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Follow the Money: Campaign Spending in Governor's Race 2000

THAD BEYLE, *Pearsall Professor of Political Science*

FERREL GUILLORY, *Director, Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life*

(EDITOR'S NOTE: This article draws on research in the campaign finance reports of the major-party gubernatorial candidates by Evan Sauda, a 2001 UNC graduate, now a law student at Washington and Lee University, who spent last summer as an intern in the Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life. In addition, the authors organized a seminar on the 2000 governor's race for the American Politics Research Group of the UNC political science department at which Jay Reiff, manager of Gov. Mike Easley's campaign, and Carter Wrenn, manager of Richard Vinroot's campaign, led a discussion of spending, organization and strategy. The authors thank members of the staff of the State Board of Elections for their courteous assistance, and we acknowledge with appreciation funding from an appropriation by the General Assembly and a grant from the Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation.)

By applying Watergate's famous lesson — follow the money — you can gain a fuller understanding of statewide campaigns. Most political analysis follows the money going into campaigns — who, representing what interests, is giving how much to which candidate. This analysis follows the money out of the campaigns of Democrat Mike Easley and Republican Richard Vinroot — how they spent their money to win votes.

Overall spending: Total expenditures in the 2000 North Carolina governor's race came to \$28.2 million, or \$9.82 per vote cast in November. It was expensive, but not super-expensive, for a race that attracted more than 2.9 million voters to the polls.

Over the course of both the party primaries and the general election, Easley out-spent Vinroot — \$11 million to \$8.2 million. While Easley finds fund-raising

an unpleasant chore, said Jay Reiff, his campaign manager, the Easley campaign used his persistent lead in the polls to its advantage in raising money.

Mass electorate, mass media: As North Carolina grew from a spread-out, largely rural state of 5 million residents in 1970 to an urban-suburban, Piedmont-clustered state of 8 million in 2000, its voting-age population increasingly resembled a mass audience, to be reached through the mass media. Accordingly, both gubernatorial candidates spent the lion's share of their budgets on television, radio and bulk mailings.

The Easley campaign spent 74 percent of its budget — \$8.3 million — on advertising, mostly radio and TV spots. The Vinroot campaign spent 62 percent — \$5 million — on broadcast commercials. Over the course of the campaign year, therefore, North Carolina voters saw and heard \$3.3 million more of Easley's message than Vinroot's.

The Easley advantage becomes even more pronounced when you breakdown the candidates' advertising budgets. Easley's campaign actually spent slightly more money on ad production than Vinroot's, but the Easley campaign was able to devote a greater share of its budget on media buys. Fully 94 percent of the Easley media budget went to purchasing air time or printed space, compared to 88 percent of the Vinroot budget.

"TV is becoming a medium that is so fragmented," said Reiff, "it takes more and more and more."

Wrenn recalled a lesson he learned from his involvement in Sen. Jesse Helms' first re-election
SEE CAMPAIGN SPENDING ON PAGE 2 →

campaign in 1978. The Helms campaign started off spending \$2 million on grass-roots organizing, including an “army of staff” and precinct leaders. “We had kids whose mileage reimbursements were more than their salary,” said Wrenn. And all of that effort resulted in a four-point gain for Helms in the polls. Then the Helms campaign spent \$250,000 on television ads just before the May primary, resulting in a 15-point boost in the polls.

Speaking of the Vinroot campaign, Wrenn said, “Our basic strategy was to raise all the money we could and put it in the message. I think this is a priority for most candidates.”

Ground game wanes: The campaign spending reports make dramatically clear what the state’s press reported as a new facet of campaigning in the Tar Heel state: That the candidates eschewed the hustings.

The Easley campaign spent a mere \$85,000 — barely more than one percent of his budget — on travel. And the Vinroot campaign spent even less, slightly more than \$25,000.

It is telling that the Vinroot campaign actually out-spent the Easley campaign in one facet of reaching out to voters. Unable to match Easley on the air, the Vinroot campaign spent more than the Easley campaign, both in total dollars and as a percentage of ad spending, on such ground-game techniques as bumper stickers, yard signs, bulk mailings and automated telephone calls to potential voters.

Toward the end of the race, the extent to which the campaign would become “nationalized” — linked to the presidential campaign — emerged

as a strategic consideration of both campaigns. Vinroot tied himself closely to Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush, who eventually carried North Carolina easily, and the national GOP poured \$1 million into the Vinroot campaign.


Meanwhile, against the advice of his political advisers — according to Reiff — Easley decided to appear with Vice President Al Gore when the Democratic candidate arrived on Air Force Two for the presidential debate in Winston-Salem. That decision softened Easley’s support among some North Carolina voters. But, Wrenn said that the \$1 million from the national Republican Governors’ Association came too late for Vinroot to gain much from the infusion of cash.

People and polling: Vinroot paid more in salaries than Easley — 12 percent of the Republican’s budget, 5 percent of the Democrat’s budget. Meanwhile, Easley spent nearly four times more than Vinroot did on polling and research.


One plausible explanation for the disparity in salaries is that the Easley campaign relied more heavily on Democratic Party staff than the Vinroot campaign relied on Republican Party staff. From the records, it appears that neither party contributed significantly to their candidates’ polling information — thus Easley apparently had a strong advantage in gathering intelligence on the electorate.

“What I strongly believe is that the building block of a good campaign is research,” said Reiff. He mentioned not only polling to look at issues and the voters, but also research to understand the opponent’s and the campaign’s own candidate’s record. ■

Easley Spending Breakdown



Vinroot Spending Breakdown



Increased Competition Drives Up Costs of Races

THAD BEYLE, Pearsall Professor of Political Science

There have been some significant changes in the state's gubernatorial elections over the past four decades. The constitutional change allowing a governor to serve a second term is one of the major changes. Jim Hunt served four terms and Jim Martin served two terms since that amendment was adopted in November 1977. Instead of seeing nine different people serving as governor over the period, there have only been five.

There have also been significant changes in the expense of gubernatorial elections. All dollar figures reported here are converted to their 2001 equivalent value.

The costs of these campaigns have escalated greatly from the \$2.9 million spent in the 1968 election to the nearly \$28.8 million spent in

the 2000 election — an increase of more than 980 percent. The average cost per election is \$16.1 million, with the single winning candidate spending an average of about 35 percent of the money each campaign. The winner's spending ranges from the nearly \$850,000 Bob Scott spent in 1968 to the more than \$11.2 million Mike Easley spent in 2000. The cost per general-election voter over the period has been \$7.62. This cost per vote ranges from the \$1.87 per vote spent in the 1968 Scott election to the \$10.80 per vote spent in the 1984 election of Jim Martin.

