

**Thad Beyle**  
*Editor & Associate Director*  
beyle@email.unc.edu

**Joanne Scharer**  
*Managing Editor & Assistant Director*  
jscharer@email.unc.edu

**Ferrel Guillory**  
*Publisher & Director*  
guillory@unc.edu

*SouthNow* is a semi-annual publication of the Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

To receive an electronic version of future issues, send your name and e-mail address to SouthNow@unc.edu.

To subscribe to a printed version, call (919) 843-8174 or e-mail SouthNow@unc.edu.

## In This Issue

- 1 Publisher's Note
- 1 Budget Woes Sweep Across the South
- 1 Weaker Levers on State Budgets in the South
- 3 The 2002 Gubernatorial Races in Eight Southern States
- 6 Pundits Look at 2002
- 7 Institutional Powers of the Southern Governorships, 1960-2002
- 9 The Christian Right, the South, and State Politics
- 11 Online and Leading the Pack: Mark Warner's 2001 Web Site Journey
- 12 Governor Winter: The South, Then and Now

# SOUTH NOW

## Publisher's Note

FERREL GUILLORY

In this issue, published amid campaigns for governor, statewide offices and legislatures across the region, we attempt to bring some perspective to the fiscal crises afflicting most Southern states. Managing editor Joanne Scharer has monitored the surveys of states' budget activities. Of course, budgeting is a process with dynamics and calendars that differ from state to state, and surveys necessarily attempt to take a picture of a moving target. So we've tried to do our best to give an overview of the South's budget woes.

Meanwhile, editor Thad Beyle provides fresh material from his long experience — and his vast accumulation of data — in measuring the budget powers of governors. He also presents a statistical history of gubernatorial races in the region.

We thank the Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation for the grant that has enabled the Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life to continue offering the *SouthNow* series of newsletters and email updates. And, once again, we invite you to contribute to the storehouse of information on the South that we continue to build. ■

## Budget Woes Sweep Across the South

JOANNE SCHARER, *Managing Editor*

Most states have faced a bleak budget situation in the past year and may well face more of the same in 2003.

In the South, 11 states experienced revenue shortfalls in their general fund budgets, ranging from 3.9 percent in Alabama to 10 percent in Virginia during fiscal year 2002. In addition to revenue shortfalls, nine of the 14 Southern states had costs exceeding original budgeted amounts.

This article reviews the most up-to-date data gathered by the National Governors' Association (NGA), the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and other organizations such as the Rockefeller Institute of Government. While there has been ample national coverage of state budgets, the information here focuses specifically on the South.

Most budget overruns occurred in Medicaid (seven states), while children's health insurance and corrections also exceeded budgeted funds.

State strategies to balance FY 2002 budgets ranged from cuts in education to a reduced work week, and 10 states made further cuts after their 2002 budgets had passed.

The only Southern states without a revenue shortfall and corresponding budget cuts are those with significant oil, gas or mineral industries: Louisiana, Texas and West Virginia.

SEE **BUDGET WOES** ON PAGE 2 →

## Weaker Levers on State Budgets in the South

THAD BEYLE, *Pearsall Professor of Political Science, UNC-Chapel Hill*

Among the most important responsibilities a governor has involves handling the state budget — from developing it, to presenting it to the state legislature and getting it adopted, to administering it. This power was developed over the 20th century, and many reforms in the past few decades have made this a more effective tool for most governors.

An "Index of State Budget Process Quality" was developed by Hal Hovey several years ago.<sup>i</sup> His criteria include: the state's balanced budget requirements, the governor's power to reduce spending when necessary, the existence of stabilization funds, and how understandable the budget process is. This information is available in "Budget Processes in the South," published by the National Association of State Budget Officers.<sup>ii</sup>

A perfect score is 100 on the index, and those states' governors ranking higher on the index would have the ability to handle budget shortfalls more quickly than those in states lower in the ranking. But that does not remove the difficult choices facing governors and legislators in tough economic times.

Here are the guiding principles for the index as spelled out in *State Policy Reports*:<sup>iii</sup>

"Strong requirements for balanced budgets, particularly mandates in state constitutions for all stages in the budget process."

SEE **LEVERS** ON PAGE 10 →

As cuts have grown deeper and with an election year deterring tax increases, states are looking everywhere for potential funds, savings and reductions. Don Boyd, director of the Fiscal Studies Program at the Rockefeller Institute, said that states are resorting to gimmicks and procrastination, trying to sweep as much under the rug as possible while hoping that good times return quickly.<sup>i</sup> Further, some states are revisiting their revenue structures or considering other efficiency measures. The following summarizes some of the stop-gap measures states have implemented in the last year.

**Budget Cuts**

- ◆ Six states (AR, FL, MI, OK, SC, TN) made cuts in K-12 Education, and eight states cut funds for higher education (AR, FL, KY, MI, OK, SC, TN, VA).
- ◆ Seven states cut Medicaid and TANF (AR, FL, KY, MI, OK, SC and TN—Medicaid only), while eight made cuts in corrections (AR, FL, KY, MI, OK, SC, TN, VA).

**Revenue Measures**

- ◆ North Carolina raised income and sales taxes, but it was an exception.
- ◆ Along with Mississippi, North Carolina withheld local shares of tax revenue. While most states did not raise taxes, some enacted revenue measures that imposed additional costs on citizens. For example, South Carolina reinstated a sales tax on food purchases, and Florida and West Virginia increased fees.

**Employee-Related Measures**

- ◆ Florida was the only state that has had employee layoffs.
- ◆ Georgia reduced employee benefits, while Kentucky reduced the work week.
- ◆ Four states (KY, NC, OK, TN) restricted travel.

**Other Measures**

- ◆ As many as seven states tapped rainy day or other reserve funds or borrowed from special/dedicated funds (KY, MI, NC, OK, SC, TN, VA).
- ◆ Four states resorted to tobacco funds (KY, LA, MI, TN).
- ◆ Two states shifted capital projects to debt (GA, VA), while Tennessee delayed capital projects.
- ◆ North Carolina, Oklahoma and Tennessee instituted a freeze on purchases.

**The Outlook for 2003**

Despite an improving economic outlook, the budget FY 2003 picture for states across the nation and in the South remains dim. One possible reason is that services, a dominant element of the economy in many states, are not taxed. In the past, Florida, among other states, has considered taxing services from haircuts to golf lessons, but states have yet to adopt systems of taxing services. Not taxing Internet sales is another area where states are missing out on a potential revenue source.

Another component of state budget woes is the rise in health expenditures as a result of higher drug costs. According to the NGA, health care now accounts for 27 percent of all state spending.

“Governors are dealing with unprecedented fiscal pressure,” says Raymond C. Schepbach, executive director of the NGA. “Even as the economy turns around, the state budget forecast will remain stormy since revenue growth lags the recovery by at least 12 to 18 months.” The cost of Medicaid benefits, he said, “has reached the breaking point. The growth rate is simply unsustainable.”<sup>ii</sup> ■

*For additional information see:*  
[www.nga.org/cda/files/may2002fiscalsurvey.pdf](http://www.nga.org/cda/files/may2002fiscalsurvey.pdf),  
[www.rockinst.org/publications/state\\_fiscal\\_news.html](http://www.rockinst.org/publications/state_fiscal_news.html),  
 and [www.nasbo.org](http://www.nasbo.org).

<sup>i</sup>David E. Rosenbaum, “States Make Cuts and Increase Fees as Revenues Drop,” *The New York Times*, May 16, 2002, pp. A1 and A20.

<sup>ii</sup>Ibid.

