

Thad Beyle
Editor & Associate Director
beyle@email.unc.edu

Eric Gautschi
Managing Editor & Assistant Director
gautschi@unc.edu

Ferrel Guillory
Publisher & Director
guillory@unc.edu

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Straight-Party and Split-Ticket Voting

FERREL GUILLORY, director, Program on Southern Politics, Media & Public Life

(Editor's note: It has become our regular practice at the UNC Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life to convene influential advisers to major-party statewide candidates shortly after a general election. Thus, we organized a seminar on the 2004 election in North Carolina for faculty and students in the Department of Political Science and the School of Journalism and Mass Communication. Panelists were Jay Reiff, campaign manager for Gov. Mike Easley; Bob Rosser, manager of state Sen. Patrick Ballantine's gubernatorial campaign; Doug Heye, a campaign spokesman and now a Washington-based aide to U.S. Sen. Richard Burr; and Morgan Jackson, the manager of the Kerry-Edwards campaign in North Carolina.

The following article draws from the seminar, as well as from the election-day exit poll conducted for national broadcast networks and newspapers. However, this review of the governor's race represents our analysis, not necessarily the specific views of the participants. Once again, we express our appreciation to Progress Energy for the grant that supports these seminars and the SouthNow package of publications. For the archives of newsletters and for our SouthNow Blog, please visit our Web site, www.SouthNow.org.)

President Bush, a Republican, won the state's 15 electoral votes by getting the votes of 1.96 million North Carolinians. Gov. Mike Easley, a Democrat, won a second term with 1.94 million votes, nearly matching the president's total.

In a period distinctive for its political polarization, many North Carolina voters obviously cast straight-ticket Democratic or Republican ballots. But just as clearly, thousands of North Carolinians split their ballots, voting for a Republican for president and a Democrat for governor.

To some extent, the results reflect that voters in North Carolina continue to make a distinction between what they seek in candidates for federal and state offices. From 1972 through the end of the 20th century, North Carolinians sent the hard-right Republican Jesse Helms to the U.S. Senate for five terms, while they also elected the aggressively pro-

education Democrat Jim Hunt to the governor's office for four terms.

More specifically, Easley scored his victory on the basis of his conduct in the office of governor, as well as a set of strategic and tactical advantages at work in the politics of 2004.

Here is an outline of factors in play in the 2004 governor's race:

The backdrop — When Easley took over the governor's office, the state's economy had taken a sharp turn, with globalization washing away jobs in textiles, tobacco and furniture. In rapid succession, North Carolina also suffered blows from both tropical and ice storms. In January 2003, the midpoint of Easley's first term, his internal polls showed that nearly six out of 10 voters felt that the state was on the wrong track.

As state revenues eroded, Easley proclaimed three budget emergencies, required state agencies to absorb painful spending cuts and diverted money earmarked for the state retirement system and for city and county governments. In his first year, he also went on statewide television to argue — successfully — for enactment of a tax-increase package to prevent further deterioration of the state's fiscal condition.

Simultaneously, the Democratic governor got the General Assembly to approve an in-school program for at-risk four-year-olds, reduction in size of classes in grades one, two and three, an effort to redesign high schools and enrollment-growth funding for state universities. Thus, Easley framed his governorship in terms of a combination of fiscal discipline and education advances as an essential response to North Carolina's economic transition.

As an incumbent governor, he also benefited from the improvement in the state's economy as the 2004 election approached. To counteract job losses in traditional industries, Easley intensified North Carolina's use of incentive packages to entice businesses to locate and expand facilities in the state.

SEE SPLIT TICKET ON PAGE 2 →

On election day, according to the exit poll, Easley won solid majorities among middle- and lower-middle-income working people — 66 percent of voters in the \$15,000–\$30,000 income bracket, and 57 percent of voters in the \$30,000–\$50,000 bracket.

Money matters — The Easley campaign collected twice as much as the Ballantine campaign in contributions. Easley raised \$9 million to Ballantine’s \$4.5 million. Thus, the Easley camp had much more to spend on TV and radio commercials and on direct mailing to voters.

Easley’s fund-raising advantage stemmed from at least two politically potent attributes: the power of incumbency and his own ability to hold together a biracial Democratic coalition that includes substantial support from the state’s business sector.

The Republican Governors’ Association sought to assist the Ballantine campaign in closing the TV advertising gap. But Democrats mounted a legal challenge to the RGA independent-expenditure effort, effectively thwarting that source of support for the Ballantine campaign until it was too late to have much effect.

Defining the debate — With his fund-raising advantage, Gov. Easley defined Ballantine for voters before his Republican opponent had a chance to define himself or to mount a strong attack on the incumbent.

The shift in economic dynamics deprived Ballantine of the ability to criticize Easley on the economy — even President Bush praised North Carolina for its economic condition. Moreover, Ballantine had hardly caught his

breath from winning the GOP primary than the Easley campaign hit him with TV ads depicting him as a candidate who would either raise taxes or cut education to redeem his support by the state employees association.

Instead of going into a front-runner’s defensive sit-on-a-lead crouch, the governor’s campaign played offense. Meanwhile, the Ballantine campaign illustrated anew how difficult it is for a state legislator, whose record includes multiple votes on issues, to mount a campaign for a high executive office.

Primary politics — Before encountering Easley in the general-election campaign, Ballantine ran a more-successful-than-anticipated primary campaign. Ballantine came up with an especially strong end-game, depicting himself as the fresh-face of Republican conservatism. He placed first narrowly and avoided a damaging runoff when former Charlotte Mayor Richard Vinroot decided not to contest him further.

Still, the primary fight sapped Ballantine of resources, while Easley had no real competition to contend with in the Democratic primary [Kipfer did get 15 percent of the primary votes against Easley but was no real threat]. What’s more, one of the state’s periodic redistricting conflicts forced a delay in the primary, giving Ballantine little time to shift gears from the primary to the general-election campaign.

A footnote to the Republican primary: Through the 1980s and the early 1990s, former U.S. Sen. Jesse Helms and his political organization formed the dominant force in state Republican politics. In the 2004 governor’s race, Helms endorsed and appeared in a TV commercial on behalf of former party chair Bill Cobey. Helms’ candidate, however, finished third.

Wide wing span — While the Republican primary showed distinct deterioration in Helms’ political clout, the general election demonstrated that, despite the economic and budgetary woes of his first term, Easley had negotiated the governance of shortfalls skillfully so as to sustain his political potency. Exit poll results gave evidence of Easley’s wide wing span.