There are two distinct periods of campaign spending — the elections held between 1968 and 1980 and the elections held between 1984 and 2000. The larger table lays out these differences on an election year-by-year basis,

while the smaller table provides some interesting comparisons. Here are a few of them:

- ◆ The average margin of victory in the elections has narrowed considerably from just over 17 points to 10 points, reflecting the growing strength of the Republican candidates.
- ◆ The average cost of the elections escalated from about \$9 million in the earlier period to nearly \$22 million in the most recent period, an increase of more than 140 percent. This jump is also reflected in the cost per voter, which increased nearly 60 percent from \$5.50 to \$8.73.
- ◆ Interestingly, the winning candidate's percent of these increased costs has remained at about 35 percent. But there is a rather wide range around that average figure. At the low end is Jim Holhouser spending only \$1 out of every \$12 spent in the 1972 race, while on the high end is Jim Hunt spending the nearly \$7 out of every \$8 spent in his reelection bid in 1980. In his last two races in the 1990s, Hunt spent about \$1 out of every \$2 spent in the campaigns.

Finally, we should note that the most expensive race was won by a Mike in 2000, while the least expensive race was won by a Bob in 1968. The other seven races were won by a Jim. ■

NC Gubernatorial Elections — \$ and Votes, 1968–2000

Rank ⁱ	Year	Winner Pty/Mgn ⁱⁱ	Type ⁱⁱⁱ	#C ⁱⁱⁱ	\$ Spent Actual ⁱⁱⁱⁱ	\$ Spent 2001\$ ⁱⁱⁱⁱ	W% ^v	CPV 2001\$ ^{vi}	WFN ^{vii}
30	2000	D + 6	O	14	28,179,601	28,754,695	39.1	9.77	Mike
43	1984	R + 9	O	14	14,048,311	24,014,297	21.7	10.80	Jim
54	1996	D +13	IW	9	18,021,728	20,762,359	50.3	8.09	Jim
62	1988	R +12	IW	6	12,513,722	18,789,372	46.1	8.62	Jim
67	1992	D +10	O	9	13,353,473	16,903,130	52.3	6.51	Jim
9 Election Average				9	-----	16,136,416	34.9	7.62	
82	1976	D +32	O	7	4,415,410	13,755,171	37.7	8.36	Jim
112	1972	R + 6	O	12	2,608,104	11,098,315	11.7	7.42	Jim
144	1980	D +25	IW	7	3,818,190	8,228,858	83.8	4.46	Jim
258	1968	D + 6	O	5	572,624	2,921,551	28.9	1.87	Bob

ⁱ Rank of this year's election in terms of cost in 2001\$ of 334 gubernatorial elections held since 1968 for which there is expenditure data. For more on these data check this Web site: www.unc.edu/~beyle

ⁱⁱ Type = type of election: O = open seat; IW = incumbent won reelection

ⁱⁱⁱ #C = number of candidates in the gubernatorial race

^{iv} W% = winner's percent of total expenditures in the race

^v WFN = winner's first name

^{vi} Pty/Mgn = party of the winning candidate and the percentage point margin of victory

^{vii} \$Spent, Actual = the amount spent by candidates in the race in actual dollar amounts for that year

^{viii} \$Spent, 2001\$ = the amount spent in actual dollars converted into 2001\$ to control for inflation so these races can be compared more easily. Based on the Consumer Price Index—Urban with 1982–84 = 1.000, the July 2001 CPI-U = 1.775. To determine each year's 2001\$, that year's CPI-U was divided by the July 2001 1.775 value. 1968 CPI-U [.348] in 2001\$ was .196; 1972 CPI-U [.418] in 2001\$ was .235; 1976 CPI-U [.569] in 2001\$ was .321; 1980 CPI-U [.464] in 2001\$ was .464; 1984 CPI-U [1.039] in 2001\$ was .585; 1988 CPI-U [1.183] in 2001\$ was .666; 1992 CPI-U [1.403] in 2001\$ was .790; 1996 CPI-U [1.541] in 2001\$ was .868; 2000 CPI-U [1.740] in 2001\$ was .980.

^{ix} CPV2001\$ = the cost of the election in 2001\$ divided by the total number of votes cast in the general election to get the cost per vote for that election

NC Gubernatorial Elections, 1968–2000

	1968–80	1984–2000	%Change ⁱ
Mgn ⁱⁱ	17.3	10	-42.2
#C ⁱⁱⁱ	7.8	10.4	+33.3
\$Spent in 2001\$ ^{iv}	9,000,974	21,844,771	+142.7
W% ^v	39.5	40.7	+3.0
CPV\$ ^{vi}	5.50	8.73	+58.7

ⁱ Percent change between the two periods.

ⁱⁱ Average percentage point margin of victory.

ⁱⁱⁱ Average number of candidates in gubernatorial race.

^{iv} Average amount spent in election by all candidates in 2001\$ [See note in Table 1 for explanation of how 2001\$ were derived.]

^v Average percent of dollars spent by the winning candidate.

^{vi} Average cost per vote in general election in 2001\$.

Hunt for Statewide Leadership Draws Big Spenders

THAD BEYLE, *Pearsall Professor of Political Science*

There were 16 candidates in the 2000 elections who spent more than \$500,000 in their quest for victory. Looking at the list contained in the table, there are several patterns apparent.

The Open Seat Pattern: Twelve of these 16 candidates were in races seeking to win one of four open Council of State seats. The candidate spending the most in each of these races won.

- ◆ The governor's race for an open seat tops the list. As noted elsewhere in this issue, the 2000 governor's race was the most expensive such race since campaign expenditure data has been collected. It is no surprise that the four top spenders in the list were the major parties' November candidates, Mike Easley (D) and Richard Vinroot (R), and the second-place finishers in the party primaries, Dennis Wicker (D) and Leo Daughtry (R). A fifth gubernatorial candidate, Chuck Neely (R), who placed third in the GOP primary, also made this list. Together they spent more than \$28 million.
- ◆ With the incumbent attorney general and lieutenant governor both seeking the governorship, there were open seat races for those two offices. The top two candidates of

both parties for each of these races also made the Big Spenders list. In both races, these candidates spent more than \$3.1 million. With long-time Agricultural Commissioner Jim Graham stepping down, the two parties' candidates, who spent nearly \$1.6 million, also made this list. Finally, Richard Moore (D), who was seeking the open treasurer's seat created by the retirement of long-time incumbent Harlan Boyles (D), also made the list at nearly \$1.3 million.