**Estimated Budget Gaps in FY 2002**  
*(Shortfalls states eliminated or expect to eliminate by the end of FY 2002.)*

STATE	AMOUNT	PERCENT OF FY 2002 GENERAL FUND BUDGET
Alabama	\$160 million (education trust fund)	3.9%
Arkansas	\$164.4 million	4.2%
Florida	\$1.3 billion	6.6%
Georgia	\$700 million	4.8%
Kentucky	\$535 million	7.3%
Louisiana	NONE	—
Mississippi	\$200 million	5.6%
North Carolina	\$1.2 billion	8.3%
Oklahoma	\$284 million	8.3%
South Carolina	\$442 million	6.5%
Tennessee	\$400 million	5.2%
Texas	NONE	—
Virginia	\$1.5 billion	10%
West Virginia	NONE	—

SOURCE: National Conference of State Legislatures, 2002

# The 2002 Gubernatorial Races in Eight Southern States

THAD BEYLE, Pearsall Professor of Political Science, UNC-Chapel Hill

## Party Lines

Across the 50 states, Republicans dominated gubernatorial races, winning 60 of the 90 races between 1993 and 1998. Then beginning in 1999, Democratic candidates began to lead by winning 12 of the 14 races held between 1999 and 2001. Six of these 14 races were in Southern states, and Democrats won five.<sup>i</sup>

Of the 36 gubernatorial races occurring in the off-year 2002 elections, eight will be in Southern states. These gubernatorial seats are currently held by five Republicans and three Democrats.

Two of the eight 2002 races in the Southern states will be for open seats as governors Frank Keating-R of Oklahoma and Don Sundquist-R of Tennessee are term-limited and cannot run for reelection. Gov. Rick Perry-R of Texas, who as lieutenant governor became governor upon the resignation of then-Gov. George Bush in 2000, will be seeking election in his own right.

The remaining five races feature incumbent governors seeking their second terms — Democrats Don Siegelman of Alabama, Roy Barnes of Georgia and Jim Hodges of South Carolina, and Republicans Mike Huckabee of Arkansas and Jeb Bush of Florida.

Looking back at the electoral history of these eight Southern governors races, we can see some changes over the past four decades. Between 1962 and 1982, Democratic candidates dominated these races winning 37 of the 47 races (79 percent). Then beginning in 1986 the playing field leveled off and contests were more evenly split, with the Republican candidates winning 17 of the 32 races (53 percent), and in the 1990s they won 10 of the 16 races (63 percent).

Only Georgia remains as a state that has not had a Republican governor. Oklahoma and Tennessee have split the winners equally with five

SEE GOVERNORS ON PAGE 4 →

## Most and Least Expensive Southern Gubernatorial Races, Off-Year Elections, 1978–1998

### MOST EXPENSIVE (\$20+ MILLION)

\$Spent <sup>i</sup>	State/Year	Winner, Party	Type of Election
\$68.6M	TX-90	Richards, D	open seat
54.3	TX-86	Clements, R	incumbent defeated
51.2	FL-86	Martinez, R	open seat
41.2	TX-82	White, D	incumbent defeated
38.6	GA-98	Barnes, D	open seat
34.1	FL-90	Chiles, D	incumbent defeated
33.5	TN-94	Sundquist, R	open seat
31.7	TX-94	Bush, R	incumbent defeated
30.5	TX-78	Clements, R	incumbent defeated
25.4	TX-98	Bush, R	incumbent reelected
25.3	FL-94	Chiles, D	incumbent reelected
24.2	AL-98	Siegelman, D	incumbent defeated
23.7	TN-86	McWherter, D	open seat
23.5	GA-90	Miller, D	open seat
23.3	AL-94	James, R	incumbent defeated <sup>ii</sup>
20.2	AL-90	Hunt, R	incumbent reelected

### LEAST EXPENSIVE (LESS THAN \$7.5 MILLION)

\$Spent <sup>iii</sup>	State/Year	Winner, Party	Type of Election
7.4	SC-78	Riley, D	open seat
6.6	AR-82	Clinton, D	incumbent defeated
6.6	OK-94	Keating, R	open seat
6.5	AL-82	Wallace, D	open seat
6.2	OK-86	Bellmon, R	open seat
5.5	TN-98	Sundquist, R	incumbent reelected
3.7	AR-86	Clinton, D	incumbent reelected
3.6	OK-78	Nigh, R	open seat
3.5	AR-98	Huckabee, R	incumbent reelected <sup>iv</sup>
3.2	OK-98	Keating, R	incumbent reelected
3.0	SC-90	Campbell, R	incumbent reelected
2.4	TN-90	McWherter, D	incumbent reelected
2.4	AR-78	Clinton, D	open seat
1.3	GA-86	Harris, D	incumbent reelected
1.2	SC-82	Riley, D	incumbent reelected
1.0	GA-78	Busbee, D	incumbent reelected

<sup>i</sup> \$Spent = amount spent by candidates in the race converted to 2001 dollars.

<sup>ii</sup> Incumbent Gov. James E. Folsom Jr.–D became governor upon the resignation of the elected incumbent Guy Hunt–R. This was his first run to win the governorship in his own right.

<sup>iii</sup> \$Spent = amount spent by candidates in the race converted to 2001 dollars.

<sup>iv</sup> Incumbent Gov. Mike Huckabee–R became governor upon the resignation of the elected incumbent Jim Guy Tucker–D. This was his first run to win the governorship in his own right.

## Southern Off-Year Gubernatorial Races, 1962–1998

### PARTISAN SUCCESS BY YEAR

YEAR	# RACES	WINNER	
		DEM.	REP.
1962 <sup>i</sup>	7	6	1
1966 <sup>ii</sup>	8	5	3
1970 <sup>iii</sup>	8	7	1
1974 <sup>iv</sup>	8	7	1
1978 <sup>v</sup>	8	6	2
1982 <sup>vi</sup>	8	6	2
1986 <sup>vii</sup>	8	3	5
1990 <sup>viii</sup>	8	6	2
1994 <sup>ix</sup>	8	3	5
1998 <sup>x</sup>	8	3	5

### PARTISAN SUCCESS BY STATE

STATES	WINNER	
	DEM.	REP.
GA	10	0
AL	7	3
AR	7	3
FL	6	3
SC	6	4
TX	6	4
OK	5	5
TN	5	5

<sup>i</sup> Dem. wins: AL, AR, GA, SC, TN, TX; Rep. win: OK. Prior to the 1966 election, Florida gubernatorial elections were held in presidential years.

<sup>ii</sup> Dem. wins: AL, GA, SC, TN, TX; Rep. wins: AR, FL, OK

<sup>iii</sup> Dem. wins: AL, AR, FL, GA, OK, SC, TX; Rep. win: TN

<sup>iv</sup> Dem. wins: AL, AR, FL, GA, OK, TN, TX; Rep. win: SC. Up until the 1974 election in Texas, gubernatorial terms were for two years so their gubernatorial elections were on an a presidential year, off-year basis. Beginning with the 1974 election, gubernatorial terms have been for four years.

<sup>v</sup> Dem. wins: AL, AR, FL, GA, OK, SC; Rep. wins: TN, TX

<sup>vi</sup> Dem. wins: AL, FL, GA, OK, SC, TX; Rep. wins: AR, TN

<sup>vii</sup> Dem. wins: AL, AR, TN; Rep. wins: AL, FL, OK, SC, TX. Up until the 1986 election in Arkansas, gubernatorial terms were for two years so their gubernatorial elections were on a presidential year, off-year basis. Beginning with the 1986 election, gubernatorial terms have been for four years.