The election-day exit poll in North Carolina showed that Easley won the votes of more than four out of 10 white men and women, nearly double what the national Democratic ticket of John Kerry and John Edwards won. Easley won a majority of college-educated voters who otherwise voted for Republican candidates for President and U.S. Senate. The Democratic governor ran twice as well among self-described suburbanites as his party’s presidential ticket.

The exit poll illustrates how evenly balanced — and divided — is the North Carolina electorate. Asked to give their own partisan identity, 39 percent of voters said they are Democrats, 40 percent Republicans, 21 percent independents. While Easley received the votes of nine out of 10 Democrats, he also got the votes of two out of 10 Republicans and six out of 10 independents.

Asked to identify their ideology, 40 percent of North Carolina voters classified themselves as conservative, 43 percent as moderate and 17 percent as liberal. As a Democrat, Easley won more than six out of 10 moderates and fully three out of 10 conservatives. ■

NC Voter Registration and Turnout in Presidential Election Years, 1960 to 2004

Year	Total NC Voting-Age Population	Total NC Registered Voters	NC Turnout			Party of Winner		
			# of Voters	% of Reg. Voters	% of Voting-Age Pop.	Pres.	Sen.	Gov.
1960	2,585,000	N/A	1,368,556	—	52.9	D	D	D
1964	2,723,000	N/A	1,424,983	—	52.3	D	—	D
1968	2,921,000	2,077,538	1,587,493	76.4	54.4	D	D	D
1972	3,541,399	2,357,645	1,518,612	64.4	42.9	R	R	R
1976	3,884,477	2,553,717	1,677,906	65.7	43.2	D	—	D
1980	4,222,654	2,774,844	1,855,833	66.9	43.9	R	R	D
1984	4,585,788	3,270,933	2,239,051	68.5	47.4	R	R	R
1988	4,887,358	3,432,042	2,180,025	63.5	44.6	R	—	R
1992	5,182,321	3,817,380	2,611,850	68.4	50.4	R	R	D
1996	5,499,000	4,330,657	2,618,326	60.5	47.6	R	R	D
2000	6,085,266	5,122,123	3,015,964	58.9	49.6	R	—	D
2004	6,305,436	5,519,992	3,501,007	63.4	55.5	R	R	D

SOURCES: U.S. Census Bureau official figures and population estimates; NC State Board of Elections data

Voter Falloff Down the Ballot, 2004

Voter Turnout 3,501,007
[Based on Presidential Race totals]

Race:	% Voting
President	100.0
Governor	99.6
US Senator	99.2
Lieutenant Governor	97.1
Attorney General	96.1
Insurance Commissioner	95.8
Secretary of State	95.2
State Treasurer	95.0
Labor Commissioner	94.5
State Auditor	94.1
Assoc. Justice, Supreme Ct – Parker	77.4
Appeals Ct. Justice – McGee	75.2
Appeals Ct. Justice – Bryant	74.3
Assoc. Justice, Supreme Ct. – Orr	73.7
Appeals Ct. Justice – Thornburg	72.6

Agriculture Commissioner
Sup. Of Public Instruction

SOURCE: NC State Board of Elections data

The Republican Base and Cross-Over Appeal

PAUL SHUMAKER, *political consultant*

Paul Shumaker is a political consultant who has advised many Republican candidates for office in North Carolina, most recently the campaign of U.S. Sen. Richard Burr.

Twenty years ago, Republican candidates running statewide in North Carolina began their campaigns relatively assured of winning 85 percent of their party's base vote. This allowed Republican candidates to focus on trying to win cross-over votes from registered Democrats.

Now, as a result of robust population growth, Republican ranks have swelled with people who have recently moved into the state. These days, candidates like Richard Burr start out their campaigns assured of only about 60 percent of their party's vote. As a result, statewide Republican candidates have to build a base within their own party, while also facing Democratic candidates who try to reach out and win cross-over votes from registered Republicans.

A growing North Carolina, therefore, has opened a window of opportunity for the GOP, which now has won two consecutive U.S. Senate races, as well as seats on the Supreme Court and Council of State. But an examination of voting returns and polling data also make clear that Republicans face a distinct challenge in having to appeal to a larger cross-section of voters.

What follows are some observations and lessons derived from my review of polling data from the Burr campaign, along with a study of the geographical mapping of the 2004 results:

Growth of NC Voters in Presidential Elections, 1960–2004

Year	# of Voters	% Growth Over Last Election	% Growth Over 1960 Election
1960	1,368,556	N/A	N/A
1964	1,424,983	+ 4.1	+ 4.1
1968	1,587,493	+11.4	+ 16.0
1972	1,518,612	- 4.3	+ 11.0
1976	1,677,906	+10.5	+ 22.6
1980	1,855,833	+10.6	+ 35.6
1984	2,239,051	+20.6	+ 63.6
1988	2,180,025	- 2.6	+ 59.3
1992	2,611,850	+19.8	+ 90.8
1996	2,618,326	+ 0.2	+ 91.3
2000	3,015,964	+15.2	+120.4
2004	3,501,007	+16.1	+155.8

SOURCE: NC State Board of Elections data

- ◆ The difference between the Burr's vote for U.S. Senate and Republican gubernatorial candidate Patrick Ballantine's vote for governor underscores the willingness of voters from both political parties to split their ticket. Richard Burr received nearly 300,000 more votes than Patrick Ballantine received in his bid for governor.
- ◆ Emphasis on early voting by Democrats helped to provide their candidates with an early advantage. Large urban counties and counties with a large public university presence provided the best results for Democrats.
- ◆ Election Day efforts by the GOP to generate turnout provided a surge for all Republican candidates. President Bush led the way in receiving nearly 58 percent of the statewide vote.
- ◆ Mecklenburg County and Guilford County continued their move to becoming Democratic counties. Forsyth County and Wake County are clearly swing counties.

However, the growth in the counties surrounding the state's four most populous counties continues to favor Republicans in a big way. Poor performance by Republican candidates in the big four counties is easily offset by such rapidly growing Republican counties like Johnston, Harnett, Cabarrus, Union, Gaston, Randolph and Davidson.

- ◆ Sen. Burr benefited greatly by having the Triad as a base to launch a statewide campaign. Burr, who represented the Fifth Congressional District, including Winston-

Salem, in Congress, received 76 percent of the swing vote in the Triad, which exceeded his statewide average of 63 percent of the swing vote.