The Legislative Party Pattern: Two of these top 16 spenders were not running for statewide office, but were the Democratic leaders in the state legislature — Senate President Pro Tem Marc Basnight and House Speaker Jim Black. Although neither of them had a primary or general-election challenge, they spent nearly \$2.4 million between them. Why? To provide support for Democratic state senators and representatives who were in tough races or Democratic candidates who might unseat incumbent Republican legislators. In effect, they raised and spent this money to ensure their continued control of their respective bodies.

The Judicial Races Pattern: Two candidates for a seat on the state Supreme Court are on the Big Spenders list. While neither Henry Frye (D) or Marvin Schiller (R) won their races for a seat on that court, it is important to note that big-money politics has invaded the state's judicial campaigns — in this case two Supreme Court campaigns.

Judicial fundraising has become a very controversial problem in more than a few states as it raises the question of whether justice is for sale. If judicial candidates need to raise considerable sums of money in order to run for and win a seat on the state's bench, where does this money come from? Studies across the states indicate that lawyers and law firms are the major contributors to judicial campaigns. Like those interests giving money to other candidates in hopes of favorable treatment, so too do the lawyers and law firms give campaign funds. No wonder calls for judicial-selection reform continue to be raised. ■

Big Spenders in the 2000 Statewide Elections

Candidate, Party	Race	Amount Spent	Outcome
Mike Easley, D	G	11,020,029	W
Richard Vinroot, R	G	8,207,412	L
Dennis Wicker, D	G	4,705,167	LP
Leo Daughtry, R	G	2,956,327	LP
Beverly Perdue, D	LG	2,466,353	W
Roy Cooper, D	AG	2,280,432	W
Jim Black, D	SH-36	1,465,654	W
Richard Moore, D	T	1,287,918	W
Chuck Neely, R	G	1,250,456	LP
Meg Scott Phipps, D	Agr	1,062,397	W
Henry Frye, D	SC-CJ	907,491	L
Marc Basnight, D	SS-1	901,382	W
Dan Boyce, R	AG	819,917	L
Betsy Cochrane, R	LG	689,373	L
Steve Troxler, R	Agr	531,767	L
Marvin Schiller, R	SC-AJ	517,576	LP

KEY: Races: AG – attorney general; Agr. – Agriculture Commissioner; G – governor; LG – lieutenant governor; SC-AJ – Supreme Court, Associate Justice; SC-CJ – Supreme Court, Chief Justice; SH-# – State House, seat number; SS-# – State Senate, seat number; T – treasurer

OUTCOME: L – lost in general election; LP – lost in party primary; W – won primary and general election

Polling in the 2000 NC Gubernatorial Race

EVAN SAUDA, Senior Journalism Major, UNC-CH, Graduated May 2001

There were two main polls of the governor's race in North Carolina — the Mason-Dixon Poll and the WTVD FlashPoll. These two can be called the main polls because they were conducted more often than any other poll in the state — six times and 12 times, respectively. Only one other poll, done by Research 2000, was done at least twice between the primary and the general election. There were four polls that were each done once.

SurveyUSA conducted the WTVD FlashPoll for the television station. The FlashPoll uses a two-day sample, which means that the 500 likely voters polled are divided over two days, 250 polled each day. This serves to stabilize opinion and insulate it somewhat from the news events of any particular day. A computer conducts the automated Flash Poll, with responses given by the press of a telephone key. There have been some concerns about the poll's possible bias and validity, but there is no proof of either concern as of yet.

Mason-Dixon Polling and Research conducted the Mason-Dixon poll for WRAL television. Two of these polls were conducted in the pre-primary period and four during the general election period. Each Mason-Dixon poll was conducted over a three- to four-day span with a sample size of around 625, meaning that slightly more than 150 people were polled each day. The Flash Poll has a margin of error of plus or minus 4.5 percent, while the Mason-Dixon's margin of error is slightly lower, at plus or minus 4 percent.

There were several other horserace polls conducted in the state over the course of the election season. Only one poll, conducted by Research 2000, was taken more than once, in early June and then again from October 4–6. Vinroot closed the gap by one point over this time, going from a 12-point deficit in June to an 11-point deficit in October. Easley actually gained in support during this time, but Vinroot gained slightly faster, by one percentage point.

Three other polls were conducted only one time in the state, a joint Democratic-Republican Poll conducted by Hickman-Brown-D and Public Opinion Strategies-R, the NCFREE poll and the Carolina Poll. The joint partisan poll was conducted in late May–early June and showed Easley with a wide margin at the outset of the general election campaign. The NCFREE poll, conducted for the Raleigh pro-business organization in early September, seemed to jibe well with the existing polls, pegging Easley's support at the same level as the Mason-Dixon poll and FlashPoll.

The UNC-CH Carolina Poll was actually two separate polls — one conducted by mail and the other conducted by telephone by UNC-Chapel Hill students. The mail poll ran from mid-October to just before the elections, and the telephone was conducted from October 28 to November 2. The mail poll found Easley with only a 2-point margin, while the telephone poll indicated a 46 percent to 40 percent lead. Again, the comparable polls were right on, except for the FlashPoll and the Carolina mail poll, which gave more support to Vinroot. For more on the two Carolina Polls, see the article by Phil Meyer in NCDN #27, February 2001.

But there's a problem with polls, one that goes beyond sample size and margin of error. They are not easy to interpret and are often reported in an overstated or obfuscated way. On October 21, the *News & Observer*, for example, ran a poll conducted from October 12–17 for the paper by KPC Research of Charlotte. In the accompanying article, the paper said that the

poll showed that Vinroot was closing on Easley. But Vinroot, in fact, was not closing on Easley — when compared with the last Mason-Dixon Poll, Easley was actually losing support while Vinroot's support remained constant. It is difficult to make a judgment about motion in a race without anything to compare to, and in this case the comparison was made to a different poll — the Mason-Dixon — conducted by a different company. The paper was perhaps a little over-exuberant in its coverage of their poll's results.