<sup>viii</sup> Dem. wins: AR, FL, GA, OK, TN, TX; Rep. wins: AL, SC

<sup>ix</sup> Dem. wins: AR, FL, GA; Rep. wins: AL, OK, SC, TN, TX

<sup>x</sup> Dem. wins: AL, GA, SC; Rep. wins: AR, FL, OK, TN, TX

Democrats and five Republicans winning these off-year elections. The other five states lie between these two points with Democratic candidates having held a slight edge.

**Campaign Costs**

The average cost, in inflation-adjusted 2001 dollars, of the 50 gubernatorial races held in these eight states between 1978 and 1998 was just over \$16 million.<sup>ii</sup> But this overall average does hide some significant variation among

the states. For example, over these two decades the average cost of the six races in Texas was just under \$42 million each, while in Arkansas the average of the eight races there was just under \$4.3 million. And the range of costs is staggering. The most expensive race was the 1990 race in Texas for an open seat (\$68.6 million), while the least expensive race was in the 1978 race in Georgia in which the incumbent was reelected (\$1.0 million).

Like elsewhere in the states, the big jump in the costs of elections came in the mid-1980s as political campaigns with consultants, TV advertising and polling became the rule. The jump is seen between the 1982 and the 1986 elections, when the cost of these elections rose by 82 percent, from \$92.2 million to \$167.9 million. Campaign costs increased slightly between 1986 and 1990 to \$172.5 million (+3 percent), but in the last two off-year election years have fallen off to \$123.2 million in 1998 (-29 percent).

Looking at the high- and low-cost races over the period provides some trends. In those 16 races costing more than \$20 million, seven involved incumbent governors being defeated, and six were for open seats. Only three were for races in which an incumbent won a new term. In those 15 races that cost less than \$7.5 million, nine were incumbent reelection races, six were for open seats, and only one saw an incumbent being defeated. So, it costs a lot more to win an open seat and oust an incumbent than it does for an incumbent to win another term.

Size of the state in terms of population is clearly a factor here, too. All six of the Texas races cost more than \$25 million, as did three of Florida's races. At the other end of the size of state continuum, four of the six races in Arkansas and Oklahoma cost less than \$7.5 million. So did three of the South Carolina races. So, the larger the state the more it costs to run gubernatorial campaigns. ■

<sup>i</sup> In 1999 Democratic candidates won in KY and MS, but lost in LA. In 2000, Democratic candidates won in NC and WV, and in 2001 the Democrat won in VA.

<sup>ii</sup> We are restricted in this analysis by the dates that states began to collect and report the costs of gubernatorial elections. Hence, the analysis can only go back as far as the 1978 races for these eight states.

**Job Approval Ratings**

**JOB APPROVAL RATINGS FOR INCUMBENT GOVERNORS SEEKING REELECTION**

GOVERNOR/PARTY/STATE	ELECTIONS <sup>i</sup>		RANGE		LAST RATING <sup>ii</sup>		
	1ST	LAST	HIGH-LOW	YEARS	%POS	%NEG	DATE
Rick Perry, R-TX <sup>iv</sup>	—	—	67-47	2001	67	22	11/01
Roy Barnes, D-GA	98	98	87-53	1999-01	57	40	7/01
Jeb Bush, R-FL	98	98	63-51	1999-02	62	38	6/02
Mike Huckabee, R-AR <sup>vii</sup>	98	98	70-53	1996-02	53	46	6/02
Don Siegelman, D-AL	98	98	65-40	1999-01	45	52	11/01
Jim Hodges, D-SC	98	98	42	2000	42	48	1/00

**JOB APPROVAL RATINGS FOR OTHER SOUTHERN GOVERNORS NOT UP FOR REELECTION**

GOVERNOR/PARTY/STATE	ELECTIONS <sup>i</sup>		RANGE		LAST RATING <sup>ii</sup>			
	1ST	LAST	HIGH-LOW	YEARS	%POS	%NEG	DATE	
Mike Foster, R-LA	95	99	82-54	1996-00	69	29	4/00	
Paul Patton, D-KY	95	99	71-45	1996-02	61	27	3/02	
Bob Wise, D-WV	00	00	68-59	2001-02	59	37	1/02	
Frank Keating, R-OK <sup>viii</sup>	94	98	74-50	1995-2001	56	??	12/01	
Mike Easley, D-NC	00	00	53-46	2001-02	49	20	4/02	
Ron Musgrove, D-MS	99	99	51-36	2000-02	41	53	4/02	
Don Sundquist, R-TN <sup>ix</sup>	94	98	66-41	1995-00	41	57	3/00	
Mark Warner, D-VA	01	01	No polls available					

**Pollsters:**

- AL – U of So. AL/Mobile Register Poll
- FL – Mason-Dixon Poll
- KY – Bluegrass State Poll
- MS – MS State U Poll
- OK – OK Poll, Tulsa World Poll
- TN – Mason-Dixon Poll
- WV – WV Poll - RMS Research
- AR – Cooper & Secrest-D
- GA – Mason-Dixon Poll
- LA – U of New Orleans Poll
- NC – Elon University Poll
- SC – Mason-Dixon Poll
- TX – Scripps-Howard Poll

<sup>i</sup> 1st election = when the governor was first elected governor; last = the most recent election of the governor.  
<sup>ii</sup> % pos = the percent of the respondents indicating a positive feeling toward the governor's job performance (excellent, good, approve, etc.); % neg = the percent of the respondents indicating a negative feeling toward the governor's job performance (fair, poor, very poor, disapprove, etc.).  
<sup>iii</sup> As lieutenant governor, Huckabee became governor upon the resignation of incumbent Governor Jim Guy Tucker-D. He was sworn in on July 15, 1996. In 1998, he ran and won election as governor in his own right.  
<sup>iv</sup> As lieutenant governor, Perry became governor upon the resignation of incumbent Governor George W. Bush. He was sworn in on December 21, 2000. In 2002, he is running to win election as governor in his own right.  
<sup>v</sup> 1st election = when the governor was first elected governor; last = the most recent election of the governor.  
<sup>vi</sup> % pos = the percent of the respondents indicating a positive feeling toward the governor's job performance (excellent, good, approve, etc.); % neg = the percent of the respondents indicating a negative feeling toward the governor's job performance (fair, poor, very poor, disapprove, etc.).  
<sup>vii</sup> Governor Keating is term limited and cannot seek reelection.  
<sup>viii</sup> Governor Sundquist is term limited and cannot seek reelection.

