While the executive branch typically can utilize only veto power, Maryland gives the governor the authority to present a plan to the General Assembly. In any case, redistricting is a drawn-out process that often requires special legislative sessions. Besides Virginia, which is a special case because of elections in fall 2001, two other Southern Legislative Conference states, Oklahoma and Missouri, which passed only congressional redistricting legislation, at least partially completed their plans during their regular sessions. In a time of a general shift to the GOP in many Southern states, the Republican party has gained influence and seats throughout the region. As a result of the Republican-designed plan in Virginia, 10 Democratic lawmakers resigned.

Seven of the 16 states in the SLC (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia) are affected by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Counties in two other states (North Carolina and Florida) also are included. Plans submitted from these states must receive preclearance from the U.S. Department of Justice or a panel of three federal judges. Among other matters, Southern legislators must ensure that they do not dilute minority voting strength in newly designed districts.

In many cases, lawsuits can be expected. Virginia and Mississippi have been forced to spend state money to either fight litigation or to hire consultants to avoid it. In November, North Carolina Republicans filed suit to block the Democratic-drawn district lines. As of August 2001, Texas had seen 11 separate congressional redistricting lawsuits filed in state and federal courts across the state. Special sessions, which are sometimes necessary when the threat of litigation prevents a plan from being passed, also come at a cost to taxpayers. Southern states, like their other regional counterparts, can possibly expect lawsuits not just from the party on the losing end of new redistricting plans, but also from third

parties such as interest groups that stand to lose influence.

A parallel issue, congressional reapportionment, is occurring in some states as well. Three SLC states, Georgia, North Carolina and Texas, are gaining congressional seats, while Oklahoma and Mississippi each are losing one, which results in two incumbent congressmen being forced to run against each other.

Finally, lawmakers are increasingly seeking more public involvement in the process. Public meetings are being held in states as diverse as Maryland, Florida and Arkansas to gauge the public's input, and publicly available redistricting software is allowing more citizens to become involved. As a result, more Southerners now have access to how redistricting works and are better able to comprehend the process.

For more in-depth information on redistricting in the Southern states, see *Drawing the Map: Redistricting in the South*, a Special Series Report from the Southern Legislative Conference. It is available at <http://www.slcatlanta.org/PubsForm.htm>. ■

Camelot Indexⁱ Overall State Rankingsⁱⁱ

RANK	STATE	AVERAGE
1	MN	8.3
13	VA	18.0
50 State Average		25.3
26	KY	27.8
29	TX	29.0
30	NC	29.2
37	WV	31.0
38	GA	32.0
39	AR	32.3
40	OK	32.5
14 Southern State Average		33.1
43	TN	34.3
44	FL	35.2
46	SC	35.8
47	AL	36.8
49	MS	41.2
50	LA	48.0

ⁱ SOURCE: "The Camelot Index," *State Policy Reports* 19:7 (April 2001): 5-15.

ⁱⁱ Measured by the individual state rankings on the six separate components — healthy economy, healthy people, educated people, healthy society and prudent government.

Camelot Indexⁱ Prudent Government Componentⁱⁱ

RANK	STATE	AVERAGE
1	IA	8.8
7	NC	15.3
9	AR	18.0
11	GA	19.0
13	VA	20.3
14	TN	20.8
14	TX	20.8
21	SC	22.0
26	AL	24.3
14 Southern State Average		24.1
50 State Average		24.4
27	KY	24.5
32	FL	26.8
33	MS	27.3
37	OK	29.0
46	WV	34.3
48	LA	35.0

ⁱ SOURCE: "The Camelot Index," *State Policy Reports* 19:7 (April 2001): 5-15.

ⁱⁱ Measured by state and local taxes as a percent of personal income, the state-solvency index that deducts state and local debt and unfunded pension liabilities from assets, structural surpluses and deficits, and bond ratings.

The Camelot Index in Southern States

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The April 2001 *State Policy Reports* highlights that Southern states remain below the national average in performance on most measures of societal well-being. The Camelot Index, developed by *State Policy Reports*, comparatively rates state rankings on issues of education, crime, economics, health of its people, voting, societal health and government management. Performance in each area is measured by the averaging of the state's ranking in two or more related measures. For example, the crime-free component is measured by averaging a state's rank among the 50 states in its levels of property and violent crimes. If a state is considerably lower than the national average, it is an indication that the state was consistently low on each or most of the component's measures. Collectively, Southern states are below the national average in each of these areas except in the area of government management. Overall, only Virginia performed better than the national average in performance on these measures of well-being while Louisiana ranks last.