It is also difficult and somewhat suspect to gauge the accuracy of a poll against another poll. The only true yardstick on which to measure a poll is the results of the election, and that happens only once each election season. All of the polls taken near the end of the election season did well in predicting the eventual winner. The Mason-Dixon Poll seems to be the best at predicting the strength of
SEE POLLING ON PAGE 6 →

Polls of the 2000 North Carolina Governor's Race

Date In field	Poll ⁱ	Sample ⁱ	ME ⁱⁱⁱ	Easley Dem.	Vinroot Rep.
2/26-29	MD	633 lvs	4.0%	47%	33%
4/24-26	MD	624 lvs	4.0	46	35
5/4-5	Flash	500 lvs	4.5	52	39
5/31-6/1	HBPOS	600 rvs	4.0	52	30
6/2-4	R2000	405 lvs	5.0	46	35
6/5-6	Flash	500 lvs	4.5	53	38
7/10-11	Flash	500 lvs	4.5	50	41
7/20-23	MD	625 lvs	4.0	47	37
8/5-6	Flash	500 lvs	4.5	43	48
8/19-20	Flash	500 lvs	4.5	53	38
9/5-6	Flash	500 lvs	4.5	49	42
9/5-8	NCF	600 lvs	4.1	48	32
9/13-16	MD	625 lvs	4.0	48	37
9/18-19	Flash	500 lvs	4.5	51	37
0/4-6	R2000	404 lvs	5.0	50	39
0/5-8	MD	625 lvs	4.0	50	37
0/7-8	Flash	500 lvs	4.5	47	42
0/12-17	N&O	770 lvs	4.9	43	37
0/14-15	Flash	500 lvs	4.5	45	43
0/17-N/3	CP-m	1628 avs	2.5	51	49
0/21-22	Flash	500 lvs	4.5	49	45
0/27-30	MD	625 lvs	4.0	48	41
0/28-29	Flash	500 lvs	4.5	46	46
0/28-N/2	CP-p	748 ads	4.0	46	40
N/4-5	Flash	500 lvs	4.5	47	46
The Actual Vote	(2-party)			52.9	47.1

ⁱ Polling organization: CP – UNC-CH Carolina Poll (m=mail poll; p=phone poll); Flash – Flash Poll; HBPOS – Hickman Brown (D) and Public Opinion Strategies (R); MD – Mason-Dixon Poll; N&O – KPC Poll for the News & Observer and WRAL; NCF – NC Free Poll; R2000 – Research 2000.

ⁱⁱ Sample size: actual number of responses to the survey; ads = adults; avs = active voters; lvs = likely voters; rvs = registered voters..

ⁱⁱⁱ ME: margin of potential error in the poll results based on the size of the sample involved.

the winner and the margin of victory using this crude test of accuracy.

Consistency of results may be a far better test. Of course, it is hard to gauge the consistency of a poll that is only conducted once or twice. The Mason-Dixon Poll's predicted strength for Easley remained fairly constant throughout the 10-month polling period.

The WTVD FlashPoll, however, showed considerably more variation in the candidates' numbers, most significantly the July and August polls, with Easley's deficit in early August and ensuing comfortable lead again. The likely culprit is under-representation of a particular region or group. A poll with more respondents in a rural, particularly Republican part of the state could cause this. Only 500 people answer the poll each time it is taken, so even 50 people polled from an area like this could cause a large change.

This fluctuation could be a result of there simply being more data points to analyze in the FlashPoll — it had 12 to Mason-Dixon's six. There just was not a Mason-Dixon Poll being taken when the volatile events that changed public opinion were happening, so the poll could not reflect them. It could also be the nature of the polls. The FlashPoll, as its very name suggests, seems to be designed to function as a fluid snapshot of opinion, more subject to rapid change. Indeed, it is intentionally conducted after significant events, like the national party conventions or the gubernatorial debates, to measure their impact.

The polls not only serve to reflect public opinion but also shape the behavior of the campaigns and candidates as well. In North Carolina's gubernatorial campaign, there was not a lot of strategy based on public polls. Both campaigns were obviously conducting internal polling and were using those results to plan strategy.

Polls of the state's likely voters were reasonably accurate this election season. However, a "rolling" poll, where people are rolled in and out of the sample rather than changing the sample all at once, would give a much more stable picture of North Carolina voters.

North Carolina was polled more thoroughly than ever before the 2000 election, and the polls should continue to get better. The state still needs two things: a poll with a larger sample size and therefore better subgroup representation, and journalists trained and capable of looking beneath the surface of a poll and reading between the lines to find the real story hidden there. ■

2000 Gubernatorial Election Exit Pollⁱ

	Poll%	Easley%	Vinroot%		Poll%	Easley%	Vinroot%
Gender				\$50-75K			
Men	47	46	51	24	46	51	
Women	53	57	42	\$75-100K			
Race				Over \$100K			
White	79	43	55	14	42	58	
African-American	19	89	8	White Religious Right?			
Race by Sex				Moved to NC Since 1990?			
White Males	49	39	59	Yes	24	29	70
White Females	51	47	52	No	73	60	38
Age				Party Identification			
18-29	18	59	39	Democrat	41	87	12
30-44	33	52	45	Republican	38	15	85
45-59	28	54	46	Independent	21	49	44
60 or older	20	43	55	Ideology			
18-64	87	53	45	Liberal	16	87	11
65 or older	13	43	54	Moderate	46	60	37
Education				Conservative			
H. S. Graduate	22	47	53	38	26	73	
Some College	30	46	50	Presidential Vote			
College Graduate	27	55	44	Gore	41	91	6
Post Grad. Degree	16	56	41	Bush	57	22	77
Income				Clinton Job Rating			
\$15-30K	18	54	44	Approve	49	79	18
\$30-50K	27	56	40	Disapprove	49	23	76

ⁱ Poll results based on a sample of 1,187 actual voters taken on Election Day at various precincts across the state.

Polls of the North Carolina Governor's Race

Flash Poll	Easley - D	Vinroot - R	Sample Size	Margin of Error
May 4-5	52%	39%	500	4.5%
June 5-6	53%	38%	500	4.5%
July 10-11	50%	41%	500	4.5%
August 5-6	43%	48%	500	4.5%
August 19-20	53%	38%	500	4.5%
September 5-6	49%	42%	500	4.5%
September 18-19	51%	37%	500	4.5%
October 7-8	47%	42%	500	4.5%
October 14-15	45%	43%	500	4.5%
October 21-22	49%	45%	500	4.5%
October 28-29	46%	46%	500	4.5%
November 4-5	47%	46%	500	4.5%
Mason-Dixon	Easley - D	Vinroot - R	Sample Size	Margin of Error
February 26-29	47	33	633	4.0%
April 24-26	46	35	624	4.0%
July 20-23	47%	37%	625	4.0%
September 13-16	48%	37%	625	4.0%
October 5-8	50%	37%	625	4.0%
October 27-30	48%	41%	625	4.0%
Research 2000	Easley - D	Vinroot - R	Sample Size	Margin of Error
June 2-4	47%	35%	405	5.0%
October 4-6	50%	39%	404	5.0%

Best Election Predictors Are Counties That Look Like NC

ERIC JOHNSON, Senior Political Science Major, UNC-Chapel Hill

In the last issue of *NC DataNet*, we found that several bellwether counties existed for presidential elections in North Carolina. Research indicates that such counties appear in gubernatorial elections as well. Thirteen counties have sided with the victor in at least nine of the 10 gubernatorial elections between 1960 and 1996.