## The 1978–1998 History of the Gubernatorial Races in the South

STATE	2002 STATUS	GEN. ELECTION VOTE			CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES <sup>i</sup>		
		TOTAL VOTES	%	ACTUAL \$	2001\$ <sup>ii</sup>	W% <sup>iii</sup>	COST PER VOTE <sup>iv</sup>
<b>Alabama (incumbent)</b>							
1998	Don Siegelman, D	1,317,842	58	22,320,478	24,182,533	34.5	18.35
1994	Fob James Jr., R	1,201,969	50.5	19,485,301	23,335,690	16.4	19.41
1990	Guy Hunt, R	1,245,626	53	14,848,688	20,174,848	27.9	16.20
1986	Guy Hunt, R	1,233,366	56	10,071,783	16,323,797	9.5	13.24
1982	George Wallace, D	1,091,353	58	3,509,600	6,451,471	42.2	5.91
1978 <sup>v</sup>	Fob James Jr., D	748,849	74	2,906,526	7,919,689	82.1	10.58
<b>Arkansas (incumbent)</b>							
1998	Mike Huckabee, R	706,011	60	3,204,489	3,471,819	73.8	4.92
1994	Jim Guy Tucker, D	716,840	60	3,608,127	4,321,110	63.8	6.03
1990	Bill Clinton, D	696,209	57	6,020,788	8,180,418	42.5	11.75
1986	Bill Clinton, D	688,266	64	2,252,906	3,651,387	70.9	5.31
1984	Bill Clinton, D	886,548	63	1,944,113	3,323,270	45.0	3.75
1982	Bill Clinton, D	789,351	55	3,584,467	6,589,094	46.5	8.35
1980	Frank White, R	838,925	52	1,048,816	2,260,379	45.3	2.69
1978	Bill Clinton, D	523,867	63	880,616	2,399,499	80.5	4.58
<b>Florida (incumbent)</b>							
1998	Jeb Bush, R	3,964,441	53	12,020,990	13,023,824	59.1	3.29
1994	Lawton Chiles, D	4,206,076	50.9	21,121,103	25,294,734	28.3	6.01
1990	Lawton Chiles, D	3,515,079	57	25,086,370	34,084,742	30.9	9.70
1986	Bob Martinez, R	3,386,145	55	31,596,036	51,209,135	23.3	15.12
1982	Bob Graham, D	2,688,576	65	4,222,742	7,762,393	66.4	2.89
1978	Bob Graham, D	2,530,468	56	6,095,619	16,609,316	45.4	6.56
<b>Georgia (incumbent)</b>							
1998	Roy Barnes, D	1,792,748	53	35,584,066	38,552,618	30.8	21.50
1994	Zell Miller, D	1,545,297	51	11,950,762	14,312,290	49.5	9.26
1990	Zell Miller, D	1,449,652	53	17,269,807	23,464,412	36.0	16.19
1986	Joe Frank Harris, D	1,174,969	71	807,907	1,309,412	86.9	1.11
1982	Joe Frank Harris, D	1,166,890	63	6,475,316	11,903,154	45.9	10.20
1978	George Busbee, D	662,711	81	385,269	1,049,779	83.9	1.58
<b>Oklahoma (open seat)</b>							
1998	Frank Keating, R	873,585	58	2,953,507	3,199,899	77.7	3.66
1994	Frank Keating, R	995,012	47	5,484,887	6,568,727	17.6	6.60
1990	David Walters, D	911,314	57	9,225,182	12,534,215	28.7	13.75
1986	Henry Bellmon, R	897,172	47	3,856,223	6,249,956	32.0	6.97
1982	George Nigh, D	880,366	62	2,334,799	4,291,910	53.5	4.88
1978	George Nigh, D	769,295	51.7	1,328,185	3,619,033	62.3	4.70
<b>South Carolina (incumbent)</b>							
1998	Jim Hodges, D	1,070,869	53	9,173,883	9,939,202	41.9	9.28
1994	David Beasley, R	933,730	50.5	12,322,069	14,756,969	27.0	15.80
1990	Carroll Campbell, R	760,965	71	2,218,997	3,014,942	84.2	3.96
1986	Carroll Campbell, R	745,890	51	6,865,817	11,127,742	44.0	14.92
1982	Richard Riley, D	671,625	70	651,799	1,198,160	81.7	1.78
1978	Richard Riley, D	621,962	61	2,727,090	7,430,763	32.3	11.95
<b>Tennessee (open seat)</b>							
1998	Don Sundquist, R	976,236	69	5,068,839	5,491,700	97.8	5.63
1994	Don Sundquist, R	1,487,049	54	27,990,695	33,521,790	25.8	22.54
1990	Ned McWherter, D	790,381	61	1,788,592	2,430,152	88.8	3.07
1986	Ned McWherter, D	1,201,051	54	14,635,836	23,720,966	28.1	19.75
1982	Lamar Alexander, R	1,238,900	60	6,979,265	12,829,531	57.3	10.36
1978	Lamar Alexander, R	1,185,454	56	6,761,642	18,424,093	30.7	15.54
<b>Texas (incumbent)<sup>vi</sup></b>							
1998	George W. Bush, R	3,738,483	69	23,402,959	25,355,319	84.1	6.78
1994	George W. Bush, R	4,396,242	54	26,435,001	31,658,684	45.1	7.20
1990	Ann Richards, D	3,726,704	51	50,537,239	68,664,727	22.7	18.43
1986	William Clements, R	3,398,294	53	33,515,785	54,320,559	32.6	15.98
1982	Mark White, D	3,163,479	53	22,421,472	41,215,941	39.8	13.03
1978	William Clements, R	2,350,818	50.0	11,183,157	30,471,817	67.9	12.96

### NOTES:

<sup>i</sup> Campaign Expenditures = Actual\$ - amount spent in that year's dollars; 2001\$ - amount spent in 2001 dollar value.

<sup>ii</sup> 2001\$ = is the reported amount converted to July 2001 dollar equivalents to control for the effect of inflation. Based on the Consumer Price Index-Urban with 1982-84 = 1.000, the July 2001 CPI-U = 1.775. To determine each year's July 2001\$ value, that year's CPI-U was divided by the July 2001 1.775 value. 1978 CPI-U [.652] in 2001\$ was .367; 1980 CPI-U [.824] in 2001\$ was .464; 1982 CPI-U [.965] in 2001\$ was .544; 1984 CPI-U [1.039] in 2001\$ was .585; the 1986 CPI-U [1.096] in 2001\$ was .617; the 1990 CPI-U [1.307] in 2001\$ was .736; the 1994 CPI-U [1.483] in 2001\$ was .835; and the 1998 CPI-U [1.639] in 2001\$ was .923. Then the amount spent in that year's election by gubernatorial candidates was divided by that year's 2001\$ CPI-U figure to get the 2001\$ equivalent spent.

<sup>iii</sup> W% = % of the total expenditures that the winner spent.

<sup>iv</sup> The 2001 amount divided by the total General Election Vote

<sup>v</sup> 1978 dollar expenditures for every state except Texas are for the two major party general election candidates only.

<sup>vi</sup> Incumbent Gov. Rick Perry moved up from lieutenant governor upon the resignation of Gov. George W. Bush in 2000.

# A Look at 2002

THAD BEYLE, Pearsall Professor of Political Science, UNC-Chapel Hill

The election year is heating up as measured by the number of candidates announcing, staffs and consultants being hired, money being raised, and political polls being taken and reported. So what is the view for 2002?

## Incumbents

What kind of “electoral mandate” did the incumbents receive in winning their first term in 1998? Of the eight races in the South in 2002, there are six incumbents seeking another term. One of them, Rick Perry, R-TX, is an “accidental governor” who, as lieutenant governor, moved into the governor’s chair upon the resignation of the incumbent governor George W. Bush. So he has no previous “political mandate” except as a lieutenant governor. The other five incumbents seeking another term won by mandates ranging from +21 points (Mike Huckabee, R-AR) to +8 points (Jim Hodges, D-SC). Within this range were mandates of +16 points Don Siegelman, D-AL, +10 points (Jeb Bush, R-FL), and +9 points (Roy Barnes, D-GA). All seemed to win handily in 1998, and there were no really tight or narrow wins involved that might indicate a weak mandate for their service.

What kind of job as governor have they done? While there are many ways of measuring this and many diverse opinions on this question depending on whose opinion it is. So, opinion polls asking citizens and voters in the state just how good a job they feel the governor has done can be used as a surrogate for this.