Prudently Managed Government

The prudent government component highlights a strength area of the Southern states with the majority of Southern states out-performing or

approaching the national average. However, West Virginia (34.3) and Louisiana (35.0) averaged a ranking on each of the components measures that was approximately 10 places lower than the national average (24.4). Each state is examined for its combined performance on state and local taxes as a percent of personal income; the state solvency index (deducting state and local debt and unfunded pension liabilities from assets); structural surpluses and deficits; and bond ratings to determine performance on this component.

Healthy Economy

The 14 Southern states' second strongest area of performance was in their economies with a regional average (26.4) just below that of the national average (25.4). The Camelot Index indicates that Southern states vary widely in economic performance. Virginia's average on the Healthy Economy Component (17.6) was well above the national average. Five other Southern states also had average ranks above the national average. However, the remaining eight states were below the national average with West Virginia rated 50th (38.4) and Mississippi 49th (36.1) in the nation. The healthy economy component is measured by

Camelot Indexⁱ Healthy Economy Componentⁱⁱ

RANK	STATE	AVERAGE
1	NV	11.9
7	VA	17.6
14	FL	21.4
14	GA	21.4
16	TX	21.7
18	NC	22.7
22	SC	24.7
50 State Average		25.4
14 Southern State Average		26.4
27	TN	27.1
37	AR	30.1
39	OK	30.3
43	KY	30.7
46	LA	34.1
47	AL	34.4
49	MS	36.1
50	WV	38.4

ⁱ SOURCE: "The Camelot Index," *State Policy Reports* 19:7 (April 2001): 5-15.

ⁱⁱ Measured by the percentage of people in poverty; growth in employment; population and income; per capita federal tax liability; tax capacity; and average pay in retailing jobs. Each measure is given equal weight. Best state = 1; worst state = 50.

Camelot Indexⁱ Healthy People Componentⁱⁱ

RANK	STATE	AVERAGE
1	MN	3.3
50 State Average		25.3
30	TX	29.0
33	VA	30.0
35	KY	31.7
36	FL	32.0
41	TN	34.0
14 Southern State Average		38.1
42	NC	38.7
42	OK	38.7
44	AR	40.3
44	GA	40.3
46	AL	41.3
46	WV	41.3
48	SC	43.3
49	MS	45.7
50	LA	47.7

ⁱ SOURCE: "The Camelot Index," *State Policy Reports* 19:7 (April 2001): 5-15.

ⁱⁱ Measured by age-adjusted death rates, infant mortality rates and the percentage of non-elderly populations without health insurance. Each measure is given equal weight. Best state = 1; worst state = 50.

the percentage of people in poverty; growth in employment, population and income; per capita federal tax liability; tax capacity; and average retail pay levels.

Healthy People

The Camelot Index's healthy people component is measured by age-adjusted death rates, infant mortality rates, and the percentage of non-elderly populations without health insurance. The healthy people component represents the area of weakest performance for the 14 Southern states with their combined average (38.1) falling 12.8 places below the national average (25.3). Nine of the ten lowest performers on the component index were Southern states. In fact, no Southern states ranked higher than the national average in performance on the component. Louisiana (47.7), Mississippi (45.7), and South Carolina (43.3) were the three lowest ranked states in the nation on this measure.

Healthy Society

The healthy society component is measured by home ownership; the percent of population voting; births to unwed mothers; single-parent families; and percent of the population receiving welfare payments. Although none of the Southern states were in the top 10 in the

nation, five states had average rankings of the healthy society measures that were above the national average. However, Louisiana's average rank on the measures was approximately 17 places below the national average.

Crime-Free State

Five Southern states out-performed the national average (25.5) on the crime-free component. Three of these states (Kentucky – 10.0, West Virginia – 12.0, and Virginia – 16.0) had average rankings well above the national average and were also the top-three ranked Southern states on the healthy society component. However, seven Southern states had average rankings on violent and property crimes below the national average by over 12 places. Florida performed worst nationally on this component.

Population Education

Of the Southern states, only West Virginia (24.6) and Oklahoma (25.0) were above the national average ranking on the educated population component (25.3). The 12 remaining Southern states ranked below the rest of the nation on education with seven of the 10 worst located in the Southeast. Three states (Alabama, Louisiana and South Carolina) had rankings nearly 10 places lower than the national average. Mississippi ranks at the bottom, almost 18

places lower than the national average. The educated population component is measured by the Armed Forces Qualification test, pupil-teacher ratios; high school completion rates; and higher education tuition and fees.

Overall Performance and Change

Only Virginia (18.0) had individual rankings on the six components that placed the state above the national average (25.3). Most of the remaining Southern states ranked among the lowest performers in the nation with seven of 10 worst average rankings on the components being recorded by Southern states. Louisiana (48.0) had by far the lowest overall average ranking followed by Mississippi (41.2). In fact, Louisiana ranked in the bottom five of all states for each of the components. Despite the low rankings, seven of the Southern states improved their overall relative ranking since the last report (March 2000). North Carolina improved eight places, Arkansas six, Texas five, and Virginia four places. Additionally, another five states maintained their rankings. Only Florida (-1) and West Virginia (-5) had lost rankings from the previous year. ■

SOURCE FOR THE CAMELOT INDEX: *State Policy Reports*, April 2001, Vol. 19 Issue 7.