Burr's second best performing market, in which he also exceeded his statewide average of swing voters, was the Raleigh market. Fueled by the debate over tobacco, Burr achieved 66.4 percent of the swing vote in the Raleigh market. Burr's performance was not driven by his showing in Wake County, which dominates the market, but rather in rural agriculture-based counties like Halifax, Granville, Franklin, Nash, Northampton, Person, Vance, Warren and Wayne counties. Burr received more than 70 percent of the swing votes in these counties.

- ◆ Between 1990 and 2000, North Carolina had a 21.4 percent growth in population, the greatest growth sector being Hispanic or Latino, which increased from 1.15 percent to 4.66 percent of the total population. White population declined as a percent of the whole from 75.05 percent to 71.32 percent, with the African American sector remaining stable at 21.35 percent. U.S. Census data show that North Carolina will continue to grow and that growth will bring more ethnic diversity to North Carolina.

New growth, coupled with a more ethnically diversified voting population, will ensure a competitive political environment for both political parties. For statewide Republican candidates to be successful in the future, they will have to develop an issue agenda that appeals to a much broader cross-section of voters. ■

Bellwether Counties in Gubernatorial Elections

County	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	% of Elections
Brunswick	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	100
Rockingham	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	100
Wake	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	100
Buncombe		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	92
New Hanover	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	92
Cleveland	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	92
Dare	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	92
Lee	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	92
Person	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	92
Mecklenburg	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	92
Polk	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	92
Rutherford	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	92

NOTE: 1972, 1984 and 1988 were statewide Republican victories; all other races were won by Democrats.

Suburban Thirty-Somethings Make the Difference

ERIC GAUTSCHI, assistant director, Program on Southern Politics, Media & Public Life

In North Carolina, a state where George W. Bush was expected to win and the other two big races (Senate and governor) didn't provide much in the way of added surprises, the how-it-went-down analysis has mostly centered on voters' choice to split their tickets.

Gov. Mike Easley, a Democrat, and President Bush, a Republican, each earned 56 percent of the vote. Of course, the two men relied on very different coalitions of voters to reach that total.

A look at the exit polls shows that many groups voted exactly as expected — super-majorities of liberals and non-whites backed Easley and the Democratic candidates, and super-majorities of white males, conservatives and evangelicals

sided with Bush and the Republicans.

Amidst these predictable patterns, however, some noteworthy stories emerged, although they didn't receive much pre- or post-election attention. Voters in the 30-44 age group and self-identified suburbanites clearly were the difference-makers in all three of the big contests. This trend held not only with Easley and Bush, but also in the narrower victory of Republican Richard Burr over Democrat Erskine Bowles in the U.S. Senate race.

For Bush, a super-majority of these voters (*see tables*) bumped up his overall victory margin, rendering what otherwise would have been a close race — in the cities and rural areas and among

the youngest and oldest voters — into a rout. For Easley, it was a respectable showing within these two groups that allowed him to hold onto his victory, preventing Republican challenger Patrick Ballantine from compensating for Easley's wide leads among other groups of voters. In the Senate race, Burr lost both the urban and the rural vote and yet won the election by nearly 5 percentage points because of suburban voters.

Given their overlapping numbers and the demographic makeup of some of the state's fastest-growing suburbs, there is a compelling case to be made that these two groups of voters are, to a large extent, one and the same.

Pollster J. Brad Coker and marketing consultant Jonathan Pontell make the case in the Nov. 29 issue of *The Polling Report* that it was the 30-44 voters, particularly those between Baby Boomers and Generation X whom they have dubbed "Generation Jones," who swung the election to Bush. As Coker and Pontell astutely point out, news media coverage of age and voting focused almost exclusively on young voters and senior citizens. But, the group that didn't vote like the others was this group in between.

Coker and Pontell also point out that 2004's swing voter group du jour, "Security Moms," aka yesterday's Soccer Moms, are largely in this Generation Jones age group as well.

And where do these voters live? Increasingly, it is in the suburbs, where the median age tends to be in the low 30s and the median household income typically falls somewhere between \$65,000 and \$75,000. Twenty percent of the state's electorate told exit pollsters that they lived in the suburbs; perhaps it is these very same thirty-somethings who make up the bulk of that 20 percent. These are young families opting to move to the suburbs to buy first or second homes, to put down roots and build new communities.

While a census-taker or a demographer might slice up the state's population to show a much higher percentage of residents living in the suburbs, not everyone sees their home turf the same way. With the state's population growth patterns, it has become increasingly difficult to draw clear distinctions among rural, urban and suburban areas.

Several factors are at work here. The boom in metropolitan centers like the Triangle, Triad and Charlotte has led to a steady outward

SEE **SUBURBAN** ON PAGE 5 →

The Big Three Races — Exit Polls

VOTE BY METRO AREA

	Bush	Burr	Ballantine	Kerry	Bowles	Easley
Raleigh/Durham (24%)	47%	44%	36%	52%	55%	62%
Eastern NC (23%)	60%	56%	45%	40%	42%	54%
Greensboro (18%)	64%	60%	50%	35%	38%	48%
Charlotte (23%)	54%	51%	44%	44%	47%	55%
Mountain/West (13%)	59%	52%	46%	41%	47%	52%

VOTE BY COMMUNITY TYPE

(self-identified by voters)

	Bush	Burr	Ballantine	Kerry	Bowles	Easley
Urban (38%)	51%	48%	42%	47%	50%	55%
Suburban (20%)	76%	72%	57%	23%	27%	42%
Rural (42%)	55%	49%	39%	45%	50%	60%

VOTE BY AGE GROUP

	Bush	Burr	Ballantine	Kerry	Bowles	Easley
18-29 (14%)	43%	41%	35%	56%	57%	63%
30-44 (33%)	61%	59%	48%	37%	38%	50%
45-59 (31%)	57%	48%	43%	42%	50%	55%
60 + (22%)	57%	54%	44%	43%	46%	56%

VOTE BY EDUCATION

	Bush	Burr	Ballantine	Kerry	Bowles	Easley
No High School (4%)	47%	44%	28%	53%	55%	72%
High School (22%)	52%	45%	38%	48%	54%	61%
Some College (29%)	61%	56%	46%	39%	44%	53%
College Degree (30%)	57%	54%	48%	41%	44%	51%
Postgrad Study (15%)	52%	50%	39%	47%	49%	59%

VOTE BY INCOME

	Bush	Burr	Ballantine	Kerry	Bowles	Easley
Under \$15K (10%)	34%	28%	24%	66%	69%	74%
\$15-\$30K (17%)	38%	33%	31%	61%	65%	66%
\$30-\$50K (22%)	54%	49%	43%	45%	49%	57%
\$50-\$75K (21%)	65%	61%	55%	34%	38%	44%
\$75-\$100K (12%)	72%	68%	51%	28%	31%	48%
\$100-\$150K (11%)	71%	66%	55%	29%	34%	44%
\$150-\$200K (3%)	67%	71%	47%	32%	27%	48%
\$200K or more (3%)	60%	58%	50%	36%	42%	47%

SOURCE: Edison/Mitofsky exit polls

Population Growth and Gubernatorial Politics in North Carolina

THAD BEYLE, *Pearsall professor of political science, UNC-Chapel Hill*

You can gain some insight into the changes in our state's gubernatorial politics by stepping back and measuring the impact of growth on the body politic during the 20th century and early 21st century.