Prior to 1960, the winner of the Democratic primary could comfortably expect to claim the governorship over his Republican opponent. The margin of victory in the general election of 1960 was just more than 100,000 votes, enough to carry Terry Sanford to victory, but much lower than the near-400,000 vote margin enjoyed in 1956 by Luther Hodges. This signaled the onset of more competitive general elections in North Carolina. Since then, Republicans won the governorship in 1972 (Jim Holshouser) and in 1984 and 1988 (Jim Martin).

The six perfect bellwether counties between 1960 and 1996 included Brunswick, Mecklenburg, Polk, Rockingham, Rutherford and Wake. When these counties voted Democratic, the Democrats won. When they voted Republican, the Republicans won. Three of these counties lost their perfect records by supporting Richard Vinroot in 2000. Seven counties correctly predicted the winner nine times out of 10 between 1960 and 1996: Buncombe, Cleveland, Dare, Lee, McDowell,

New Hanover and Person. One of them, McDowell, fell to Vinroot in 2000.

What is so special about these 13 counties? A variety of factors could affect their voting tendencies, but this study looks at four that are often suggested as important variables in explaining differences in political voting patterns between counties. They are the racial composition, the educational and urbanization levels in the county and the region in which the county is located. North Carolina has historically had significant differences among regions.

As a rule, minorities (particularly African-Americans, the predominant minority group in North Carolina) are more likely to vote Democratic at a higher percentage than other groups do. This study considered the non-Hispanic white percentage of the population of a county as a possible factor in whether a county was a bellwether. To measure the effect of education level, the percentage of the population over 25 years of age who have graduated from college is included. And to measure the level of urbanization we examined whether or not the county contains part of a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The location of the county should also be examined as well as historical factors accompanying that location.

New Hanover and Brunswick counties contain not only the metropolitan area of Wilmington,

but they also have an almost identical percentage of non-Hispanic white voters. New Hanover County contains about 10 percent more college graduates over 25 years of age than does Brunswick County, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. These coastal neighbors would be expected to share many of the same interests and thus would generally vote the same way, but the nature of their population might indicate an even more solid Democratic record than what exists. In recent years few counties have predicted success in the race for governor with the regularity of these two. The only other county in this study from the east, Dare, has been a bellwether every year except 1972. That year the predominantly white, rural Dare County supported Democrat Skipper Bowles in his unsuccessful campaign against Jim Holshouser. Perhaps the relatively high rate of education in Dare County weighs more heavily than its racial and rural makeup.

Not surprisingly, the two most populous counties in North Carolina, Mecklenburg and Wake, are perfect bellwethers. Possessing some of the most diverse populations in the state and very high rates of college graduates in addition to their urban environments, these counties might be expected to vote Democratic with regularity. For the most part in gubernatorial elections they do, yet they

SEE **BELLWETHER COUNTIES** ON PAGE 8 →

County Victory as an Indication of State Victory in North Carolina Gubernatorial Elections

County	1960	1964	1968	1972*	1976	1980	1984*	1988	1992	1996	2000	% of Elections	%Non-Hispanic White	College Graduates**	MSA***
Brunswick	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	100	80	11	Y
Rockingham	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	100	78	9	N
Wake	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	100	73	35	Y
Mecklenburg	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	91	68	28	Y
Polk	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	91	90	20	N
Rutherford	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	91	87	10	N
Buncombe	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	91	89	19	Y
Cleveland	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	91	77	11	N
Dare	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	91	94	21	N
Lee	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	91	73	14	N
New Hanover	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	91	77	21	Y
Person	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	91	67	8	N
McDowell	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	82	94	8	N
Caldwell	-	-	-	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	-	-	-	36	93	9	Y
Davidson	-	-	-	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	-	-	-	36	88	10	Y
Randolph	-	-	-	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	-	-	-	36	92	9	Y
Wilkes	-	-	-	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	-	-	-	36	93	9	N
Avery	-	-	-	Y	-	-	Y	Y	-	-	-	27	98	12	N
Davie	-	-	-	Y	-	-	Y	Y	-	-	-	27	89	15	Y
Mitchell	-	-	-	Y	-	-	Y	Y	-	-	-	27	98	9	N
Yadkin	-	-	-	Y	-	-	Y	Y	-	-	-	27	93	7	Y

* Indicates statewide Republican victory. All other races won by Democrats.

**College graduates over 25.

***Metropolitan Statistical Area is a large population nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a high degree of social and economic integration with that core.

SOURCES: America Votes and United States Census Bureau

sided with the victorious Republicans in 1972, 1984 and 1988. Jim Martin benefited from his personal proximity to Charlotte (he taught at Davidson College), and perhaps in those three elections the highly educated populations identified with Republican issues that other counties did not. Not surprisingly, Mecklenburg went to Vinroot, the former mayor of Charlotte, in 2000.

Lee County, a neighbor of Wake to the south, cast its rural, moderately educated and diverse votes for the victors every time but 1972. Two other “floaters,” Person and Rockingham counties, are rural, relatively uneducated settings benefiting from a good deal of ethnic diversity. The two predict the winner of the gubernatorial election with accuracy 90 and 100 percent of the time, respectively.

Strangely, a block of bellwethers appears in southwestern North Carolina. Buncombe County, the only one of the group to contain an MSA, voted against Sanford in 1960. Its lack of minorities and its educated populace combine to create an excellent predictor of gubernatorial victory. Neighbors Polk and Rutherford, very similar in terms of diversity, differ in their percentage of college graduates by 10 percent, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Cleveland and McDowell counties, while similar in their lesser educated populace, differ in diversity—17 percent more minorities live in Cleveland County, many of them in Shelby (Census Bureau). Three of these counties—Polk, Rutherford, and McDowell—voted for Vinroot in 2000, possibly because of their proximity to Mecklenburg County.