Camelot Indexⁱ Healthy Society Componentⁱⁱ

RANK	STATE	AVERAGE
1	ID	6.8
15	KY	20.2
17	WV	22.8
18	VA	23.6
21	OK	24.0
25	AL	24.6
50 State average		25.1
30	SC	26.4
33	NC	27.2
14 Southern State Average		29.4
36	AR	30.4
37	TX	30.8
40	GA	33.6
41	MS	33.8
42	FL	34.0
47	TN	38.4
49	LA	42.2

ⁱ SOURCE: "The Camelot Index," *State Policy Reports* 19:7 (April 2001): 5-15.

ⁱⁱ Measured by home ownership; the percent of population voting; births to unwed mothers; single-parent families; and percent of population receiving welfare payments. Each measure is given equal weight. Best state = 1; worst state = 50.

Camelot Indexⁱ Crime-Free Componentⁱⁱ

RANK	STATE	AVERAGE
1	NH	1.5
6	KY	10.0
8	WV	12.0
13	VA	16.0
25	AR	25.0
25	MS	25.0
50 State Average		25.5
31	AL	30.5
14 Southern State Average		31.8
36	OK	34.5
40	GA	37.5
40	TN	37.5
42	TX	38.0
43	NC	39.0
47	SC	44.5
48	LA	46.0
50	FL	50.0

ⁱ SOURCE: "The Camelot Index," *State Policy Reports* 19:7 (April 2001): 5-15.

ⁱⁱ Measured by rates of violent and property crimes. Each measure is given equal weight. Best state = 1; worst state = 50.

Camelot Indexⁱ Educated Population Componentⁱⁱ

RANK	STATE	AVERAGE
1	KS	11.6
19	WV	24.6
20	OK	25.0
50 State Average		25.3
24	VA	26.4
32	NC	29.2
35	TX	30.0
37	FL	30.4
37	TN	30.4
14 Southern State Average		31.7
41	KY	32.2
43	AR	33.6
43	GA	33.6
46	AL	35.0
47	LA	35.2
47	SC	35.2
50	MS	42.8

ⁱ SOURCE: "The Camelot Index," *State Policy Reports* 19:7 (April 2001): 5-15

ⁱⁱ Measured by the Armed Forces Qualification test, pupil-teacher ratios, high school completion rates and higher education tuition and fees. Each measure is given equal weight. Best state = 1, worst state = 50.

Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life
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Publisher's Note

FERREL GUILLORY, Director

Since 1999, the Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life and the Program on the Humanities and Human Values have joined in an effort to provide state legislators with an enriching mid-career experience. More than 50 lawmakers from 10 states have taken part in the Executive Seminar for Southern Legislators on the campus of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

We built the third annual seminar, which ran from Nov. 11 to Nov. 14, around the themes of leadership and political courage. And we also had discussions on early childhood development, public education, biotechnology/genomics and religion in public life.

In filling out the evaluation form just before departing, one legislator praised the “total quality of the overall aspects of the seminar” — and added, “I can, without reservation, say in my more than 3 decades of public office — this was the best seminar or institute I have participated in.”

Former Gov. James Holshouser of North Carolina and former Gov. William Winter of Mississippi have made presentations at all three legislative seminars, as has UNC President Emeritus William Friday.

Dr. Charles Haynes, senior scholar at the First Amendment Center, led lawmakers through a consideration of John Winthrop and Roger Williams as the historical context for a consideration of contemporary church-state issues. Using John F. Kennedy's *Profiles in Courage* as a text, UNC General Counsel Leslie Winner, a former legislator, delivered a thoughtful, introspective presentation on the pressure on a lawmaker to balance personal convictions and effectiveness in representing constituents.

Legislators also heard from Dean Madeleine Grumet of the School of Education; George Lensing, professor of English; Dick Richardson, professor of political science; Bill Leuchtenburg, professor of history; Dr. Jim Evans of the School of Medicine; and Dick Clifford of the Frank Porter Graham Child Development Center, as well as state Sen. Howard Lee, Appeals Court Judge James Wynn and Ashley Thrift, chairman of the N.C. Partnership for Children. Willis Whichard, a former legislator, former judge and now Dean of the Campbell University Law School, served as moderator.

We owe special thanks to the N.C. Biotechnology Center, where Senior Vice President Kenneth Tindall led a discussion, and to the National Humanities Center for hosting a dinner for the legislators. ■