To assist in this endeavor are several tables (*see pages 5-6*) comparing the way in which voters cast their ballots in seven separate gubernatorial elections between 1900 and 2004. The specific gubernatorial elections selected occurred in the last year of the decade, the same year that the U.S. Census is taken, and the most recent gubernatorial election.

We look at these seven elections from the perspective of the 14 counties in which the most votes in the 2004 governor's race were cast. These counties include those seven in the three traditional Metropolitan areas of the Research Triangle - [Wake, Durham, Orange], the Piedmont Triad [Guilford, Forsyth], and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg metropolitan area [Gaston, Mecklenburg], and seven smaller metropolitan counties — Buncombe [Asheville], Cabarrus [Concord], Catawba [Hickory], Cumberland [Fayetteville], Davidson [Salisbury], New Hanover [Wilmington], and Union [Monroe].

Here are some highlights to consider:

Overall growth. In the 1900–2004 period, the population of the state more than quadrupled, from 1,893,810 in 1900 to an estimated 8,541,221 in July 2004. However, the size of the gubernatorial vote increased over 11 times. While much of this growth is due to population growth in the state, a great deal of the growth is also due to major shifts in governmental election policies — the adoption of the 19th

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1920, which gave women the right to vote; the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, which guaranteed minorities the right to vote; and the adoption of the 26th Amendment, which opened up the voting booth to citizens between 18 and 21. In 1900, the number of gubernatorial votes represented only 16.5 percent of the total N.C. population, while in 2004 the number of gubernatorial votes represented just above 40 percent of the total N.C. population, a growth of almost 25 percentage points.

The 14 counties with the largest 2004 gubernatorial vote. A considerable amount of this growth focused on the 14 most populous counties of 2000. While these counties held about a quarter of the state's population in 1900, by 2004 they were home to nearly half of the state's population. Their share of the state's gubernatorial vote between 1900 and 2004 rose from less than one-quarter of the vote to just over one-half of the vote in 2004.

Partisan voting in these 14 counties. Both major parties received about 23 percent of their statewide gubernatorial vote from voters in these 14 counties in the 1900 election. By the 2004 election, these counties' share of the total state vote for their candidates had doubled for the Republican candidates and had more than doubled for the Democratic candidates. In the 2004 election, the total vote in these counties was 1,758,586, of which Democratic Gov. Mike Easley received 52.2 percent and Republican challenger Patrick Ballantine received 48.0 percent.

The three traditional metropolitan areas. In 1900, nearly one in eight votes came from the three traditional metropolitan areas of

Charlotte, the Piedmont Triad, and what is now the Research Triangle. Now in the 2004 election, more than one in three votes comes from the seven core counties in these metro areas. The greatest growth in the last few decades has been in the three core Research Triangle counties — Durham, Orange and Wake — that have seen their share of the statewide vote more than double since the 1960 gubernatorial election from 6.5 percent to 15.0 percent.

The smaller metropolitan counties. A slightly different picture emerges when looking at the seven smaller metropolitan counties of the state. Their share of the statewide gubernatorial vote has not risen as sharply as their more traditional counterparts — from just over one in 10 votes in 1900 to just under one in seven votes in the 2004 election. But the number of voters in each county continue growing, with Union and New Hanover counties showing the largest growth in the past two plus decades.

One political fact of life continues to be clear from these changes. Each of these metropolitan areas and the seven smaller metropolitan counties are part of the major media markets of the state. Where they are marginally in those major media markets cable television and individual antennas bring the media market to them.

Political campaigning will continue its emphasis on direct contact with potential voters through political ads on television and radio in these media markets. This has been clear in the recent elections in the state and we can only expect more in the future as the state and these metro areas and counties continue to grow. ■

→ SUBURBAN FROM PAGE 4

sprawl. As some smaller municipalities get annexed into larger cities, some of the other outlying small towns are morphing into exurban alternatives to the traditional suburbs. Meanwhile, some of the older suburbs are becoming small cities in their own right, with scaled-down business districts and city-away-from-the-city amenities. How you think of your community — rural, urban or suburban — has as much to do with not only where you live, but how long you've lived there.

Wake County, the second most populous county in the state and one of the fastest-growing, provides some interesting case studies. Cary, an older suburb of Raleigh, has seen its


population more than double since 1990 and is now the seventh largest city in the state. Holly Springs, a tiny town of barely 1,000 people in 1990, now has more than 12,000 residents, many of whom commute the short distance into Raleigh, Durham or Research Triangle Park. It is anyone's guess which residents in these two places consider themselves to be suburban.

Neither suburb voted the way the self-identified suburban voters did statewide. Rather, the two municipalities voted very much like the state did overall. Bush carried Cary precincts with just under 56 percent of the vote. Likewise, Easley won Cary with 56 percent. The voters in Holly Springs shifted only slightly in favor of the GOP,

where Bush bumped up to 59 percent and Easley dipped to 53 percent.