On the other hand, a span of eight counties stretching from Randolph County in central North Carolina to Mitchell County in the far west serve as poor predictors for gubernatorial success, each holding a 30 or 40 percent success rate between 1960 and 1996. For the most part these counties have voted consistently Republican and thus emerged victorious only when the GOP did. The only exceptions to this rule are the four of the eight counties that sided with Jim Hunt in 1976. They did not support him in any of his subsequent three campaigns. Each of these counties supported Vinroot in 2000. All of these counties contain extremely high percentages of non-Hispanic whites (Avery and Mitchell are 98 percent white) and low percentages of college graduates. Some are

rural, while some are on the outskirts of an MSA. Yet they form such a curious band in central to western North Carolina that further consideration is beneficial.

The counties that most poorly predict success in a race for governor consistently demonstrate less diversity, fewer college graduates, and do not contain major metropolitan areas (though several are peripheral to the Greensboro–High Point–Winston-Salem Triad). Several of these counties are in the North Carolina mountains, a haven for Republicanism from Civil War times. The values and beliefs of people in these counties tend to correspond more to those espoused by the Republican Party.

Just as history indicates Republican strength in the mountains, it also provides a partial explanation to the Democratic (and bellwether) tendencies of Buncombe, McDowell, Rutherford, Polk and Cleveland counties. This area contains the heart of the old Shelby Dynasty of the Democratic Party (in Cleveland County). Democratic tradition remains strong in this cluster of counties, yet they are rural enough to support the Republican victories of 1972, 1984 and 1988. While several of the major metropolitan areas of the state appeared among the bellwether counties, a majority of those counties are indeed rural.

In general, the bellwether counties possess traits more reflective of the rest of the state. In 1998, for instance, 74 percent of North Carolinians were non-Hispanic whites and 17 percent were college graduates older than 25—numbers much closer to the best predictors than to the worst ones (Census Bureau). Most of North Carolina counties are rural, just like the bellwether counties.

Gubernatorial candidates should put time and effort into winning the two largest metropolitan areas of the state, Mecklenburg and Wake counties, as well as prevailing in the major urban areas of the coast and mountains—New Hanover, Brunswick and Buncombe counties. A concerted effort in the realm of the old Shelby Dynasty is in order, as five of the bellwether counties are located there. Republican candidates should swing through the “belt” stretching from Mitchell County to Randolph County—they must carry these counties. Democrats should probably not waste their time there. Not surprisingly, those counties most representative of the state predict victory most accurately in its gubernatorial elections. ■

Labor Commissioner Goes Republican

JOY GANES AND JONATHAN TRIBULA, UNC- Chapel Hill


When Harry Payne (D) announced that he would not seek a third term as labor commissioner in the 2000 elections, it spurred heated campaigns for the two parties' nominations in the primaries and in the general election. The general election win by Republican Cherie Berry indicates that serious two-party competition is starting to move down the chairs in the Council of State.

Up until this 2000 race, the only 20th-century Republican Council of State wins had been in three governor's races (1972, Jim Holshouser; 1984 and 1988, Jim Martin) and in one lieutenant governor's race (1988, Jim Gardner). Of note also is that Berry became the first Republican woman to win a statewide race — and one of the four women to win seats on the Council of State in 2000. The other three were Beverly Purdue (D) as lieutenant governor, Elaine Marshall (D) as secretary of state and Meg Scott Phipps (D) as commissioner of agriculture.

Doug Berger won the Democratic labor commissioner nomination by garnering 39.8 percent of the 439,190 votes in the Democratic primary. But this was a relatively narrow win as Dana Cope ran second with 31.6 percent of the vote, with George Parrott running third with 28.6 percent of the vote. On the Republican side, Berry led in the labor commissioner nomination by garnering 38.4 percent of the 241,425 votes in the Republican primary. This, too, was a very contested race as John Miller ran second with 30.7 percent of the vote, with Mac Wethermann running third with 20.5 percent of the vote, and Carl Southard running last with 10.4 percent of the vote. Miller challenged Berry to a runoff for the nomination, but in the runoff election she still prevailed.

In the general election, Berry led by only a slim, several-thousand-vote margin. The result was so close that under state law a recount was automatically granted. A recount is automatically granted in a statewide race if the margin is under a half percent of the total vote or less than 10,000 votes. While the country was watching the various recounts and court challenges in the 2000 presidential race in Florida, the labor commissioner recount went along very quietly — in fact, Berger conceded before the recount was finished. In the end, Berry won 50.1 percent to 49.9 percent with a margin of only 7,252 votes out of the 2,751,582 votes cast, a slight increase in the margin reported on election night.

Counties Carried By Cherie Berry



Berry is a resident of Catawba County and a retired business owner of LGM, Ltd, a manufacturer of ignition machinery. She won a seat in the N.C. House in 1992 and served four terms. During her tenure there, she served on several committees including Welfare Reform (chairwoman), Commerce (vice chairwoman) and finance. One of Berry's top concerns was the changing demographic make-up of the N.C. work force. Her platform included using the Department of Labor to foster the best ergonomic practices. In addition, she wanted to create a division to protect Hispanic/Latino affairs.

Berger is a resident of Franklin County. For the five years prior to the race, he worked for the N.C. Industrial Commission as a workers-compensation judge. He also had experience as a supervisor for the Industrial Commission Fraud Investigations Unit. As a lawyer, he had knowledge of the laws that affect laborers and how to effectively make the laws more effective. His platform included improvement of safety for nighttime workers and a violence-prevention coordinator to prevent domestic violence from filtering into the workplace. He wanted the Commissioner to be more active within the community, doing hands-on work rather than supervising from behind a desk.

One of the reasons for the close vote was the similarity of their campaign promises. Each wanted to have a more active role in the community. They wanted to make labor laws more effective. And each candidate had an impressive background in labor issues and workers' rights.

But there was a down side to this race. The negative campaigning between the two candidates looked very similar to what was seen in the gubernatorial and presidential races. Both candidates attacked the other's competence and credibility. Berger attacked Berry's viewpoint on workplace safety, contending that the spark-plug factory that she once owned was in violation of several safety codes. Berry criticized Berger's self-identity crisis as a Democratic Socialist while he participated in student government at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The voting patterns on this race are of interest and reflect some traditional and some changing patterns. Berry's margin in the 15 most populous counties (50.2 percent to 49.8 percent) was not much different than the margin in the other 85 counties (50.1 percent to 49.9 percent). Berry won most of the counties in the western part of the state, and Berger won most of the counties in the east. Some of Berry's wins in the west were by a 2-to-1 ratio. But while Berger won six mountain counties plus Cleveland and Mecklenburg in the west, Berry claimed eight counties in the east and won New Hanover and rapidly growing Johnston County in addition to the Goldsboro area.