As indicated in Table 1 on Page 4, “Job Approval Ratings for Incumbent Governors Seeking Reelection,” the results of fairly recent polls indicate a set of positive ratings ranging from a high of 70 percent approval for Huckabee-AR to a low of 42 percent for Hodges-SC. One “rule of thumb” some political consultants use is that when an elected official’s positive job approval ratings drop below 50 percent, they are vulnerable. Using this as a guide would suggest that Siegelman-AL (42 percent) and Hodges-SC (45 percent) are vulnerable, while the others with ratings above 50 percent are in much less vulnerable. This less vulnerable category would include Perry-TX, who had a 67 percent positive job approval rating despite being an “accidental governor.”

## The Pundits

Of course, we can’t forget “the pundits” who make their living making political projections. Three have set out their projections so far: Stuart Rothenberg, publisher of *The Rothenberg Political Report*; Charles Cook, publisher of *The Cook Political Report*; and Ron Faucheux, editor of *Campaigns & Elections*. Their projections are in the table below, “Pundits on the 2002 Southern Gubernatorial Races.”

They seem to agree that Barnes-GA and Huckabee-AR look to be heading for a second term. The possibility of Bush-FL and Hodges-SC winning a second term is less certain, but they do have a slight edge at this point. While also only holding a slight advantage at this time, Perry-TX also appears likely to win his first full term. At the other end of the spectrum, they agree that Siegelman-AL is in serious trouble of not winning a second term.

We’ll have to wait until November to see how well these signals hold up when the voters go into the voting booths. ■

## Pundits on the 2002 Southern Gubernatorial Races

8 GOVERNOR’S CHAIRS UP 5R, 3D	POM 3/02	ODDS	CPR 4/02	RPR 4/26/02
Barnes, D-GA	LNR	3-1D	S	CS
Bush, R-FL	PR	3-2R	V	NA
Hodges, D-SC	PR	4-3D	V	NA
Huckabee, R-AR	LNR	3-1R	S	CS
OPEN, Keating, R-OK	PR	4-3R	PS	CA
Perry, R-TX	PR	5-4R	PS	NA
Siegelman, D-AL	SR	12-11D	HV	LT
OPEN, Sundquist, R-TN	CR	Even	HV	TU

### NOTES:

For OK and TN the reports assess the incumbent party’s chance of holding the seat.

CPR – *The Cook Political Report*: HV – Highly Vulnerable; V – Vulnerable; PS – Probably Safe; S – Safe. (April 27, 2002).

POM – *Campaign Insider’s Political Odds Maker*. CR – critical risk; SR – serious risk; PR – potential risk; LNR – little or no risk. The numbers are the odds on the D or R candidate winning. 3-1 = 75% chance; 3-2 = 60% chance; 4-3 = 57.1% chance; 5-4 = 55.6% chance; 12-11 = 52.2% chance. [Web site www.campaignline.com, March 26, 2002].

RPR – *The Rothenberg Political Report*: CS – Currently Safe for incumbent; CA – Clear Advantage for Incumbent Party; NA – Narrow Advantage for Incumbent Party; LT – lean takeover by other party; TU – Toss Up. [April 26, 2002].

# Institutional Powers of the Southern Governorships, 1960–2002

THAD BEYLE, Pearsall Professor of Political Science, UNC-Chapel Hill

What powers do Southern governors find available to them? The “Index of Formal Powers of the Governorship,” first developed by Joseph Schlesinger in the 1960s, consists of six different indices of gubernatorial power that I have updated through 2002.

These indices include the number and importance of separately elected executive-branch officials, the tenure potential for governors, the appointment power for administrative and board positions in the executive branch, the governor’s budgetary power, veto power, and the partisan control of the governorship

and the state legislature. Each of the individual indices is set in a five-point scale (*see the box on this page for details*).

Table 1 shows that over the four decades since 1960, the overall institutional powers of

SEE **POWERS** ON PAGE 8 →

**Table 1:**  
**Governors’ Institutional Powers, 1960 vs. 2002**

SPECIFIC POWER	SCORES		% CHANGE
	1960	2002	
<b>SEP</b>			
All 50 states	2.3	2.9	+26
14 Southern	1.9	2.0	+ 5
36 Non-Southern	2.9	3.3	+14
<b>TP</b>			
All 50 states	3.2	4.1	+28
14 Southern	2.9	4.0	+38
36 Non-Southern	3.4	4.2	+24
<b>AP</b>			
All 50 states	2.9	3.1	+ 7
14 Southern	2.3	2.8	+22
36 Non-Southern	3.1	3.2	+ 3
<b>BP</b>			
All 50 states	4.0	3.1	-23
14 Southern	3.4	3.0	-12
36 Non-Southern	4.2	3.1	-26
<b>VP</b>			
All 50 states	2.8	4.5	+61
14 Southern	2.4	4.5	+88
36 Non-Southern	2.9	4.5	+55
<b>PC</b>			
All 50 states	3.6	3.2	-11
14 Southern	4.7	3.2	-32
36 Non-Southern	3.2	3.1	- 3
<b>TOTALS</b>			
All 50 states	3.1	3.5	+13
14 Southern	2.9	3.3	+14
36 Non-Southern	3.3	3.6	+ 9

NOTES:  
 SEP – Separately elected executive branch officials.  
 TP – Tenure potential of governors.  
 AP – Governor’s appointment power.  
 BP – Governor’s budget power.  
 VP – Governor’s veto power.  
 PC – Gubernatorial party control.  
 Scores – sum of the scores on the six individual indices divided by six to keep a 5-point scale.

## Institutional Powers of the Governorship

**SEP** — Separately elected executive branch officials: 5 = only governor or governor/lieutenant governor team elected; 4.5 = governor or governor/lieutenant governor team, with one other elected official; 4 = governor/lieutenant governor team with officials (attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer, auditor) elected; 3 = governor/lieutenant governor team with process officials, and some major and minor policy officials elected; 2.5 = governor (no team) with six or fewer officials elected, but none are major policy officials; 2 = governor (no team) with six or fewer officials elected, including one major policy official; 1.5 = governor (no team) with six or fewer officials elected, but two are major policy officials; 1 = governor (no team) with seven or more process and several major policy officials elected.

**TP** — Tenure potential of governors: 5 = four-year term, no restraint on reelection; 4.5 = four-year term, only three terms permitted; 4 = four-year term, only two terms permitted; 3 = four-year term, no consecutive election permitted; 2 = two-year term, no restraint on reelection; 1 = two-year term, only two terms permitted.

**AP** — Governor’s appointment powers in six major functional areas: corrections, K-12 education, health, highways/transportation, public utilities regulation, and welfare. The six individual office scores are totaled and then averaged and rounded to the nearest .5 for the state score. 5 = governor appoints, no other approval needed; 4 = governor appoints, a board, council or legislature approves; 3 = someone else appoints, governor approves or shares appointment; 2 = someone else appoints, governor and others approve; 1 = someone else appoints, no approval or confirmation needed.

**BP** — Governor’s budget power: 5 = governor has full responsibility, legislature may not increase executive budget; 4 = governor has full responsibility, legislature can increase by special majority vote or subject to item veto; 3 = governor has full responsibility, legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget; 2 = governor shares responsibility, legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget; 1 = governor shares responsibility with other elected official, legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget.

**VP** — Governor’s veto power: 5 = has item veto and a special majority vote of the legislature is needed to override a veto (three-fifths of legislators elected or two-thirds of legislators present); 4 = has item veto with a majority of the legislators elected needed to override; 3 = has item veto with only a majority of the legislators present needed to override; 2 = no item veto, with a special legislative majority needed to override it; 1 = no item veto, only a simple legislative majority needed to override.