As Democrats continue to solidify their electoral base in the cities and Republicans continue to perform well in rural areas, the suburbs have emerged as a potent x-factor for electoral success in the state. Speaking at the New Strategies for Southern Progress conference that the Program co-hosted in February, Democratic consultant Mac McCorkle framed this urban-rural split thusly: "This is a lesson learned from Vietnam. You can't hold the cities and lose the countryside, and still win the war." Patches of North Carolina's countryside today just happen to include SUVs, strip malls, subdivisions and — somewhere in there — suburban voters. ■

Fourteen Highest-Voting Counties in the



The 20th and 21st Centuries NC Gubernatorial Ambition Ladder

Year	Rung	Governor, Party
1900	none	Charles Aycock, D
1904	SL	Robert Glenn, D
1908	CN	William Kitchin, D
1912	SL	Locke Craig, D
1916	AG	Thomas Bickett, D
1920	SL	Cameron Morrison, D
1924	none	Angus McLean, D
1928	LG	O. Max Gardner, D
1932	SL	J.C.B. Ehringhaus, D
1936	SL	Clyde Hoey, D
1940	SL	J. Melville Broughton, D
1944	SL	Gregg Cherry, D
1948	AC	Kerr Scott, D
1952	USS	William Umstead, D
1954	LG	Luther Hodges, D
1956	ING	Luther Hodges, D
1960	SL	Terry Sanford, D
1964	SJ	Dan Moore, D
1968	LG	Robert Scott, D
1972	SL	Jim Holshouser, R
1976	LG	Jim Hunt, D
1980	ING	Jim Hunt, D
1984	CN	Jim Martin, R
1988	ING	Jim Martin, R
1992	FG	Jim Hunt, D
1996	ING	Jim Hunt, D
2000	AG	Michael Easley, D
2004	ING	Michael Easley, D

NOTES: Rung: the most recent elected office held by the new governor. They are: AC – agriculture commissioner; AG – attorney general; CN – congressman; FG – former governor; ING – incumbent governor; LG – lieutenant governor; SJ – superior court judge; SL – state legislature; USS – US senator

SOURCES: *North Carolina Manual* [various years]; Beth Crabtree, *North Carolina Governors, 1585-1968* [Raleigh: State Department of Archives and History, 1968].

The 20th and 21st Centuries NC Gubernatorial Ambition Ladder: Last Elected Position Prior to Becoming Governor

Position	#	%
State Legislature	9	32
Incumbent governor	5	18
Lieutenant governor	4	14
Attorney General	2	7
US Congress	2	7
Agriculture Commissioner	1	4
Former governor	1	4
Superior Court judge	1	4
US Senator	1	4
No previous elected position	2	7
Total	28	100

Gubernatorial Partisan Voting in the 14 Largest Counties

Year	Democratic Vote	% ⁱ	Republican Vote	% ⁱⁱ	Winner, Party	NC Presidential Winner, Party
1900	43,283	23.2	28,454	22.5	Charles Aycock, D	Bryan, D
1920	88,337	28.7	61,092	26.5	Cameron Morrison, D	Cox, D
1940	213,852	35.1	52,029	26.6	Melville Broughton, D	Roosevelt, D
1960	264,986	36.0	265,572	43.3	Terry Sanford, D	Kennedy, D
1980	512,104	44.8	289,059	41.8	Jim Hunt, D	Reagan, R
2000	756,595	49.4	670,638	49.3	Michael Easley, D	Bush, R
2004	1,012,489	52.2	717,964	48.0	Michael Easley, D	Bush, R

SOURCES: N.C. State Board of Elections, *North Carolina Manual*, selected years.

NOTE: Data in this table represents the historical record on how the 14 top voting counties in the 2004 gubernatorial race voted in six other elections since 1900.

ⁱ Total Democratic gubernatorial vote in the 14 largest counties [by the 2000 Census], and the percent of the total Democratic gubernatorial NC vote this represents.

ⁱⁱ Total Republican gubernatorial vote in the 14 largest counties [by the 2000 Census], and the percent of the total Republican gubernatorial NC vote this represents.

2004 Governor's Race



Top Counties Vote in the 2004 Gubernatorial Race

	Total Vote	%	Dem Vote	%	Rep Vote	%
<i>Traditional Metropolitan Counties</i>						
Research Triangle ⁱ	522,704	15.0	331,145	17.1	183,205	12.3
Charlotte Metro ⁱⁱ	382,984	11.0	215,761	11.1	161,403	10.8
Piedmont Triad ⁱⁱⁱ	337,076	9.7	197,794	10.2	134,168	9.0
<i>Smaller Metropolitan Counties</i>						
Buncombe Co.	101,968	2.9	58,863	3.0	40,551	2.7
Cumberland Co.	95,864	2.7	59,168	3.1	35,229	2.4
New Hanover Co.	81,198	2.3	43,421	2.2	36,502	2.4
Cabarrus Co.	60,756	1.7	29,276	1.5	30,518	2.0
Union Co.	59,541	1.7	24,355	1.3	34,444	2.3
Davidson Co.	59,334	1.7	27,050	1.4	31,301	2.1
Catawba Co.	57,161	1.6	25,656	1.3	30,643	2.0
14 Metro Counties Total	1,758,586	50.4	1,012,489	52.2	717,964	48.0
86 Other Counties Total	1,728,102	49.6	926,665	47.8	777,057	52.0
100 Counties Total	3,486,688	100	1,939,154	55.6	1,495,021	42.9

NOTES:

ⁱ Durham, Orange and Wake counties

ⁱⁱ Gaston and Mecklenburg counties

ⁱⁱⁱ Forsyth and Guilford counties

Counties Accounting for More Than 50 Percent of the 2004 Presidential Vote

County	Total Votes	% Statewide Vote	County Winner	Victory Margin
1 Wake	348,844	9.96	Bush	7,415
2 Mecklenburg	323,102	9.23	Bush	11,744
3 Guilford	199,314	5.69	Kerry	1,788
4 Forsyth	139,125	3.97	Bush	11,954
5 Durham	109,651	3.13	Kerry	39,910
6 Buncombe	105,013	3.00	Bush	623
7 Cumberland	95,226	2.72	Bush	3,351
8 New Hanover	81,247	2.32	Bush	9,779
9 Orange	64,153	1.83	Kerry	22,139
10 Gaston	63,714	1.82	Bush	22,998
11 Union	61,001	1.74	Bush	24,846
12 Cabarrus	60,824	1.74	Bush	20,977
13 Davidson	59,496	1.70	Bush	24,884
14 Catawba	58,688	1.68	Bush	20,744
14 Counties Total	1,769,398	50.54	Bush: 11 Kerry: 3	Bush 95,478
Other 86 Counties Total	1,674,636	49.46	Bush: 69 Kerry: 17	Bush 339,839

NOTES: In analyzing past statewide elections, we found that it took the 15 highest-voting counties to comprise a majority of the total votes cast statewide. In 2004, the 14 highest-voting counties accounted for nearly 51 percent of the statewide total. The list of highest-voting counties does not match up perfectly with the list of most populous counties in the state. Orange County, only the 22nd-most populous county, cast the 9th highest number of votes. Onslow County, the 10th-most populous county, was not among the highest-voting counties.