In a few words, this was a very close race played out across the whole state. While not many voters followed the race or knew what the office does, many who have ridden in an elevator have been affected by the policy decisions of that office. Just check the elevators you ride, and you will see Cherie Berry's signature gradually replacing Harry Payne's on the inspection form. ■

Table 1: Incumbent Political Turnover Rates

Year	Council of State	US Senate	US House	Totals
1970	---	---	0/11	0/11
1972	2/10 ⁱ	1/1 ⁱⁱ	3/11 ⁱⁱⁱ	6/22
1974	---	1/1 ^{iv}	2/11 ^v	3/12
1976	4/10 ^{vi}	---	1/11 ^{vii}	5/21
1978	---	0/1	0/11	0/12
1980	1/10 ^{viii}	1/1 ^{ix}	2/11 ^x	4/22
1982	---	---	3/11 ^{xi}	3/11
1984	4/10 ^{xii}	0/1	3/11 ^{xiii}	7/22
1986	---	1/1 ^{xiv}	2/11 ^{xv}	3/12
1988	3/10 ^{xvi}	---	0/11	3/21
1990	---	0/1	1/11 ^{xvii}	1/12
1992	5/10 ^{xviii}	1/1 ^{xix}	1/11 ^{xx}	7/22
1994	---	---	3/12 ^{xxi}	3/12
1996	2/10 ^{xxii}	0/1	2/12 ^{xxiii}	4/23
1998	---	1/1 ^{xxiv}	0/12	1/13
2000	5/10 ^{xxv}	---	0/12	5/22
Total	26/80	6/10	23/180	55/270
Percent	32.5	60.0	12.8	20.4

ⁱIncumbent Governor Robert Scott (D) and Lieutenant Governor Pat Taylor (D) were term limited and not eligible to run for re-election.

ⁱⁱIncumbent Senator B. Everett Jordan (D) lost in Democratic Primary to Congressman Nick Galifinakis (D-4th).

ⁱⁱⁱIncumbent Congressmen Alton Lennon (D-7th) and Charles Jonas (R-9th) retired, and Nick Galifinakis (D-4th) did not seek re-election as he ran in the US Senate race that year winning the Democratic nomination over incumbent Senator B. Everett Jordan and then lost in the general election against Jesse Helms (R).

^{iv}Incumbent Senator Sam Ervin (D) retired.

^vIncumbent Congressmen Wilmer Mizell (R-5th) and Earl Ruth (R-8th) were defeated by W.G. Hefner (D and Stephen Neal (D).

^{vi}Incumbent Governor Jim Holshouser (R) and Lieutenant Governor Jim Hunt (D) were term limited and could not seek re-election to those offices. Incumbent Treasurer Edmund Gill (D) and Labor Commissioner Billy Creel (D) retired.

^{vii}Incumbent Congressman Stephen Neal (D-5th) was defeated by former Congressman Wilmer Mizell (R).

^{viii}Incumbent State Auditor Henry Bridges (D) retired.

^{ix}Incumbent Senator Bobby Morgan (D) was defeated by John East (R).

^xCongressmen L. Richardson Preyer (D-6th) and Lamar Gudger (D-11th) were defeated by Gene Johnston (R) and Bill Hendon (R).

^{xi}Incumbent Congressmen Gene Johnston (R-6th) and Bill Hendon (R-11th) were defeated by Robin Britt (D) and James Clarke (D). Congressman L.H. Fountain (D) retired.

^{xii}Incumbent Governor Jim Hunt (D) and Lieutenant Governor Jimmy Green (D) were term limited and could not seek re-election to those offices. Incumbent Attorney General Rufus Edmisten (D) ran for governor and lost to Congressman Jim Martin (R-9th), and Insurance Commissioner John Ingram (D) retired.

^{xiii}Congressman Jim Martin (R-9th) ran successfully for governor, while incumbent Congressmen Ike Andrews (D-4th), Robin Britt (D-6th) and Jamie Clarke (D-11th) were defeated by William Cobey (R), Howard Coble (R) and former Congressman Bill Hendon.

^{xiv}Incumbent Senator James Broyhill (R) was defeated by Terry Sanford (D). Broyhill had been appointed to the seat by Governor Jim Martin upon the death of Senator John East (R).

^{xv}Incumbent Congressmen William Cobey (R-4th) and Bill Hendon (R-11th) were defeated by David Price (D) and former Congressman Jamie Clarke (D).

^{xvi}Incumbent Secretary of State Thad Eure (D) and Superintendent of Public Instruction Craig Phillips (D) retired, and Lieutenant Governor Bob Jordan (D) lost his bid to become governor in a race with incumbent Governor Jim Martin.

^{xvii}Incumbent Congressman Jamie Clarke (D-11th) was defeated by Charles Taylor (R).

^{xviii}Incumbent Labor Commissioner John Brooks (D) was defeated by Harry Payne (D), Attorney General Lacy Thornburg (D) and State Auditor Ed Renfrow (D) retired. Governor Jim Martin (R) was term limited and could not seek re-election to the office, and Lieutenant Governor James Gardner (R) lost his bid to become governor in a race with former Governor Jim Hunt (D).

^{xix}Incumbent Senator Terry Sanford (D) was defeated by Lauch Faircloth (R).

^{xx}Incumbent Congressman Walter Jones (D-1st) retired. There was no incumbent running for the 12th District seat as the state was only awarded that new seat following the 1990 Census.

^{xxi}Incumbent Congressmen Tim Valentine (D-2nd), Martin Lancaster (D-3rd) and David Price (D-4th) were defeated by David Funderburk (R), Walter Jones, Jr. (R) and Frederick Heineman (R).

^{xxii}Superintendent of Public Instruction Bobby Etheridge (D) did not seek re-election and won his bid to win a seat in Congress (2nd) and Secretary of State Rufus Edmisten (D) had resigned before the end of his term so the race was for an open seat held by an interim appointed official.

^{xxiii}Incumbent Congressmen David Funderburk (R-2nd) and Frederick Heineman (R-4th) were defeated by Bobby Etheridge (D) and former Congressman David Price (D).

^{xxiv}Incumbent Senator Lauch Faircloth (R) was defeated by John Edwards (D).

^{xxv}Incumbent Governor Jim Hunt (D) and Lieutenant Governor Dennis Wicker (R) were term limited and could not seek re-election to those offices. Attorney General Mike Easley (D) ran and won the governorship, and Agricultural Commissioner James Graham (D) and Labor Commissioner Harry Payne (D) retired.