**PC** — Gubernatorial party control: the governor’s party: 5 = has a substantial majority (75% or more) in both houses of the legislature; 4 = has a simple majority in both houses (less than 75%, or a substantial majority in one house and a simple majority in the other); 3 = split party control in the legislature or a nonpartisan legislature; 2 = simple minority (more than 25%) in both houses, or a simple minority in one house and a substantial minority (less than 25%) in the other house; 1 = a substantial minority in both houses.

**Total** — sum of the scores on the six individual indices. Score — total divided by six to keep 5-point scale.

the governors in the 50 states increased. Comparing the 14 Southern states with the 36 non-Southern states, indicates that the greatest increase in gubernatorial powers came in the South (14 percent increase in Southern states, 9 percent increase in the non-Southern states).

The greatest strengthening came in veto power (61 percent) as more governors gained an item veto. After two centuries, the North Carolina governor finally won veto power in a 1996 amendment to the N.C. Constitution approved by the voters. This probably accounts for greater growth in veto power in the Southern states (+88 percent) than in the non-Southern states (+55 percent).

There were also significant increases in the tenure potential of governors over the four decades. All but two states moved to four-year terms and allowed governors more succession rights than they had in 1960. The Southern states gained more (+38 percent) than the other 36 states (+24 percent) so that there is now not much difference between North and South in gubernatorial tenure. Still, Virginia holds its governor to a single term while New Hampshire and Vermont still have short two-year terms for their governors.

The 50-state gubernatorial budgetary powers actually showed a decline over the period (-23 percent), although the decline was less in the Southern states (-12 percent). However, during this same period, state legislatures were also undergoing considerable reform and gaining more power to work on the governor's proposed budget. Hence, while some governors may have seen increased budgetary powers, there were also increased legislative budgetary powers that more than balanced out gubernatorial leverage.

There was a considerable change in partisan control of the governorship and state legislatures — mostly in the Southern states. While many of the non-Southern states have long suffered from split control of state government, the rise of the Southern Republican Party has brought the same "power-split" to the South. This is not likely to change as two-party politics has become the norm in most Southern states.

Table 2 compares the Southern states in terms the strength of governorships. At the top of the list is West Virginia (4.3) followed by Kentucky (3.7), Florida and Tennessee (3.6). The least powerful governorship is Oklahoma (2.7), a bit weaker than the governorships in South Carolina (2.8) and North Carolina (2.9).

A cautionary point: Individual governors can bring their own skills to the job that can overcome institutional shortcomings. Likewise, a governor lacking in personal skills can reduce the impact of what normally might be seen as a strong governorship. So, remember this article focuses on the governorship itself and not the individuals who have been holding these offices. ■

SOURCE/NOTES:

Parts of this article are taken from the author's chapter "Governors: Elections, Powers and Priorities," in *The Book of the States, 2002-2003* (Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments, forthcoming 2002).

Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," *Politics in the American States*, 1st and 2nd ed., ed. Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, (Boston: Little Brown, 1965 and 1971).

Thad L. Beyle, "The Governors," *Politics in the American States*, 7th ed., ed. Virginia Gray, Russell L. Hanson and Herbert Jacob, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1999). Earlier versions of this index by the author appeared in the 4th edition (1983), the 5th edition (1990) and the 6th edition (1996).

**Table 2:**  
**Southern Governors' Institutional Powers, 1960 vs. 2002**

STATE	TYPE OF POWER — 1960/2002 SCORES						TOTAL		CHANGE %
	SEP	TP	AP	BP	VP	PC	1960	2002	
AL	1/1	3/4	3/3	5/3	4/4	5/4	3.5	3.2	+ 9
AR	2.5/2.5	2/4	2/3	5/3	2/4	5/2	3.1	3.1	0
FL	3/3	3/4	2/2.5	1/3	2/5	5/4	2.7	3.6	+33
GA	1/1	3/4	1/2	5/3	3/5	5/4	3.0	3.2	+ 7
KY	3/3	3/4	4/4	5/3	2/4	5/4	3.7	3.7	0
LA	1/1	3/4	2/3.5	4/3	4/5	5/2	3.2	3.1	- 0.3
MS	1/1.5	3/4	1/2	1/3	2/5	5/4	2.2	3.3	+50
NC	1/1	3/4	2/3.5	4/3	0/2	5/4	2.5	2.9	+16
OK	1/1	3/4	1/1	5/3	4/5	5/2	3.2	2.7	- 16
SC	1/1	3/4	1/2	1/2	2/5	5/3	2.2	2.8	+27
TN	4.5/4.5	3/4	5/4	5/3	1/4	5/2	3.9	3.6	- 8
TX	1/2	2/5	1/1	1/2	3/5	5/3	2.2	3.0	+36
VA	2.5/2.5	3/3	5/3.5	5/3	4/5	5/2	4.1	3.2	- 22
WV	1/2.5	3/4	3/4	1/5	1/5	1/5	1.7	4.3	+153
1960 avg.	1.9	2.9	2.3	3.4	2.4	4.7	2.9		
2002 avg.	2.0	4.0	2.8	3.0	4.5	3.2	3.3		
%+/-	+ 5%	+38%	+22%	-12%	+88%	-32%	+14%		

NOTES:  
 SEP – Separately elected executive branch officials; TP – Tenure potential; AP – Appointment power; BP – Budget power; VP – Veto power; PC – Gubernatorial party control.  
 Scores – Each of the six individual power scales is scored on a 5-point basis with 5 the high and 1 the low score. The explanation of the 5-point scoring for each of the power scales is contained in the box on Page 7. The totals are the sum of the six separate indices divided by six to keep within the 5-point basis.

# The Christian Right, the South, and State Politics

GREGORY A. PETTIS, Ph.D. candidate, Political Science, UNC-Chapel Hill

THAD BEYLE, Pearsall Professor of Political Science, UNC-Chapel Hill

The Christian Right arrived on the scene dramatically in 1980, its membership in President Reagan's electoral coalition indicative of a new politicization among religious conservatives. The movement flourished during the 1980s, spearheading campaigns against abortion rights and mobilizing supporters to vote for Republican candidates.

The dawn of the 1990s saw the Christian Right as an interest group engaged in some of the most high profile battles in American politics. John Persinos, then editor of *Campaigns and Elections*, sent surveys to 395 political observers in all 50 states, asking them how much influence they thought the Christian Right had in the state's Republican Party. Persinos asked the respondents to estimate two factors in particular: what percentage of the state GOP central committee supported the issue agenda of Christian conservatives, and the percentage of those on the committees who were members of the Christian Right organizations. Results from the survey allowed Persinos to rank the influence of the Christian Right in the state GOP as weak, moderate or strong. Far from being a monolithic political force, he found that the Christian Right was strong in some places and weak in others.<sup>i</sup> Eighteen states

reported that the Christian Right was in a strong position, 13 states were moderate, and 20 states reported weak influence.

Persinos found that much of the Christian Right's strength was in Southern states. Of the 18 states that reported strong Christian Right influence, 10 of them were in the South. Only two Southern states, Tennessee and West Virginia, reported weak influence. The story, then, was one with a distinctly regional tinge.

Kimberly Conger and John Green have recently revisited this research by re-administering the study to see how things have changed.<sup>ii</sup> They find that the South is still home to strong Christian Right movements, largely due to the large number of evangelical Protestants that live in the region. They find that the Christian Right has made gains in the Midwest, with little gained in the West and the Northeast. They conclude that the Christian Right is "spreading out and digging in," indicating that in many places its strength broadened (many states saw influence increase or decrease to the moderate category), but without a general move toward the Christian Right exercising political dominance.