In Legislative Races, Media Spending Matters

JOAN GANDY, graduate student, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

UNC graduate student Joan Gandy conducted an analysis of campaign financial reports as part of her master's thesis research. The following article pulls from her thesis paper.

Even in state legislative races, votes don't come cheap these days. North Carolina House campaigns have become increasingly expensive, making challengers harder to find. These expanding costs and a reduction in competitive districts, due to redistricting, almost guarantee victory for House incumbents and defeat for their opponents.

Despite soaring costs and poor odds for non-incumbents, the potential for turnover in the North Carolina House exists under the right conditions. House of Representative hopefuls can improve their long odds by spending more money in selective districts at the politically right time. In the past four years, by campaigning strategically, fresh faces have filled almost half of the 120 seats in the North Carolina House.

Rising Costs


The median price tag on a state House seat in 2000 was 2.1 times as great as the median price in 1992 after adjustments for inflation, according to an analysis of campaign finance

reports filed by the candidates with the North Carolina Board of Elections. In 1992, a candidate for the state House of Representatives would have had to raise \$14,556 to reach the median cost of a campaign at that time. By 2000, the same candidate could expect to spend \$30,694 on the campaign trail.

Since a few big spenders skew the average cost of House campaigns, the median is a more appropriate figure.

While the increase is less dramatic for non-presidential election years, the costs have also climbed. In 1990, the median cost of a campaign was \$17,647, about \$7,400 less than in 2002. In all, the median price of campaigning rose 42.1 percent during these four election

N.C. General Assembly: Incumbent Spending and Election Rates



SOURCE: Analysis of N.C. State Board of Elections candidate campaign finance reports

cycles, after adjusting for inflation.

As the cost of campaigning rose in presidential election years from 1990 to 2002, media expenditures by candidates escalated at an even greater rate. In 2000, median media expenditures by candidates, which include expenses such as television, radio and print advertising, were 2.4 times as great as the same expenditures in 1992, after adjustments for inflation.

While these increases are substantial, they are not part of every campaign. With many districts designed to be safe Republican or Democratic territory, it is the swing and leaning districts that experience the most competition and the biggest spending.

Spending and odds of election

While incumbents may have an easier time raising money, in general, more spending by an incumbent candidate does not lead to greater success at the ballot box. In every election cycle from 1992 to 2004, incumbents who spent between \$1 and \$10,000 were re-elected 100 percent of the time. However, success rates for incumbents spending greater than \$50,000 varied from as high as 100 percent in 1992 to as low as 45.5 percent in 1994.

While this may appear counterintuitive, incumbents spend more money when they are facing tough competition. When incumbents are safe, they tend not to spend as much money on their own campaigns. Conversely, challengers who have the best chances of winning receive more contributions from the political parties and other candidates, giving them cash to spend and forcing incumbents to spend more.

N.C. General Assembly: Total Media Costs, 1990–2002



Costs were adjusted for inflation

SOURCE: Analysis of N.C. State Board of Elections candidate campaign finance reports

SEE PRICETAGS ON PAGE 9 →

The Ambition Ladders for NC Governors

THAD BEYLE, Pearsall professor of political science, UNC-Chapel Hill

Since 1900, the state has had 27 gubernatorial elections and one “accidental governor,” who moved up from the lieutenant governor’s chair upon the death of the governor. Twenty-three separate individuals have served as governor over this period. This article explores the patterns of how these individuals reached their position from the perspective of the last rung on the political ladder they used to reach the office.

How they got there

One theory about how individuals achieve this elective position is that there is a “state office route” to the governorship. [See Joseph Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States*, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966].

Seventeen of the 28 governors reached that goal by using the “state office route.” Nine used a position in the state legislature as their launching pad, while 13 others used a separately elected state-wide office as their launching pad, including five who ran as

incumbent governors seeking another term. Only three of the 28 used “the federal office” route of moving from a US Senatorial or Congressional seat to the office, while two other governors had no previous electoral experience. All but one of these governors came to the governorship by election. Luther Hodges [D, 1954] was the lone “accidental governor” who moved into the seat upon the death of incumbent William Umstead-D.

How long they stayed there

Governors could only serve one four-year term prior to the adoption of a Constitutional Amendment in 1977 allowing the possibility of serving a second, consecutive four-year term. Therefore, the average length of service for the 19 governors serving between 1900 and 1976 was four years. Since the 1977 amendment was passed, Jim Hunt-D [1977-85, 1993-2001], has been the longest serving governor at 16 years, followed by Jim Martin-R [1985-1993] at eight years and Mike Easley, who can serve to 2009. Before the 1977 change, Luther Hodges [1954-61]

had the longest tenure at six years, two months, while the shortest serving governor was William Umstead who died only one year and 10 months after being sworn in [1953-54].

What is next?

Only one attorney general had moved on to the governorship, Thomas Bickett-D in 1916, until Mike Easley’s election in 2000. The 2004 election saw NC voters re-elect incumbent Gov. Mike Easley-D as he became the fourth straight governor to be re-elected to a second term following the adoption of the two-term amendment in 1977. And State Senator Patrick Ballantine, the Republican candidate, was coming off holding a leadership position in the state legislature. So, both of the major party candidates rode a trend of the past in seeking the governorship in this year’s election, but the power of being an incumbent seeking re-election again proved to be too hard to beat. Come 2008, the new governor game starts anew as there will be an open seat with no incumbent in the race. ■

→ PRICETAGS FROM PAGE 8

While increased spending by incumbents can be a sign of a campaign in danger, greater expenditures by challengers is one indication of possible Election Day victory. The best odds a challenger spending less than \$10,000 could hope for between 1992 and 2002 were less than three out of 10. However, a sure fire way to improve those odds, no matter what the election year, was to spend money. Six out of 10 challengers who spent more than \$50,000 campaigning were elected to office in 2002, compared with two out of 10 who spent between \$1 and \$10,000 on their campaign.

For challengers, spending money on media expenses is imperative to winning campaigns. From 1992 to 2002 only two challengers out of 46 who spent nothing on media expenditures ran winning campaigns. Although only 22 incumbents during the same time period had no media expenditures, they were all elected to office.

The best bet for a challenger is to spend more than \$20,000 on media.

Even with better odds for those challengers spending more on media, during the past 10 years challengers’ odds of winning plunged.


In 1992, 71.4 percent of challengers spending more than \$20,000 won, compared to only 34.3 percent in 2000. The same trend is true for challengers spending less on media, too.