North Carolina's Majority Party

THAD BEYLE, Pearsall Professor of Political Science

Over the past few decades, much has been made of the rise of the Republican Party in the state's political system. Signs of this growth have been everywhere from increasing GOP registration, more victories for GOP candidates up and down the ballot, and more citizens indicating they feel closer to the GOP than the Democratic Party.

While our eyes focused on this shift from a one-party Democratic state to a competitive two-party state, we may have overlooked another trend of equal if not more importance. There is another strength in the state, a strength that dwarfs that of either of the two major parties. This is the incumbent party — to which only incumbent office holders can belong. And once a member, they are hard to dislodge from their official positions.

As noted in Table 1, covering the 1970–2000 periods, only 55 of the 270 races for the U.S. Senate, Congress and the Council of State saw non-incumbents win the seat (20.4 percent). However, Table 2 indicates that of the 55 non-returning incumbents, 17 decided to retire, five others decided to seek another office, and nine were governors and lieutenant governors who were term limited and could not seek re-election. Only 24 of the 55 non-returning incumbents actually lost in their bids for re-election (43.6 percent of those not returning). This means that 215 of the 239 incumbents seeking re-election to these seats won for a batting average of 90 percent.

Put another way, the turnover rate in these seats ranged from a high of 60 percent in races for our two U.S. Senate seats, to 32.5 percent in races for the 10 seats in the Council of State, to 12.8 percent in races for our U.S. Congressional seats.

U.S. Senate: Senator Helms won in a 1972 race that saw the incumbent U.S. Senator B. Everett Jordan defeated in the Democratic Party primary by Congressman Nick Galifianakis, whom Helms later defeated in the general election. The other U.S. Senate seat, held by Sam Ervin until he retired in 1974, has been a revolving door for incumbents. John East (R) defeated Senator Robert Morgan (D), who won the seat in 1974. Then following the death of East in 1986, his appointed successor, Jim Broyhill (R), was defeated by Terry Sanford (D) later that year. In 1992, Sanford was defeated by Lauch Faircloth (R), who in turn was defeated by John Edwards (D) in 1998.

U.S. House of Representatives: The Congressional district with the greatest turnover between 1970 and 2000 was the 11th district — with incumbents losing five times between 1980 and 1990, it became known as the “swinging door” district. Since 1990, Charles Taylor (R) has won the seat each time. Close behind is the 4th district, which saw incumbents defeated four times, although two of those defeats came in the next election when the incumbent who ousted an incumbent was also ousted. In 1984, Bill Cobey (R) beat incumbent Ike Andrews (D) but was beaten himself by David Price (D) in 1986. In 1994, Price lost to Frederick Heineman (R) but came back in 1996 to beat Heineman.

Council of State: The only loss by an incumbent in the Council of State races was in 1992, when Labor Commissioner John Brooks (D) was defeated by Harry Payne (D) in the Democratic Party primary. With the exception of the Brooks loss, only constitutional restrictions, retirement or the desire to seek another office has caused turnover. These are seemingly lifetime executive seats, held until the occupant decides to leave for some reason.

Why has this incumbent party become so strong that it continues to elect its members? Several reasons are apparent. First is the cost
SEE **MAJORITY** ON PAGE 12 →

Table 2: Why Incumbents Left Office

Office	Defeat ⁱ	Retire ⁱⁱ	Other ⁱⁱⁱ	Term Limited ^{iv}	Total
Council of State	1	12	4	9	26
US Senate	5	1	—	—	6
US House	18	4	1	—	23
Total	24	17	5	9	55
Percent	43.6	30.9	9.1	16.4	100

ⁱDefeated in bid for re-election to another term.
ⁱⁱRetired and did not seek re-election.
ⁱⁱⁱDid not seek re-election but sought election to another office.
^{iv}Constitutionally term limited and could not seek reelection.

SOURCES: Federal Election Commission; North Carolina State Board of Elections

Table 3: Incumbent Legislative Turnover Rates

Year	State House	State Senate	US House	Total	Rate%
1970	43/120	18/50	0/11	61/181	33.7
1972	50/120	15/50	3/11	68/181	37.6
1974	49/120	21/50	2/11	72/181	39.8
1976	24/120	11/50	1/11	36/181	19.9
1978	30/120	7/50	0/11	37/181	20.4
1980	33/120	8/50	2/11	43/181	23.8
1982	31/120	9/50	3/11	43/181	23.8
1984	39/120	18/50	3/11	60/181	33.1
1986	25/120	6/50	2/11	33/181	18.2
1988	25/120	5/50	0/11	30/181	16.6
1990	21/120	8/50	1/11	30/181	16.6
1992	42/120	10/50	1/11	53/181	29.3
1994	39/120	15/50	3/12	57/182	31.3
1996	22/120	11/50	2/12	35/182	19.2
1998	16/120	7/50	0/12	23/182	12.6
2000	15/120	5/50	0/12	20/182	11.0
Total	504/1920	174/800	23/180	701/2900	
Percent	26.3	21.8	12.8	24.2	

→ **MAJORITY FROM PAGE 11**

of campaigning with greater and greater emphasis on television advertising. A related financial factor is the ability of incumbents to seek and receive campaign contributions in considerable excess of any challenger. In addition, the individualization of politics means the strength of parties has waned to some degree. Each candidate and incumbent creates an individual campaign party around his or her election goals without much emphasis given to a unified set of party positions.

Finally, by definition incumbents have higher name recognition, a record of service and have already been successful candidates for the offices they hold. They have traveled across the district or state and know who and where their supporters are. It all adds up to a very distinct political advantage.

One problem with a low turnover rate is the reduced chance new individuals have to enter politics and win one of these seats. There tends to be a virtual cap at the top of our state's various political-ambition ladders. The result is "political dropout" in which many fine potential public servants turn their

ambitions and skills in other directions as the chairs above them are full and will generally remain so.

Another interesting pattern to note is the rhythm to the retention and turnover of Congressional and state Legislative seats over the past three decades. This is obviously tied to the decennial census and the resulting redistricting of these seats. From Table 3, we see that the greatest turnover occurs in the second and fourth years of the decade (1972-74, 1982-84 and 1992-94), when the impact of changing congressional and legislative districting lines is felt. Then, with but a few exceptions, the turnover rate declines over the rest of the decade as the incumbents use their strengths noted earlier to stay in office.

So, as we move into the 2002 election year, we should anticipate that there will be more non-incumbents winning congressional and state legislative seats than in the past two elections. Which seats will be turning over is not exactly clear, but don't be surprised to see more retirements among the legislative incumbents who just don't want to face the challenge of working with a different electorate than they have in recent elections. ■