The story in the South is one of continued strength, but the states where this strength lies is changing. While many states were classified as strong and continue to be classified so (Alabama, Arkansas, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia), several decreased from strong to moderate (Florida, Georgia, Louisiana and North Carolina). Two Southern states saw increased influence to become classified as strong (Mississippi and West Virginia), Tennessee increased from weak to moderate, and Kentucky was classified as moderate in both times. The effect of this, then, is that the number of Southern states reporting strong influence of the Christian Right in the Republican Party decreases from 10 to 8, the number of moderate states increases from 2 to 6, and the number of weak states decreases from 2 to zero.

But how does the Christian Right's changing influence in the South compare to other regions? To estimate a net effect, we have created a scale from Persinos' original measure of Christian Right influence. We have coded 1 as weak, 3 as moderate and 5 as strong. We then take averages for 1994 and 2000 by region to assess net increases or decreases in influence.

The most striking initial result is that the South

does have the highest amount of Christian coalition influence — a score of 4.1 out of 5. This is above the 3.4 national average in 2000. Its already high influence in the South is not increasing. The influence is increasing nationally, however, because it is increasing in every other region. The largest increase is in the Midwest, which had a 1.1 unit change, from below moderate influence (2.7) to above moderate influence (3.8). The other increases are small — 0.3 in the Northeast and 0.2 in the West, producing a 0.4 increase nationally.

Such findings are not entirely consistent with Conger and Green's characterization of the Christian Right as "spreading out and digging in." The vast majority of the "spreading out" obviously occurred during the 1980s. By 1994 the national average for Christian coalition

SEE CHRISTIAN RIGHT ON PAGE 10 →

**Table 1:**  
*Christian Right Influence in State Republican Parties by Region, 1994 vs. 2000<sup>i</sup>*

REGION	# STATES	1994 SCORE	2000 <sup>ii</sup> SCORE
South <sup>iii</sup>	14	4.1	4.1
50 States & DC		3.0	3.4
West <sup>iv</sup>	13	3.6	3.8
Midwest <sup>v</sup>	12	2.7	3.8
Northeast <sup>vi</sup>	12	1.5	1.8

<sup>i</sup> John Persinos, "Has the Christian Right Taken Over the Republican Party?" *Campaigns & Elections* 15:9 (September 1994): 20–24 and Kimberly H. Conger and John C. Green, "Spreading Out and Digging In: Christian Conservatives and State Republican Parties," *Campaigns & Elections* 23:1 (February 2002): 59.

<sup>ii</sup> To get a quantifiable scoring system for this measure of the strength of the Christian Right in the state's Republican Party the following scores were assigned: 5 = strong; 3 = moderate; 1 = weak.

<sup>iii</sup> AL AR FL GA KY LA MS NC OK SC TN TX VA WV

<sup>iv</sup> AK AZ CA CO HI ID MT NV NM OR UT WA WY

<sup>v</sup> IL IN IA KS MI MN MO NE ND OH SD WI

<sup>vi</sup> CT DE DC ME MD MA NH NJ NY PA RI VT

**Table 2:**  
*Christian Right Influence in Southern State Republican Parties, 1994–2000*

STATE	INFLUENCE IN STATE GOP 1994 <sup>i</sup>	2000 <sup>ii</sup>
AL	Strong	Strong
AR	Strong	Strong
OK	Strong	Strong
SC	Strong	Strong
TX	Strong	Strong
VA	Strong	Strong
MS	Moderate	Strong
WV	Weak	Strong
FL	Strong	Moderate
GA	Strong	Moderate
LA	Strong	Moderate
NC	Strong	Moderate
KY	Moderate	Moderate
TN	Weak	Moderate
#Strong	10	8
#Moderate	2	6
#Weak	2	0

<sup>i</sup> John Persinos, "Has the Christian Right Taken Over the Republican Party?" *Campaigns & Elections* 15:9 [September 1994]: 20–24.

<sup>ii</sup> Kimberly Conger and John C. Green, "Spreading Out and Digging In: Christian Conservatives and State Republican Parties," *Campaigns & Elections* 23:1 (February 2002): 58–60, 64

influence is already at the moderate level. After this point we do not see “digging in,” which would describe stagnating levels of influence, but instead increasing influence. This influence increases in every region of the country except for the region where it is already very strong — the South. This increase, while greater in some regions than others, accounts for a national increase of .4 units. Instead of the Christian Right “digging in,” or taking a defensive position to maintain their political gains, these results indicate they are “going on the offensive,” looking for gains in influence wherever they present themselves. From 1994 to 2000 the Midwest was the ripest region for these gains, but as stated before, they occurred in all regions.

While Conger and Green argue for “digging in,” they provide quite a bit of anecdotal evidence for “going on the offensive” as they describe the electoral exploits of the Christian Right in different regions. This is especially true for the Midwest, where the authors describe the Kansas Christian Right challenging

the incumbent governor in the primary and also taking control of the state school board to institute a pro-creationism education agenda. The Christian Right in both Ohio and Wisconsin have worked with their respective governors, in Illinois they mobilized for Sen. Peter Fitzgerald’s win in 1998, and in Missouri they worked for Sen. John Ashcroft’s losing campaign in 2000. Looking outside the Midwest, even in the toughest region for the Christian Right, the West, it is apparent that they engage in ambitious political battles. In 1998 and 2000 Washington state Christian Right candidates won Republican nominations for governor and senator, respectively. While they did lose the eventual elections, the Christian Right is competing politically whenever they can in a bid to increase their power. ■

<sup>i</sup> John Persinos, “Has the Christian Right Taken Over the Republican Party?” *Campaigns & Elections* 15:9 (September 1994): 20–24.

<sup>ii</sup> Kimberly H. Conger and John C. Green, “Spreading Out and Digging In: Christian Conservatives and State Republican Parties,” *Campaigns & Elections* 23:1 (February 2002): 58-60, 64.

“Extensive powers for governors to constrain spending, including line-item veto authority and the ability not to spend appropriated funds.”

“Large reserves held as balances or rainy day funds.”

“Understandable budgets that reveal the impacts of current decisions on future budgets, the use of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in budgeting, coverage of all state money and disclosure of why and on what money is being spent.”

In the 2002 version of the index, the scores in the 50 states range from a high of 93 in Georgia to a low of 36 in New Hampshire. The 50-state average score is 70, and the 14-Southern state average is 62.

Three Southern states have scores above the national average — Georgia, Louisiana and Florida. Seven of the Southern states score between 44 and 56 and rank 40 to 47 among the 50 states.

So as these lower scoring states address the budgetary problems brought on by our current economic situation, they might also address the very budgetary process itself so they would be better able to handle future problems the economy might visit upon them. ■

NOTE: This article is adapted from “Ranking State Budget Processes,” *State Policy Reports* 20:6 (March 2002): 9–22.

<sup>i</sup> Hovey served as state budget officer in Ohio and Illinois, was a consultant to many states and state organizations such as the National Governors’ Association and was founder and editor of *State Policy Reports*.

<sup>ii</sup> NASBO, *Budget Processes in the States* (Washington, DC: NASBO, January 2002). This report is also available on the organization’s Web site — [www.nasbo.org](http://www.nasbo.org).

<sup>iii</sup> “Ranking State Budgetary Processes,” 9–10.