Despite this downward trend, in 2002, challengers experienced a spike in election rates. While not back up to the 1992 levels, in 2002, 60.6 percent of challengers spending more than \$20,000 won a state House seat. Challengers in other spending categories also saw a leap in their odds of winning. Challengers who spent between \$8,500 and \$20,000 won 41.2 percent of the time. In addition, 41.2 percent of challengers spending between \$3,000 and \$8,500 were elected, up more than 20 percentage points from 2000.

In the end it might look like a lot of percentages,

but candidates know that the numbers matter. Whether dealing with the demographics of a district, allocation of resources or raising of money, correct calculations can make the difference between winning and losing. ■

N.C. General Assembly: Challenger Media Expenditures and Election Rates



SOURCE: Analysis of N.C. State Board of Elections candidate campaign finance reports

TV Ad Inflation Drives Campaign Spending

MICHAEL EASLEY JR., UNC-CH junior

When running a statewide campaign, it is essential for candidates to raise enough money to get their message to all corners of the state. Though it has become less effective in recent years, television advertising is still one of the best ways for campaigns to saturate their message. As efficiency has decreased, television advertising has become an increasing percentage of campaign expenditure, and it is changing the context of North Carolina elections.

Media analysts divide North Carolina into six main media markets from east to west, and the costs of each of these markets have a lot to do with how voters are targeted. The markets are Greenville-New Bern-Washington, Wilmington, Raleigh-Durham, Greensboro-High Point-Winston Salem, Charlotte and Asheville-Greenville-Spartanburg. As the price of media buys in these markets has increased, so too have the costs of campaigns. A very noticeable increase has taken place in these markets since the 2000 election.

This cost increase is visible through the analysis of estimated 'costs per point.' Units of television time are divided up into 'points.' To buy one point means that 1 percent of the TV households in a market will see the ad. Similarly, to buy 100 points means, in an ideal world, that 100 percent of TV households in a given market will see the ad. The job of a campaign's media consultant is to determine the number of points to purchase per week in which markets, and what it will cost to penetrate those markets. Changes in estimated costs per point for each of the six main media markets are featured below. A quick look at the table shows that on average costs increased 37 percent in the last four years,

a big increase in a big chunk of North Carolina campaign expenditure.

The true cost of these increases are even better understood when we begin to consider an estimate of how many points are needed per week per market to 'penetrate' statewide. Media consultant estimates suggest an average of 800 to 1000 points per week per market. An ad buy of 1000 points means that each targeted voter will, ideally, see the ad 10 times in a week, the standard for advertisers. This leaves statewide candidates spending about \$620,000 per week, on what cost only \$461,000 just 4 years ago.

Increased cost also leads to decreased emphasis on less efficient markets, like Asheville, which spills over into parts of South Carolina. This inefficiency is best illustrated by the market's high cost per ad per voter, \$0.039, the highest cost of any of the major markets. This leads to decreased emphasis on this market's 263,122 voters and more emphasis on markets like Raleigh where there are 843,526 votes to be won at a cost of only \$0.019 per ad per voter. Asheville's cost seems low, however, compared to some of the even smaller markets, which are neglected all together. Clay County, part of the Atlanta market, is an example. Clay County only holds 3,936 voters with a \$322 cost per point, yielding a cost of \$8.18 per ad per voter. The costs per ad per voter for the six main markets are as follows.

When candidates buy television time, they are essentially buying name identification, a fundamental good for any campaign. As the cost of name identification continues to increase,

there will be certain consequences in the pool of possible candidates for statewide office. Basic economics teaches us that as the cost of entering a business increases, such barriers to entry result in decreased competition. It is most likely that those aspiring candidates from rural counties will unfortunately be the casualties of these barriers to entry.

Statewide politics is on the road to being reserved exclusively for (a) those who are already well known with strong name identification, (b) those with a wealth of personal money to pour into buying name identification, or (c) those who come from a strong financial base like Charlotte or Raleigh. Someone from a rural county, without the strong foundation of a wealthy financial base behind them, will have a more difficult time entering and maintaining themselves in the campaign process than ever before. This increasing cost is good news for incumbents and those with the funds necessary to play the game, but bad news for those aspiring candidates who reside in any of North Carolina's 85 rural counties.

The definite impact of these increasing costs on the context of North Carolina elections is not yet known, but it can be predicted that it is trending towards further excluding less efficient markets from the political process, as campaigns are forced to allocate scarce funds most efficiently. It can also be predicted that the prospective candidates these cost increases will hurt will be average people, in rural counties, without name identification and without large sums of personal money. ■

Growth of NC Registered Voters, 1968–2004

Year	Total NC Registered Voters	% Growth Over Last Election	% Growth Over 1968 Election
1968	2,077,538	N/A	N/A
1972	2,357,645	+13.8	+ 13.8
1976	2,553,717	+ 8.3	+ 22.9
1980	2,774,844	+ 8.7	+ 33.6
1984	3,270,933	+17.9	+ 57.4
1988	3,432,042	+ 4.9	+ 65.2
1992	3,817,380	+11.2	+ 83.7
1996	4,330,657	+13.4	+108.5
2000	5,122,123	+18.3	+146.5
2004	5,519,992	+ 7.8	+165.7

SOURCE: NC State Board of Elections data

Changes in Estimated Costs Per Point in Six NC Media Markets

Market	Estimated CPP\$ 2000	Estimated CPP\$ 2004	% Change
Charlotte	132.00	177.00	+34.1
Greensboro	66.00	89.00	+34.9
Greenville	34.00	55.00	+61.8
Asheville	84.00	102.00	+21.4
Raleigh	120.00	164.00	+36.7
Wilmington	25.00	33.00	+32.0

SOURCE: Saul Shorr and Associates

Costs of Ads in the Six Main Media Markets in NC

Market	Estimated CPP\$ 2004	2000 General Election Voters	\$ Cost per ad per voter
Charlotte	177.00	772,642	0.023
Greensboro	89.00	580,891	0.012
Greenville	55.00	225,703	0.024
Asheville	102.00	263,122	0.039
Raleigh	164.00	843,526	0.019
Wilmington	33.33	139,488	0.024

SOURCE: Saul Shorr and Associates

Job Approval Ratings and Incumbent Re-Elections

THAD BEYLE, Pearsall professor of political science, UNC-Chapel Hill

One proposition that political consultants often suggest is that when an elected official's positive job approval ratings drop below 50 percent, that incumbent may be in political trouble in a re-election bid. With the number of public opinion polls being conducted in the states, it is possible to test this proposition to see if and when it holds true. Here we will test it in North Carolina.

The 13 incumbents seeking reelection since the 1980 elections in NC for which there are such job approval ratings are listed in the accompanying table. There were four presidents [Reagan, 1984; Bush, 1992; Clinton, 1996, Bush, 2004], five US senators [Helms, 1984, 1990, 1996; Sanford, 1992; Faircloth, 1998], and four governors [Hunt 1980, 1996; Martin, 1988; Easley, 2004]. Unfortunately, there aren't such NC poll results for President Carter and Senator Morgan [1980], or for incumbents prior to 1980.

These 13 incumbents' positive job approval ratings ranged from a high of 73 percent for Gov. Jim Hunt toward the end of his first term to a low of 36 percent for President Bill Clinton at the end of his first term. Seven of them had ratings above the 50 percent mark, and each won re-election to office.

Six of them had ratings below the 50 percent mark, and they had a 3-3 won-loss record in their re-election bids. Those incumbents for whom the consultant's proposition was true were senators Terry Sanford [43 percent rating — lost in 1992] and Lauch Faircloth [47 percent rating — lost in 1998], and President Bill Clinton [36 percent rating — lost NC in 1996]. Those who overcame the consultant's proposition were Sen. Jesse Helms [45 percent rating — won in 1984 and 1990] and President George Bush [44 percent rating — won NC in 1992].

Also of interest in this table is that the 50 percent mark relates to another pattern. All the incumbents but Sen. Helms [1996] and George W. Bush [2004] with job ratings above 50 percent saw their actual vote percentage come in lower than their job performance ratings. While two of the incumbents with job performance ratings below the 50 percent mark achieved identical actual vote percentages [Faircloth, 1998; Bush, 1992], the other four incumbents below the 50 percent mark achieved a higher actual vote percentage on Election Day. So, job approval ratings do not equal voting day ratings.

Why? There are at least two separate reasons. First, the polls are "snapshots in time" of how

those surveyed rated an incumbent's performance. They probably had not been even thinking about what this question asked of them. On Election Day, voters are much more likely to have had this question on their minds. Second, the samples involved are quite different. In the 30 statewide polls involved here, seven were samples of adults, seven were samples of regis-

tered voters, and 16 were samples of likely voters. The results on Election Day were 100 percent samples of actual voters.

We won't be able to test this proposition again until the 2008 and 2010 elections when the two newly elected US Senators will possibly seek re-election. ■

Job Approval Ratings and Incumbent Re-Elections in NC, 1980–2004

Political Consultant's Proposition: If an incumbent's positive job approval ratings in the polls drop below 50%, the incumbent is in political trouble.

Year	Incumbent, Party	Race	Pos. Job Approval Ratings	Actual Vote & Outcome	Difference Between Ratings And Vote
1980	Hunt, D	G	73 ⁱ	62 W	-11
1984	Reagan, R	P	63 ⁱⁱ	61 W	- 2
1996	Hunt, D	G	63 ⁱⁱⁱ	56 W	- 7
1988	Martin, R	G	61 ^{iv}	56 W	- 5
2004	Easley, D	G	57 ^v	56 W	- 1
2004	Bush, R	P	51 ^{vi}	56 W	+ 5
1996	Helms, R	S	51 ^{vii}	53 W	+ 2
1998	Faircloth, R	S	47 ^{viii}	47 L	None
1990	Helms, R	S	45 ^{ix}	53 W	+ 8
1984	Helms, R	S	45 ^x	52 W	+ 7
1992	Bush, R	P	44 ^{xi}	44 W	None
1992	Sanford, D	S	43 ^{xii}	46 L	+ 3
1996	Clinton, D	P	36 ^{xiii}	44 L	+ 8

KEY:

Race: P = presidential race; S = US senatorial race; G = gubernatorial race

Pos. Job Approval Ratings, election year: Average of positive job approval ratings in statewide public opinion polls during the election year, or of the most recent polls prior to the election year if no election year polls are available. Positive = excellent/good; approve, etc.

Actual Vote: The incumbent's actual vote percent in that year's election;

W/L pts: Did the incumbent win/lose that election in the state.

Type of sample: ads = adults; lvs = likely voters; rvs = registered voters.

Rating Scale: app = approve; exg = excellent, good; expg = excellent, pretty good; g = good.

NOTES:

ⁱ UNC Carolina Polls, April 1979, 512 ads [73% g] and October 1979, 611 ads [73% g].

ⁱⁱ UNC Carolina Poll, April 1984, 1212 ads [63% exg].

ⁱⁱⁱ Mason-Dixon Polls, September 1996, 815 lvs [61% exg] and October 1996, 812 lvs [53% exg]; News & Observer/FGI Poll, October 1976, 607 lvs [74% exg].

^{iv} Independent Opinion Research Polls, March 1988, 383 rvs? [60% exg] and September 1988, 806 rvs? [62% exg]; Mason-Dixon Poll, April 1988, 834 lvs [62% exg]; Charlotte Observer Poll, May 1988, 769 ads [58% exg].

^v Research 2000 Poll, September 2004, 600 rvs [57% exg].

^{vi} Research 2000 Poll, September 2004, 600 rvs [51% exg], Elon University Poll, September 2004, 494 rvs [51% app.].

^{vii} Mason-Dixon Polls, February 1996, 844 lvs [51 exg] and September 1996, 815 lvs [53% exg]; News & Observer/FGI Poll, October 1996, 607 lvs [53% app].

^{viii} Mason-Dixon Polls, March 1998, 805 lvs [43% exg] and July 1998, 829 lvs [50% exg].

^{ix} Mason-Dixon Poll, February 1990, 849 rvs [49% exg]; KPC Charlotte Observer Polls, April 1990, 843 rvs [49% exg], September 1990, 401 lvs [44 exg?], and October 1990, 595 lvs [36% exg].

^x UNC Carolina Polls, April 1983, 599 ads [47% exg?] and October 1983, 582 ads [42% exg].

^{xi} UNC Carolina Poll, February 1992, 621 ads, [44% app].

^{xii} Mason-Dixon Polls, February 1992, 810 lvs [45% exg] and April 1992, 832 lvs [41% exg].

^{xiii} Mason-Dixon Polls, February 1996, 844 lvs [37% exg], September 1996, 815 lvs [35% exg], and October 1996, 812 lvs [37% exg].

SOURCES: Election data from *The Almanac of American Politics* [various years]. Polling data from www.unc.edu/~beyle.



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