### Southern State Budget Process Quality<sup>i</sup>

RANK	STATE	INDEX
1	GA	93
15	LA	77
19	FL	73
US Average .....		70
24	OK	69
25	KY	68
25	WV	68
32	MS	64
South Average.....		62
40	TX	56
40	TN	56
42	SC	53
43	AR	52
43	VA	52
46	AL	48
47	NC	44
50	NH	36

<sup>i</sup> From “Ranking State Budget Processes,” *State Policy Reports* 20:6 (March 2002): 9–22.

# Online and Leading the Pack: Mark Warner's 2001 Web Site Journey

STEVEN GOULD, 2002 UNC-Chapel Hill Political Science Honors Graduate, currently a Governor's Fellow in the office of Gov. Mark Warner, VA

In his successful 2001 bid for Virginia governor, Democrat Mark Warner set a new standard for online politics. In addition to reaching out to the state's rural localities and stressing fiscal responsibility, Warner utilized his technology background, rooted in the cellular phone industry, to maximize the effectiveness of his campaign.

With his gubernatorial campaign Web site, [www.markwarner2001.org](http://www.markwarner2001.org), Warner surpassed the Internet-based efforts of his Republican opponent, Mark Earley, [www.markearley.com](http://www.markearley.com), by displaying a better understanding of this increasingly influential and powerful electronic medium. This is perhaps best reflected in the two campaigns' expenditures on online campaigning; Warner spent \$100,000, dwarfing his opponent's \$13,000.<sup>i</sup> Both Warner and Earley allowed supporters to sign up for regular e-mail updates. However, their efforts yielded different results. By the end of his campaign, Warner had amassed a list of approximately 30,000 names on his e-mail list, twice as many as Earley.<sup>ii</sup>

Both Web sites offered users the option of sending electronic postcards to friends. These online greetings featured different text, graphics and pictures, as well as added touches of the campaign staff. The two candidates also attempted to reach out to Virginia's growing Hispanic population by offering Spanish versions of their sites.

Both Warner and Earley provided several Real Media clips on their respective sites. Warner allowed users to view a September 2000 Webcast conversation that he had with high school students in central and southwestern parts of the state.

In addition to accessing the extra multimedia options on Warner's Web site, users were also able to "Get Warner 2001 stuff for your computer." Features offered included "E-Bumper Stickers" and Warner campaign buttons, which were GIF images that users could download for use on their personal computers. By placing these ordinarily tangible accessories online, Warner opened up a new campaign front on the Internet. Supporters could now

access and much more easily distribute items bearing his likeness, logo, and Web site address.

Following his November win, the Warner campaign worked quickly to launch the "Governor-Elect's Transition Web Site," [www.warnertransition.com](http://www.warnertransition.com), which was unveiled one week after the election. Through this site, users could send the governor-elect an e-mail, contact the transition office and examine links pertaining to other points of interest within the state. The transition team also used their new online home to provide regular press releases announcing cabinet appointments and allowing Warner an opportunity to comment on the final decisions of outgoing Republican Gov. Gilmore.

The other major feature of the transition Web site was an option allowing users to submit their resumes online.

While the transition Web site did provide several basic and user-friendly options, it also began to take the relationship between technology and the Commonwealth to the next level. Via this site, supporters could view the "Webcast of the Inauguration of Governor Mark R. Warner" in real time. Although both Warner's and Earley's Web sites had previously allowed Virginians to use their Real Players to access and watch clips of the candidates, the sites had not provided this option while the event was occurring.

With his official Web site as the governor of Virginia, Warner has continued to raise the bar. The Commonwealth's official site, [www.myvirginia.org](http://www.myvirginia.org), which was ranked eighth nationally among other state Web sites by The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for The Business of Government, provides a

prominently displayed link to the governor's page.

Warner uses this official site for several of the same purposes as his transition site. By posting news releases on the front page of his site, Warner continues to provide Virginians with an additional way to learn about the workings of the state government. This is also accomplished through the online availability of all of the governor's executive orders during the legislative session.

Similar to his campaign Web site, Warner allows users to submit their e-mail addresses in order to receive "the latest news releases from the Governor." Through these e-mails, titled "The Governor's Update," Warner again helps to bridge the gap between the capital and the more distant areas of the Commonwealth. In addition to receiving recent general information via these e-mails, users can also choose to receive information about other issues of importance to them, such as education, technology, and gubernatorial appointments. For those interested in appointments to state boards and commissions, applications are available online in both Microsoft Word and Adobe Acrobat form.

With his three online homes, Mark Warner has demonstrated an understanding of the future of politics in Virginia and across the nation that candidates will undoubtedly study. ■

NOTE: Steven Gould graduated with honors from UNC at Chapel Hill in May. This article is based on his Senior Honors Thesis.

<sup>i</sup> Michael Cornfield, "Inching Forward," *Campaigns and Elections* 22:10 (2001): 45.

<sup>ii</sup> *Ibid.*

<b>Mark Warner's Web Site Journey, 2001-2002</b>					
<b>WEB SITE URL</b>	<b>REGULAR PRESS RELEASES/UPDATES</b>	<b>E-MAIL UPDATES</b>	<b>MULTIMEDIA OPTIONS</b>	<b>FLASH TECHNOLOGY</b>	<b>EN ESPANOL</b>
<a href="http://www.markwarner2001.org">www.markwarner2001.org</a>	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
<a href="http://www.warnertransition.com">www.warnertransition.com</a>	yes	no	yes	no	no
<a href="http://www.governor.state.va.us">www.governor.state.va.us</a>	yes	yes	yes	yes	no

Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life  
School of Journalism and Mass Communication  
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

CB #3365  
University of North Carolina  
Chapel Hill, N.C. 27599-3365

Non-Profit Organization  
U.S Postage  
**PAID**  
Permit No. 177  
Chapel Hill, N.C.

## Winter: The South, Then and Now

*Former Governor Winter of Mississippi addressed the June 3 inaugural meeting of a new board for the Center for the Study of the American South at UNC-Chapel Hill. The board will serve in an advisory capacity to the Center as well as the Southern Oral History Program and the Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life. Excerpts from Governor Winter's speech follows:*

The irony is that even though we have put behind us here in the South so much of what had been wrong and indefensible and have achieved this greatly increased level of material affluence and productivity that we once thought would automatically produce a good society, we are finding instead a disturbing lack of civil discourse and an increase of partisan rancor, a growing gap between the haves and the have-nots, a predisposition to getting while the getting is good, and a continuing lack of trust between blacks and whites. And so in our self-centered preoccupation with our own private interests we tend to stop talking to each other and retreat literally and figuratively into little enclaves behind locked gates, living in suspicion and distrust of our neighbors and our neighbors living in ignorance of us.

This is where this university and this center must call into play the collected wisdom and inspiration of those who have done so much

to shape this region for the better, who have helped preserve its noblest qualities, and who, if we will only listen, will help us to avoid the nightmare that David Cohn once said was too often our common fate, "With heaven in sight, we insist on marching perversely into hell."

These fountainheads of wisdom cannot be reserved just for the bastions of the intellectual. They must be made a part of the currency of the marketplace and the arena of public policy-making. That is why this center must be involved with citizens and public leaders across the region, mobilizing that spirit of community and good will that still exists in abundance but that so often gets overlooked and overwhelmed by the political hucksters and the fast buck fortune-seekers.

We must work to instill in more of our community leaders the vision and civic courage that will cause them to confront and deal with difficult public issues whether on race relations or urban sprawl or education or housing or health care before they spiral out of control. So many of these local officials work in lonely and isolated situations without the benefit of wise and knowledgeable advisors. They need all the help they can get to protect them from the raw and uncompromising pressures of biased or uninformed public opinion.... ■